Jeannine Dorroh, sr. accountant at Southern Research in Birmingham, is the eyewitness who saw Mike McGarity attack and assault me with a roadside sign

Jeannine Dorroh

Jeannine Dorroh lives in Birmingham, AL, and is a senior accountant at Southern Research (SR). She lives in Broken Bow South, the same Shelby County neighborhood where Carol and I lived for 25 years.

Dorroh was pulling her vehicle out of the neighborhood one morning when she looked to her left and saw Mike McGarity, our neighbor with a lengthy criminal record, strike me in the back with a roadside sign. Dorroh's window was rolled up, and I didn't want to scare her by walking up to her vehicle after she had seen such an unusual event. I mouthed the words, "Did you see that?" and she nodded her head yes.

As I was walking away from the neighborhood entrance/exit, I noted her license-plate number and wrote it down as soon as I got home. I called the Shelby County Sheriff's Office, and a deputy soon arrived at our house to take a report of what McGarity had done. The deputy said he had spoken with McGarity and received a radically different version of events from mine.

I rolled up my sweatshirt to show him the bleeding welt on my back. "I didn't put that there myself," I said. I also informed the deputy of an eyewitness and gave him the license-plate number I had jotted down.

We obtained a copy of the deputy's report a few days later, and it included Jeannine Dorroh's name and address, which was a couple of streets over from ours. I called her one evening, explained who I was, and she was kind enough to state what she saw and express concern about my well-being. I told her I was going to be OK, but explained our difficulties with McGarity in the past, and this was just an extension of those.

Mike McGarity

I tape-recorded the conversation and have her statement, word for word. (A video with our phone conversation is embedded at the end of this post.) When you hear her voice, and learn about her background, it becomes clear this is a highly intelligent woman who is used to dealing in details. I would put her word up against Mike McGarity's any day of the week. Here is how our conversation began:

Roger Shuler (RS): I was the guy I think you saw get hit in the back with the sign the other morning . . . .

Jeannine Dorroh (JD): I told the officer what I saw. He came to my house and I gave my statement.

RS: We've had problems with this guy, he lives next door to us . . . It's a long-running thing; It's not been much fun.

JD: I looked out the window (of my vehicle) and I saw you two conversing, and all of a sudden you were walking away, and the other gentleman hit you in the back of the head. (He actually struck me in the upper back, but from Dorroh's vantage point, it probably looked like the blow landed on the back of my head.) I was shocked when I saw that. First, I thought you were joking, and then I saw it wasn't a joke. Then, you came up to my window, and said, "You saw that?," and I said, "Yes, yes I did. . . .

RS: I appreciate you being honest about it.

JD: Are you OK?

RS: I've got quite a welt on my back. If you have a second, I can tell you what caused the whole deal. . . . As you know weeds grow high down there, and it's hard to see, and people put up signs that aren't supposed to be there. It's against the law to put a sign in a state right-of- way, and it makes it hard to see when you pull out. So I went down there to remove the signs, and he followed me. He follows me and my wife. He started putting the signs back up, and I said, "Mike, those signs are gong to come down. It's against the law, and I can't see around them. He started saying, "I'm going to fight you" and called me names, and I shot back a thing or two, but didn't threaten him, and I started walking away, and you saw what he did.

With Jeannine Dorroh's help, we've established what really happened. We've also learned that McGarity resorted to his natural instincts and lied to the deputy who took a report. That's not a surprise to Carol and me because we've seen McGarity lie under oath in court.

Jeannine Dorroh pretty much puts the kibosh on McGarity's efforts to sell a phony story. We will address that issue in an upcoming post.

As we've reported previously, McGarity works in operation services at Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama (BCBSAL), and he has a lengthy criminal record, which includes at least eight convictions. (All convictions that we have found are misdemeanors, although several are offenses that involve  violence or sex.) In this most recent incident, McGarity committed a felony assault and filed a false report with a law-enforcement officer, although neither was prosecuted. (More on that in upcoming posts.)

Does BCBSAL care that one of its employees engages in such unsavory and dangerous behavior, while having a sketchy record that pre-dates his employment at the company? We posed several questions about McGarity -- including whether he disclosed his criminal history on his job application -- to Koko Mackin, vice president of corporate communications at BCBSAL. She has not responded to our queries.

We take that to mean the company does not care about such issues.


(To be continued)

Personnel from Burrell Behavioral Health claim in 911 call that I threatened to shoot evicting deputies, but that is contrary to notes in their own medical records

Burrell Behavioral Health

I threatened to shoot any Missouri sheriff's deputy who attempted to evict Carol and me back in 2015, according to the statements of two Burrell Behavioral Health employees in a 911 call they made. Mental-health workers might get their jollies from spreading such rubbish, but when the story is not true -- and this one wasn't, on multiple grounds -- it becomes a problem, both for the patient and the entity that violated his rights to medical confidentiality.

In this instance, I obviously knew the Burrell employees' statements were untrue, but I only heard the 911 call via limited discovery we received in the bogus "assault on a law enforcement officer" case brought against my wife, Carol.

Had the Burrell folks bothered to check their own records, they would have learned: (1) My lawyer-brother, David Shuler, called a Burrell supervisor and concocted the "threaten to shoot" story without providing any evidence that I actually said that; in fact, David is one of the last people on earth with whom I would discuss such a subject, or any subject of substance; (2) Records from my caregiver, a psychiatric nurse named Matt Charles, show I never made such a statement to him, and he repeatedly describes me as "not having suicidal or homicidal thoughts."

We learn about a level of coordination between my brother and certain Burrell employees that is downright devious. The Burrell personnel had every reason to know my brother was lying, and they had no lawful grounds to speak to him anyway.

How did Burrell case manager Joshua Davis and social worker Kathryn Mays (she was whispering in Davis' ear throughout the 911 call) come up with such a tale? For one, they admit near the end of the 911 call that my "relatives" (which is shorthand for David) called Burrell with the allegation that I had threatened to shoot eviction-minded cops. (Video of the 911 call is embedded at the end of this post.)

They also admit that someone at Burrell talked to David, even though we had rescinded our release that allowed them to communicate with any of my family members. We did that after Mays reported to us that David called and claimed I had asked him to call her. I never asked David to call her, and we knew then that he was pulling the kind of con games for which lawyers have become known.

In other words, we had reported David as an unreliable source of information about us, but Burrell personnel apparently took his words as gospel and placed the 911 call. That caused Greene County Sheriff's Office (GCSO) deputies to arrive for our eviction with a squadron of officers (6 to 8, at least), armed with assault rifles, handguns, and all sorts of weaponry that could have gotten us killed.

Did Davis and Mays intentionally spread false information via the 911 system? They say in the call that Mays had last seen me during an appointment with Matt Charles on August 4, 2015 -- and I threatened on that date to go all Rambo against cops. They also claim I had a gun, even though (at the time) I had never owned a gun, other than a BB gun I received as a Christmas gift when I was about age 12.

Now, let's compare the Davis/Mays 911 statements against Matt Charles' notes in my medical records from that appointment on 8/4/15 (five days before our eviction):

Progress Note

MRN: 151401

PATIENT: Roger Shuler

DATE OF BIRTH: 11/25/56

Date of service: 08/04/15

Time of service: 10:10 am. to 10:33 a.m.

Service Code: 9214


CHIEF COMPLAINT:

Follow-up for medication management


HISTORY OF PRESENT ILLNESS:

Patient reports that he has been feeling okay since his last visit. He states that "nothing much has changed." He reports that his mood has been good and he has been sleeping well at night. He denies having suicidal or homicidal thoughts. He denies any problems with anxiety or panic. He denies hallucinations.

Patient continues to be preoccupied with legal issues. He states that his current landlord has been causing problems for him and his wife. He states that their lease recently expired, and they have not signed a new lease. He is under the impression that the lease was to go month to month at this point; however, he is not certain his landlord is going to want him to stay there. [Note: I had the month-to-month "impression" because that's what the lease said.] He is concerned that his mother and brother have "said things about me and my wife" to the landlord and that they are going to try to evict him.

Patient has some difficulty describing the details of the situation. Patient continues to perseverate on the issues that occurred in Alabama. He reports that he is unwilling to go through another situation such as that, where he was "harassed by the police and their goons." He states that he would protect himself if this ever were to occur again. He is very evasive when asked about what he means by "protecting himself." 

Does Matt Charles say I threatened to shoot anyone? No. Does he say I had a gun? No. Does he say my brother, David Shuler, had called Burrell with the "threaten to shoot" story? Yes, he does -- in an update the next day, 8/5/15 -- as we reported in an earlier post. Does he note any evidence to suggest David's story is remotely true, or that Burrell had any lawful grounds to communicate with David? Nope.

For the most part, I think Matt Charles gives a pretty fair summary of things at that time. But I do take issue with at least three items. It's possible that the medical-records process at many facilities is much more sloppy, and much less accurate, than most of us would like to think:

(1) Charles states: "Patient has some difficulty describing the details of the situation." Given adequate time, I had no problem describing "the details of the situation," as I've done on this blog numerous times. As you can tell from the time stamp on Charles' notes, our meetings usually lasted 15 to 20 minutes. I did not have time to go into great detail about a complex tenant-landlord situation, and I don't recall Charles asking for a lot of details. I did make it clear that the the planned eviction was unlawful, but did Charles seem interested in details about the law? Not that I could tell, and I didn't have time to tell him anyway.

(2) Charles states: "[Patient] is very evasive when asked about what he means by 'protecting himself.'" This came near the end of our session, and I did not have time to go into details. Also, I was -- in my view -- being honest, not evasive. I didn't know what we could do to protect ourselves, but Charles' own account indicates it did not involve a gun or shooting anyone. I think it's axiomatic that a homeowner (or renter) is entitled to protect himself against unlawful intruders, which the cops were going to be, in this instance. If I'd had more time, I likely would have tried to explain the legal options we had, including filing a notice of appeal that would have put an automatic stay on execution. In fact, that is what we did, but cops ignored the stay and evicted anyway -- breaking Carol's arm in the process.  In other words, the cops acted just as unlawfully as we had feared they would.

(3) Charles states: "Patient continues to perseverate on the issues that occurred in Alabama." Perseverate is a fancy verb that means "to repeat or prolong an action, thought, or utterance after the stimulus that prompted it has ceased." In my case, a simple way of saying it would be that I "continued to think about certain key events in Alabama after they had happened." As regular readers know, those events included my unlawful arrest (for blogging) and incarceration of five months, the loss of our home of 25 years to a wrongful foreclosure, and a forced move to Missouri (where certain of my family members proved they had developed into backstabbers.) Does Matt Charles think we are supposed to have a robotic reaction to such jarring events? We are supposed to snap our fingers and forget about trauma that creeps into our lives? After all, I already had been diagnosed with PTSD (by a physician) for a reason. Matt Charles left Burrell a few months after this appointment, but I really would like to ask him, "What does your use of the term 'perseverate' mean? Do you think it's abnormal to continue thinking about traumatic, life-altering events after they happened -- even when the victim knows the events happened way outside the law? Is the war veteran supposed to 'switch off'' memories of horrific scenes he might have witnessed?" As for me, I would be concerned about the sanity (and maybe the honesty) of anyone who claimed they could switch off thoughts about such events.

Charles describes me throughout his notes as "not homicidal," so I'm not sure why the "protecting himself" comment would raise concerns about any activity outside the law. And, in fact, the record is clear that Carol and I acted within the law 100 percent.

The finances of federal judge Gerald Bard Tjoflat are all tied up with JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America, but that does not keep him from hearing cases involving those parties -- and ruling in their favor

Gerald Bard Tjoflat

How does a federal judge get away with unlawfully ruling on cases where he has a financial stake in one of the parties? Gerald Bard Tjoflat, an 89-year-old geezer from the Richard Nixon/Gerald Ford era, still serves on the U.S. Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Atlanta (covering Alabama, Georgia, and Florida), and his hatchet job on "The House Case" -- where we lost of our home of almost 25 years in Birmingham via a wrongful foreclosure -- provides a classic example of how ethically bankrupt our federal courts have become.

One of the basics of American law is this: A federal judge automatically is disqualified from hearing a case in which he or an immediate family member has a financial interest. But our research shows Tjoflat has been hearing such cases for decades -- almost always ruling in favor of his own pocket book.

That was the situation in "The House Case," where one of the defendants was Chase Mortgage, which held the mortgage on our home. We are aware of at least one other such case, involving an alleged wrongful foreclosure, where a three-judge panel led by Tjoflat ruled against a Daphne,, AL couple named Karun and Ursula Jackson -- while ruling in favor of the Jacksons' mortgage company, Bank of America (BOA).

How does this happen? The decision on whether to hear a case often is left to the crooked judge himself -- with little or no oversight waiting in the wings. We invite you to follow us on the money trail for details about how Gerald Bard Tjoflat has made a habit of scamming the American people, especially those who live in the Deep South.

The money trail begins with Tjoflat's financial disclosure forms, One of the most recent disclosure forms we can find on the Web for Tjoflat is from 2012. It shows he has investments in the following entities:

(1) Alliance Bernstein Global Techology (Mutual Fund)

(2) Columbia Marsico Focused Equities Fund (Mutual Fund)

(3) Manulife Financial (401K)

(4) Quaker Strategic Growth Fund (Mutual Fund)

(5) Merrill Lynch Wealth Management (401K)

(6) Rogers, Towers, Bailey, Jones and Gay P.A.(401K)

What holdings are included in these financial instruments? Let's take a look:


(1) AllianceBernstein (AB) Global Technology -- This instrument now is called the AB Global Thematic Growth Fund, and a 2014 document from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) shows it has a forward currency exchange contract with JPMorgan Chase Bank. In 2017, AB picked long-time JPM Chase executive Seth Bernstein as its CEO

(2) Columbia Marsico Focused Equities Fund -- A report from Kiplinger's says two of this fund's largest positions are in JPMorgan Chase and Vestas Wind Systems of Denmark. This fund also is intimately connected to Bank of America, with founder Thomas Marsico buying the firm back from BOA in 2007, seven years after selling it to the No. 2 U.S. bank.

(3) Manulife Financial (401K) -- Manulife, based in Toronto and operating as John Hancock in the United States, issued a $750-million U.S. public offering in 2017. JPMorgan Securities LLC acted as one of the joint book-running managers for the offering.

(4) Quaker Strategic Growth Fund -- According to MarketWatch, JPMorgan Chase is among this fund's top 10 holdings. According to mutualfunds.com, Bank of America also is among the fund's top holdings.

(5) Merrill Lynch Wealth Management -- According to brightscope.com, Bank of America is the largest fund in this plan.

(6)  Rogers, Towers, Bailey, Jones and Gay P.A. -- This appears to be a retirement fund for a Florida-based law fim, and information about the fund does not appear to be publicly available.


The public record is clear: Judge Gerald Bard Tjoflat's finances are tied up with JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America -- and it's hard to imagine he does not know it. Does that keep him from hearing cases involving those two parties? Nope. Does it keep him from ruling in favor of those two parties? Definitely not -- and we have the evidence to prove it.


(To be continued)

Audio of 911 call reveals my lawyer-brother David Shuler concocted story about "threats" toward cops, and Burrell Health spoke to him against our wishes

Burrell Behavioral Health

A 911 call that I supposedly made, threatening to shoot any sheriff's deputy who tried to evict Carol and me, actually came from an administrator at Burrell Behavioral Health -- a guy I never had met. The call was based on statements from my lawyer-brother David Shuler and not on anything I said.

In other words, my brother put his words in my mouth, made the whole "threat" story up, and caused a bevy of cops to barge into our home with assault rifles and handguns -- damned near getting Carol and me killed. And yet, the words I've repeatedly heard about David's efforts are that "he's just trying to help."

A copy of the 911 call, obtained in discovery for the bogus "assault" case against Carol, shows David has a strange way of helping. (A video of the 911 call is embedded at the end of this post.) And get this: We had cancelled any releases allowing David (or any other family member) to speak with Burrell personnel -- and we did that after catching him in an earlier lie.

In other words, Burrell had no lawful grounds to talk to David, and case manager Joshua Davis admits that on the 911 call. Burrell spoke with David anyway, violating our directive and probably violating state and federal law, and apparently placed a wildly defamatory 911 call at his insistence.

Joshua Davis is the primary voice from Burrell heard on the 911 call, although Kathryn Mays, a social worker who had been assigned to my case, can be heard whispering to him through the phone line. I've never met Joshua Davis and spoke with him briefly via phone one time. So, where did he get this misinformation about me? It apparently all came from David, my brother.

Did anyone at Burrell bother to check with me, to see if David's story was remotely accurate, if I had spoken with him about cops and evictions and guns? No, they did not ask me a thing about communications with David, and no, I did not talk with him about any of those subjects.

We had canceled our releases for David and other family members after Katherine Mays told me that David had called her, saying I'd asked him to do so. I told her that was a flat-out lie, and we immediately withdrew permission for Burrell to speak with him.

Did Burrell trample my patient rights by speaking with someone I had withdrawn permission for them to speak with -- and then placing a 911 call filled with false information, at my brother's insistence? It sure looks that way to me -- and it's all on the 911 call.

At 4:11 on the video below, Joshua Davis (with Kathryn Mays whispering information in his ear) had the following conversation with a 911 dispatcher named Maggie:

Maggie: When was the last time you talked with him (me)?

Josh: My caseworker is sitting here with me, she talked with him on 8/4/15 . . .

Maggie: That's when he said this?

Josh (w/ helpful whispers from Kathryn Mays): He said that, and he's also made threats to relatives, I believe, and they called and wanted to let us know and that would have been Aug. 6-7.

Maggie: The relatives called you?

Josh: Yes. We couldn't really speak to them because we don't have any releases, but we did make a hotline call to the Department of Mental Health.

Maggie: What hotline was it?

Josh: The Department of Health and Senior Services.

Maggie: I do have some contacts, if you would like that after they [cops] talk to him . . .

Josh: Do you have any other questions?

Maggie: Do you have Roger's phone number?

Josh: (205) 381-5673.

Did anyone from the Greene County Sheriff's Office bother to call me or stop by our apartment after this call? Nope, they just came barging into our home on eviction day, even though the eviction had been stayed by our notice of appeal and there was no final court order, approving the eviction.

What about Kathryn Mays' claim, during her whispering session, that I threatened to shoot officers during a visit with my caregiver, Matt Charles, on Aug. 4, 2015? I have Matt Charles' notes from that session, and he never includes a word about me threatening to shoot anyone. Earlier in the 911 call, even Joshua Davis admits I never made such a statement.

That apparently all came from David Shuler, and I never discussed any such subject with him.


(To be continued)

11th Circuit appellate panel, led by Nixon-era geezer Gerald Bard Tjoflat, cheats us on the wrongful-foreclosure "House Case" by ignoring changes to procedural rule that have been in place for 25 years

Gerald Bard Tjoflat

You might think that when changes are made to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (FRAP), U.S. judges would be capable of keeping up with them. But that apparently is too much to ask of the three-judge panel, led by Richard Nixon-era geezer Gerald Bard Tjoflat, which cheated us raw in "The House Case" -- a federal lawsuit over the theft of our Birmingham home via a wrongful foreclosure.

The Tjoflat panel based its denial of our appeal on a 1980s version of FRAP 3, holding in its 2017 ruling that a mistake in the declared scope of our Notice of Appeal meant the court had no jurisdiction to hear the full appeal:

“The notice of appeal must . . . designate the judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed.” F. R. App. P. 3(c); Osterneck v. E.T. Barwick Indus., Inc., 825 F.2d 1521, 1528 (11th Cir. 1987). “Where the appellant notices the appeal of a specified judgment only or a part thereof,” moreover, “this court has no jurisdiction to review other judgments or issues which are not expressly referred to and which are not impliedly intended for appeal.” C. A. May Marine Supply Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 649 F.2d 1049, 1056 (5th Cir. 1981). Otherwise, because the intent to appeal is not clear, prejudice would likely fall upon the adverse party. Id.

As shown in the green highlighted areas above, the panel relied on case law from 1987 and 1981, respectively, ignoring important changes made to FRAP 3 in 1993. We described those changes in our Motion for Panel Rehearing: (See here and here.)

A 1993 advisory committee amendment to FRAP 3, plus a string of case law, has changed the landscape for notice of appeal requirements and made the panel’s cited law obsolete. 

A case styled Bogle v. Orange County, 162 F.3d 653 (11th Cir., 1998) holds: “The test for determining the sufficiency of a notice of appeal is "whether it is objectively clear that a party intended to appeal." Fed. R.App. P. 3(c) advisory committee's note (1993 amendment). Signs that the Shulers’ intended to appeal are all over the documents filed with this court and served on adverse parties.

Our intent to appeal the entire district-court dismissal is objectively clear in our appellate brief -- and the Tjoflat panel admits this. From our Motion for Panel Rehearing:

As the panel notes, the Shulers make it clear in their appellate brief – in two places – that they intended to appeal the dismissal, in its entirety. In their “Statement of Jurisdiction” on page 1, the Shulers’ state regarding the Eleventh Circuit: “. . . this court has jurisdiction to consider an appeal of the district court’s order dismissing the case. . . .

In the “Statement of the Issues” on page 2 of their appellate brief, the Shulers specifically raise three issues on appeal, including this: Did the district court unlawfully dismiss the Shulers’ case . . . ? It could not be more clear that the Shulers intended to appeal the dismissal, plus all orders leading up to that.

Do objectively clear statements in the appellate brief override a flawed Notice of Appeal? Case law flowing from the 1993 committee amendment to FRAP 3 shows the answer is yes. In fact, the Bogle finding goes beyond that, invoking the U.S. Supreme Court in the process. From our panel-rehearing motion:

Bogle then mentions the notion that an appellate brief may serve as a notice of appeal (“Assuming that an appellate brief may serve as a notice of appeal.”) That notion later was confirmed with clarity by the U.S. Supreme Court in Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244 (1992), finding: “In this case, we hold that a document intended to serve as an appellate brief may qualify as the notice of appeal required by Rule 3.” Thus, the Shulers’ appellate brief lawfully serves as a notice of appeal, and the panel admits that the brief shows the Shulers’ intent to appeal the entire district-court case. 

Barry further holds: “Courts will liberally construe the requirements of Rule 3. . . . Thus, when papers are "technically at variance with the letter of [Rule 3], a court may nonetheless find that the litigant has complied with the rule if the litigant's action is the functional equivalent of what the rule requires." The Shulers’ appellate brief, where they mention in two places their intent to appeal the entire district-court case, clearly serves as the functional equivalent of Rule 3 requirements.

It cannot be disputed that current law, under FRAP 3 and its progeny: (1) Allows statements in an appellate brief to override a flawed Notice of Appeal; (2) Allows an appellate brief to qualify as a Notice of Appeal; and (3) Calls for the requirements of Rule 3 to be liberally construed, especially where the litigant's actions are the "functional equivalent of what the rule applies."

Do you need more evidence that Tjoflat and the Gang screwed us, big time? Consider the holdings of Rinaldo v. Corbett, 256 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir., 2001). Consider this from our panel-rehearing motion:

Rinaldo v. Corbett, 256 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir., 2001) drives home the totality element of the Shulers’ appeal: “When a district court enters a final judgment, `all prior non-final orders and rulings which produced the judgment' are merged into the judgment and subject to review on appeal." The record shows the district court entered a final judgment – meaning all non-final orders and rulings which produced the judgment are merged into the judgment and subject to review on appeal – especially where the Shulers’ appellate brief makes clear their intention of appealing the entire district-court case.

And then, we have this:

Rinaldo holds: “Now, Rule 3(c)(4) directs that "[a]n appeal must not be dismissed for informality of form or title of the notice of appeal, or for failure to name a party whose intent to appeal is otherwise clear from the notice." Fed. R.App. P. 3(c)(4). Explaining this new subsection, the 1993 Advisory Committee Notes state that: “Finally, the rule makes it clear that dismissal of an appeal should not occur when it is otherwise clear from the notice that the party intended to appeal. If a court determines it is objectively clear that a party intended to appeal, there are neither administrative concerns nor fairness concerns that should prevent the appeal from going forward.” There can be no dispute that the Shulers intended to appeal. They say so in their notice of appeal and they say so again, twice, in their appellate brief. And the law is clear this presents no fairness or prejudice concerns for adverse parties.

If this were a case of incompetence in the 11th Circuit, that would be alarming enough. But this involves intentional cheating, which probably rises to the level of fraud on the court. And that, by law, should give us grounds to reopen "The House Case," along with all of the other federal matters -- including our employment cases against UAB and Infinity Insurance -- where we were intentionally cheated due to fraud on the court.

As for Tjoflat, our research reveals a clear reason why he tends to favor big financial outfits like Chase Mortgage, which wrongfully foreclosed on our home of almost 25 years.

We will provide details in upcoming posts.


(To be continued)

Audio evidence shows Missouri Deputy Scott Harrison committed perjury in Carol's "assault" trial -- putting Judge Jerry Harmison's guilty verdict on shaky ground

Deputy Scott Harrison

Corruption and incompetence among law-enforcement and correctional officers has become a hot topic since the so-called suicide of alleged sex trafficker Jeffrey Epstein in New York City. But it's not a new topic here at Legal Schnauzer, and we've seen a shocking level of dishonesty play out under oath in a court of law.

A Missouri sheriff's deputy committed perjury in my wife Carol's "assault on a law enforcement officer" trial in Greene County. That means, by law, the guilty verdict against Carol is due to be vacated or set aside, and Deputy Scott Harrison is subject to criminal prosecution.

Harrison's false statement under oath is one of several such statements cop-witnesses for the state made in Carol's trial. But Harrison's is the one we can prove -- right this minute, with no additional investigation or discovery -- is perjurious. Other deputies' sketchy statements generally were inconsistent -- their trial testimony differed from written statements in incident reports -- so it would take some research to determine what might rise to the level of perjury. Either way, they apparently committed perjury or filed false police reports, both of which are crimes.

At least one statement from Harrison -- the deputy who burst into our apartment and pointed an assault rifle at my head during an unlawful eviction in September 2015 -- leaves no doubt. This is from page 3 of Judge Jerry Harmison Jr.'s judgment in Carol's case: (The judgment and Carol's Motion to Vacate Judgment That Was Procured by Fraud, Perjury, etc. are embedded at the end of this post.)

Harrison stated he initially focused on Roger Shuler once the front door was open because Roger Shuler had called and expressed threats to law enforcement on August 12, 2015.

We have recorded evidence that Harrison's statement is false, and we presented that evidence in a recent post, with more relevant posts to come. (The video/audio is embedded at the end of this post.)

How is perjury described under Missouri law? It can be found at RSMo 575.040, and Carol cites it in her Motion to Vacate:

Perjury is defined at RSMo. 575.040:

1. A person commits the crime of perjury if, with the purpose to deceive, he knowingly testifies falsely to any material fact upon oath or affirmation legally administered, in any official proceeding before any court, public body, notary public or other officer authorized to administer oaths;

2. A fact is material, regardless of its admissibility under rules of evidence, if it could substantially affect, or did substantially affect, the course or outcome of the cause, matter or proceeding;

3. Knowledge of the materiality of the statement is not an element of this crime, and it is no defense that:

(1) The defendant mistakenly believed the fact to be immaterial.

Is there any doubt that Harrison's statement was material? Absolutely not. At least two deputies -- including Jeremy Lynn, the "victim" of Carol's assault -- stated they were only on the scene because of Harrison's false claim that I had made a threatening 911 call. The only problem? Audio evidence shows that Josh Davis and Kathryn Mays -- a case manager and social worker at Burrell Behavioral Health, respectively -- made the 911 call. And I had nothing to do with it.

Carol and I, of course, knew all along I never made a 911 call or a threat to law enforcement -- and I've reported that here -- but how did we obtain evidence to prove Harrison's trial statement was false? Carol explains in her Motion to Vacate:

During the course of discovery in the instant case, the Shulers obtained a copy of the 911 call – it was among the 2-3 discovery requests the prosecution actually produced, and Shuler didn’t get it until almost the trial date – and the call came from Josh Davis, a case manager at Burrell Behavioral Health, with Kathryn Mays, a social worker, whispering instructions in his ear. Roger Shuler had nothing to do with the 911 call, and he never made a threat re: cops or anyone else to a member of his family – contrary to the hearsay testimony presented by multiple prosecution witnesses in this case.

As for the important element of materiality, here are details about that, from the Motion to Vacate:

Harrison’s statement clearly was false, with intent to deceive the court, and it was material. The other three cop-witnesses also testified in some fashion, via hearsay, about such threats from Roger Shuler, and two of them – Debi Wade and Jeremy Lynn – stated at trial that they were present for the Shulers’ eviction only because of a “threat” Roger Shuler never made and/or a 911 call he never placed. Carol Shuler wound up falsely accused of “assaulting” Jeremy Lynn, but he was only there because of Scott Harrison’s bogus 911 story. Debi Wade went on to falsely testify that Carol Shuler charged into her “like a bull” – a canard even prosecutors apparently did not believe because they did not charge Carol with it. 

Also, Wade falsely testified that Carol flailed around in the back seat of a patrol car – even though Carol was seat-belted – suggesting Carol produced a comminuted fracture (broken in more than two places), a feat that likely is physically impossible and has never happened in human history. This was not a hairline fracture of the arm; it was about as bad a trauma-induced break as is found in medicine. Bottom line: The officer who falsely claimed Carol Shuler assaulted him and the officer who authored a bogus Probable Cause Statement on the subject were only present at the Shulers’ eviction because of Scott Harrison’s phony 911 story. It’s very likely Harrison’s perjury is the reason Carol Shuler was found guilty of an offense even the “victim” (Jeremy Lynn) admits she did not commit.

Let's drive this point home because it's important: The officer who falsely claimed Carol assaulted him (Jeremy Lynn) and the officer who wrote a false Probable Cause Statement on the subject (Debi Wade) stated under oath that they were only present because of Scott Harrison's phony 911 story.

X-ray of comminuted fracture
in Carol Shuler's left arm.

Without the 911 canard, one deputy likely would have been on the scene -- and he might have stayed in his vehicle, scratching himself in indelicate places throughout the eviction. Our research indicates that's how most Missouri evictions are handled, with one deputy usually providing a "presence" to help ensure a tense process remains peaceful. In our case, we were confronted with a heavily armed SWAT team, whose members wound up brutalizing Carol and breaking her arm so severely that it required roughly eight hours of trauma surgery for repair.

Do courts view perjury during a criminal trial as a serious matter? On paper, they sure do? What impact can a finding of perjury have on a verdict? On paper, it can turn the results upside down.

How could Scott Harrison's perjury affect the judgment in Carol's case? We will examine that subject in an upcoming post.

And what about the Missouri Attorney General's Office? That likely is where a case of suspected perjury should be reported. Do they take it seriously?We have our doubts, but we intend to find out.


(To be continued)

Federal judge Gerald Bard Tjoflat has a financial stake in JPMorgan Chase, whose subsidiary launched the wrongful foreclosure on our house in Birmingham, meaning he was disqualified from hearing our appeal

Gerald Bard Tjoflat

By the time a three-judge panel of the U.S. Eleventh Circuit -- led by 89-year-old Gerald Bard Tjoflat -- denied our appeal in "The House Case," my wife Carol and I had been cheated enough in court to be highly jaded about the whole process. The ruling came in December 2017, and we would have been shocked if any court ruled correctly, according to facts and law, in one of our cases. But the finding in Shuler, et al v. Garrison, et al was so off-the-charts crooked that even we were taken aback.

"How could federal judges -- three of them -- be so brazen about ruling contrary to black-letter law?" we said to ourselves. The answer to that question now is apparent. Tjoflat had a financial stake in the case, and he ruled in favor of his own pocketbook. That, of course, is wildly unlawful; a cornucopia of law holds that a federal judge is not to hear a case in which he or an immediate family member has a financial interest. Tjoflat, however, ignored that rule in "The House Case," and our research indicates he's been ignoring it for years, maybe decades. We are aware of at least one Alabama case from last year -- and it, like "The House Case," involved an alleged wrongful foreclosure -- where Tjoflat heard a case in which he had a financial stake. That case is styled Jackson v. Bank of America, NA, 898 F. 3d 1348 (11th Cir., 2018), which we wrote about back in May.

This is not a "no harm, no foul" situation, where Tjoflat (in at least a few cases) rules against the party where his financial interests lie. Rather, Tjoflat has an astonishing record of ruling in favor of the large financial institutions in which he has invested -- as we will spell out in upcoming posts.

How did "The House Case" intertwine with Tjoflat's financial incentives? Chase Mortgage, a division of JPMorgan Chase, held the mortgage on our home of almost 25 years in Birmingham and launched the wrongful foreclosure -- with assistance from a number of legal/political entities and individuals in Alabama. According to his financial disclosures, which are available online, Tjoflat holds stock (and perhaps other forms of securities) in JPMorgan Chase.

That casts considerable illumination on the Eleventh Circuit's bogus dismissal of our appeal. Tjoflat ruled in a way that would protect his own financial bottom line. Court corruption does not get much uglier than that.

It's not like the governing law on "The House Case" appeal was complicated. I did not help matters by mistakenly indicating on our Notice of Appeal that we intended to appeal only a portion of the district court's ruling. But current statutory and case law is clear that such a mistake is not grounds for dismissing an appeal -- especially if the appellate brief makes clear, as ours did, the intent is to appeal the entire case. Here is how we described it in a previous post:

The Tjoflat panel based its denial of our appeal on a 1980s version of FRAP 3, holding in its 2017 ruling that a mistake in the declared scope of our Notice of Appeal meant the court had no jurisdiction to hear our full appeal:

“The notice of appeal must . . . designate the judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed.” F. R. App. P. 3(c); Osterneck v. E.T. Barwick Indus., Inc., 825 F.2d 1521, 1528 (11th Cir. 1987). “Where the appellant notices the appeal of a specified judgment only or a part thereof,” moreover, “this court has no jurisdiction to review other judgments or issues which are not expressly referred to and which are not impliedly intended for appeal.” C. A. May Marine Supply Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 649 F.2d 1049, 1056 (5th Cir. 1981). Otherwise, because the intent to appeal is not clear, prejudice would likely fall upon the adverse party. Id.

As shown in the green highlighted areas above, the panel relied on case law from 1987 and 1981, respectively, ignoring important changes made to FRAP 3 in 1993. We described those changes in our Motion for Panel Rehearing: (See here and here.)

A 1993 advisory committee amendment to FRAP 3, plus a string of case law, has changed the landscape for notice of appeal requirements and made the panel’s cited law obsolete.

A case styled Bogle v. Orange County, 162 F.3d 653 (11th Cir., 1998) holds: “The test for determining the sufficiency of a notice of appeal is "whether it is objectively clear that a party intended to appeal." Fed. R.App. P. 3(c) advisory committee's note (1993 amendment). Signs that the Shulers’ intended to appeal are all over the documents filed with this court and served on adverse parties.

Our intent to appeal the entire district-court dismissal is objectively clear in our appellate brief -- and the Tjoflat panel admits this. From our Motion for Panel Rehearing:

As the panel notes, the Shulers make it clear in their appellate brief – in two places – that they intended to appeal the dismissal, in its entirety. In their “Statement of Jurisdiction” on page 1, the Shulers’ state regarding the Eleventh Circuit: “. . . this court has jurisdiction to consider an appeal of the district court’s order dismissing the case. . . .

In the “Statement of the Issues” on page 2 of their appellate brief, the Shulers specifically raise three issues on appeal, including this: Did the district court unlawfully dismiss the Shulers’ case . . . ? It could not be more clear that the Shulers intended to appeal the dismissal, plus all orders leading up to that.

In short, Tjoflat and his crooked crew used outdated law, directly counter to their own precedent in Bogle, to cheat us. To make matters even more seamy, Tjoflat dismissed both "The House Case" and the Jackson case in ways that meant the cases would not even be considered on the merits. What does that tell us? It tells me that Tjoflat knew both Carol and I, and the jacksons, were cheated raw in the district courts, so he concocted ways to dismiss the appeals without calling attention to the butcher jobs we experienced at the trial level.

What about details of Tjoflat's financial holdings -- the ones that, by law, disqualified him from hearing our appeal? Stay tuned. That information will be revealed in upcoming posts.


(To be continued)

Eleventh Circuit's Gerald Bard Tjoflat, longest serving federal judge in U.S., hears matters where he has a financial conflict and should, by law, be disqualified

Gerald Bard Tjoflat

A fundamental of the American "justice system" is that no judge should hear a case in which he -- or a member of  his immediate family -- has a financial interest. That is particularly spelled out in the federal court system, but a Legal Schnauzer investigation shows a U.S. appellate-court judge in the Deep South has been violating that principle for years, maybe decades.

The judge in question is Gerald Bard Tjoflat, who serves on the U.S. Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Atlanta (covering Alabama Georgia, and Florida), from his base in Jacksonville, Florida.
Tjoflat is the longest serving federal judge, still in active service, in the country. Richard Nixon nominated Tjoflat to a federal judgeship in 1970, and Gerald Ford elevated him to the appellate bench in 1975. Think about that; this guy has been hearing federal court cases pretty much since the Beatles broke up.

We've seen signs for several years that Tjoflat might be one of the most crooked judges in the country. He was on a three-judge panel that upheld abominably unlawful convictions in the political prosecution of former Alabama governor Don Siegelman. He was on a panel that upheld summary judgment for the University of Alabama Board of Trustees in my employment-discrimination/First Amendment case against UAB. How outrageous was that ruling? Black-letter law, including Eleventh-Circuit precedent, holds that summary judgment cannot be considered (much less granted) in a lawsuit until sufficient discovery has been conducted. In the UAB case, no discovery was conducted at all -- meaning there was no factual record in the case -- but the late (and monstrously corrupt) district judge William Acker granted summary judgment anyway. A Tjoflat-led panel upheld  the ruling, even though a case styled Snook v. Trust Company of Georgia, 859 F. 2d 865 (11th Cir., 1988) holds there can be no summary judgment without discovery; the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in slightly different language, says the same thing -- so the principle is firmly established across the country.

That Tjoflat would intentionally botch such a long-held and simple concept suggests he is a deeply compromised judge. Now, we know why, at least in part: He makes a habit of hearing cases where he has a financial conflict. And he has an astonishing record of siding with the party where his financial interests lie.

We are aware of at least two Alabama cases (both since December 2017) where Tjoflat did not let clear financial conflicts keep him from ruling. One of those was "The House Case," where our home of 25 years in Birmingham essentially was stolen from underneath us via a wrongful foreclosure. The other, also a wrongful-foreclosure case, involved a Daphne, AL, couple named Karun and Ursula Jackson. In both cases, a Tjoflat panel ruled against the plaintiffs/appellants -- siding with large banks -- and the record suggests he had a financial incentive to do so.

Let's first examine Jackson v. Bank of America, NA, 898 F. 3d 1348 (11th Cir., 2018), which was the subject of a Schnauzer post in May of this year. Tjoflat authored the panel ruling that denied the Jacksons' appeal, ranting that their attorney -- Kenneth Lay of Birmingham -- had engaged in an abuse of the judicial process by producing "incomprehensible shotgun pleadings." From our May post:

Tjoflat used his opinion in Jackson v. Bank of America, NA, 898 F. 3d 1348 (11th Cir., 2018) to label the pleadings of Birmingham attorney Kenneth James Lay as frivolous "garbage." Tjoflat further claimed Lay and his clients -- Karun and Ursula Jackson, of Daphne, AL -- "obstructed the due administration of justice."

In short, Tjoflat was so incensed about the Jacksons' pleadings that the merits of their appeal hardly got considered. Is that because the Jacksons (and Lay) really conducted their appeal so poorly? Or was Tjoflat protecting his financial stake in Bank of America (BOA)?

The public record is clear that Tjoflat holds stock (or perhaps other forms of securities) in BOA. And yet, he heard the Jackson case and issued a one-sided ruling in favor of the bank, largely ignoring issues the Jacksons raised on appeal.

Was this a rare oversight on Tjoflat's part? Nope. Our research indicates he has made a habit of hearing cases where the law holds he should be disqualified. One of those cases hits close to home.


(To be continued)

Kevin Newsom, a Trump-nominated judge who used to be at Birmingham's Bradley Arant, casts a vote that chips away at "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard

Kevin Newsom

While many Americans wonder if Donald Trump will attempt to buy Greenland or officially be named "King of the Jews," Trump-appointed federal judges are chopping away at the fundamentals of our democracy. Do Americans notice?

One such judge is Kevin Newsom, who now sits on the U.S. Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Atlanta (covering Alabama, Georgia, and Florida) and used to work at Bradley Arant in Birmingham. An acolyte of former Trump attorney general and U.S. Senator Jeff Sessions and U.S. Circuit Judge Bill "Bad Puppy" Pryor -- both closeted gays, by the way -- Newsom served as Alabama's solicitor general when Pryor was AG.

Before that, Newsom worked at the D.C. law firm Covington Burling, which produced horrible Obama AG Eric Holder and brags about its ties to right-wing luminaries, such as Karl Rove. In what should be a surprise to no one, Newsom is a member of the Federalist Society, which has hand-picked many of Trump's judicial nominees.

What do these nominees stand for? It certainly is not the U.S. Constitution. Earlier this year, Newsom cast the deciding vote in a ruling that chips away at a bedrock principle of American law. People for the American Way (PFAW) addresses the case as part of  a blog series titled "Confirmed Judges, Confirmed Fears. From the post about Newsom's ruling, titled "Trump judge erodes the 'reasonable doubt' requirement for a guilty verdict." Writes analyst Paul Gordon:

In January 2019, Trump judge Kevin Newsom of the Eleventh Circuit authored a 2-1 opinion in U.S. v. Munksgard upholding a felony criminal conviction even though the prosecution had failed to prove a key element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Newsom cast the deciding vote to allow this constitutional violation.

Because tyrannical governments misuse the criminal law to imprison people for illegitimate reasons, the Constitution requires prosecutors to prove a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. That requirement applies to every element of the crime. So when the United States charged Matthew Munksgard with making false statements in 2013 and 2014 in order to get a loan from an FDIC-insured bank, the prosecution had to prove that the bank was, in fact, FDIC-insured during that time frame.

But all they did was show that the bank had been FDIC-insured in 1990 (when it was chartered) and in 2016 (at the time of the trial). For Judge Newsom, that was enough for a jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that it had been FDIC-insured in 2013-2014, because there is (according to him) a “universal presumption” that a bank is so ensured. 

This is straight from the Munksgard opinion, which Newsom wrote:

Matthew Munksgard admits to knowingly making false statements in order to obtain bank loans—indeed, four times over. Even so, he contends, the government failed to show beyond a reasonable doubt, as it had to, that the institution he swindled was FDIC-insured. This case presents the (irritatingly familiar) question whether the government presented sufficient evidence to prove that pesky jurisdictional prerequisite. The proof of FDIC insurance here—as in other cases in which we have rapped the government’s knuckles—was hardly overwhelming. And given the ease with which insurance coverage could have been demonstrated—certificate, contract, cancelled check, etc.—inexplicably so. Having said that, “overwhelming” isn’t the standard, and when we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, as we must, see United States v. Frank, 599 F.3d 1221, 1233 (11th Cir. 2010), we conclude—albeit reluctantly—that the proof was adequate to demonstrate Munksgard’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But let this be a warning to federal prosecutors: You are (as the author’s mother used to say) cruisin’ for a bruisin’. Don’t apologize—do better.

Even Gerald Bard Tjoflat, the hideously crooked geezer from the Richard Nixon era, seemed taken aback by Newsom's "reasoning." Writes Gordon:

But as Republican-nominated Judge Gerald Tjoflat pointed out in dissent, knowing the bank’s insurance status in 1990 and in 2016 does not tell us much about 2013 or 2014, because that status is up for renewal four times each year: It could have changed as many as eight times between the alleged crime and the trial. That is hardly proving its status “beyond a reasonable doubt.” In addition, the jury was instructed to only consider evidence presented in the trial, so they could not base their ruling on some “universal presumption.”

Judge Tjoflat correctly stated that:

"If the majority’s statement of the law were correct, the government would be relieved of its duty to prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. That would violate the Constitution."

Nevertheless, Judge Newsom was willing to erode this bedrock of our liberty.

Missouri resident Scott J. Wells pleads guilty to baseless child-pornography charges after his own lawyer -- Brady Musgrave -- pressures, threatens, entices, and harasses him into entering a plea

Scott J. Wells

A Missouri resident recently pleaded guilty to baseless child-pornography charges after his own attorney pressured, threatened, enticed, and harassed him into entering the plea, family members say.

We have shown in a series of posts here at Legal Schnauzer that the government had no case against Scott J. Wells for a number of reasons, particularly because (1) The criminal complaint alleged no offense that was physically possible to perform; and (2) The indictment was deficient, merely copying from the relevant federal law without citing any "particulars" (specifics) about what unlawful actions Wells allegedly took.

Wells reportedly is seeking to have the guilty plea withdrawn this week, and that will require a judge's approval.

Why would attorney Brady A. Musgrave, of Springfield, MO, pressure his own client to plead guilty to charges the government clearly could not prove? Specifically, why didn't Musgrave file two simple documents -- a motion to dismiss due to a defective criminal complaint and indictment, plus a motion to suppress evidence that was obtained via a search at Wells' home that violated the Fourth Amendment?

Brady Musgrave

A Legal Schnauzer investigation has unearthed public documents that point to a possible motive for Musgrave's actions. Hint: It involves money -- and it should be a concern for anyone who considers using the legal services of Musgrave or his law firm, Jones and Musgrave.

How did Brady Musgrave con his own client into a bogus guilty plea? The tactics come under several headings, family members say:

(1) "If you go to trial and are convicted, you will be sentenced to 18-20 years in prison."

(2) "If you go to trial, you will be convicted."

(3) "The government can show that you made certain searches related to child porn." (Musgrave apparently did not explain how such a search would be unlawful. Wells was charged with receiving and distributing child pornography, and it remains unclear how conducting a simple Web search, by itself, would amount to proof of either offense.)

(4) "The government has 60-some images of child porn that were found on your computer during the search of your home." (Can the government prove Wells "knowingly" placed those pictures on his computer -- as opposed to them appearing via malware, viruses, etc. -- and exerted "dominion and control" over them; that Wells knew individuals in the photos were minors [under age 18]; or that the images even amounted to child pornography [which is unlawful contraband] as opposed to child erotica [which is not illegal.]? Our research indicates the answer to all of those questions is "no." And family members are not aware that any of Wells' three court-appointed lawyers has reviewed all of the government's evidence with him -- and none of them retained an expert witness to examine Wells' computer and determine if he caused certain images to appear there, apparently in the cache, or if someone else [maybe the government itself?] put them there.)

(5) "If you take a plea, given that you've been detained for more than two years, you might walk out of here a free man, with a sentence of "time served." (Never mind that you will have pleaded guilty to a crime you didn't commit, that the government can't prove you committed, and you have zero guarantees about the sentence you will receive.)

(6) "I will not file any pretrial motions because they would not be meritorious."

That last one is a flat-out lie. Anyone with functioning eyesight, three brain cells, and two days of law school should be able to file a motion showing the criminal complaint and indictment are deficient and due to be dismissed.

Musgrave is not the first lawyer to pull such a stunt on Scott Wells. While Wells was behind bars at Leavenworth, KS, Missouri lawyer Shane Cantin sent him a letter that included the following. (Full letter is embedded at the end of this post.)

Dear Scott:

. . . If the government is allowed to present testimony as outlined in the discovery file, you will be convicted as charged.

I see no viable defense to these charges. Further, because you proffered to federal agents with your prior counsel (federal public defender David Mercer), your admissions made during the proffer will be used to impeach you, should you testify at trial that you did not knowingly obtain an image of child pornography from the internet.

The government computer forensic expert will testify that the images found on your device did not come to that device by means of "pop-ups," nor were they saved in a location on your hard drive that would suggest otherwise. Further, the internet search history is consistent with a user seeking out images of child pornography. This is consistent with the forensic expert at the Federal Defender's Office who also examined the device. You will not overcome this evidence at trial, and you will be convicted.

(Notice that Cantin makes no mention of retaining an expert witness for the defense, countering the government's expert. Cantin's idea of a defense, it appears, is to allow the government's expert to go unchallenged. Gee, that's impressive.)

Wells' family members say Musgrave told them he agreed to take the case after Cantin's letter became part of the public record, prompting him to withdraw. The two met over lunch to discuss the case -- in clear violation of Wells' attorney-client privilege rights? -- and Cantin more or less offered the case to Musgrave, which he apparently accepted with fervor.

Family members say it is not clear that Musgrave ever was appointed by, or accepted by, the court, which might mean he isn't officially Scott Wells' attorney. Also, details of any plea agreement apparently are not remotely clear. In fact, Scott Wells might not even be aware of what he supposedly agreed to.

As for withdrawing the guilty plea, family members say Musgrave instructed Wells to write a letter to a judge. But if Musgrave is Wells' attorney of record, it appears he has a duty to file a motion to withdraw the plea and actually argue it before the court -- without applying pressure tactics to his client.

As for Musgrave's possible motive for selling his own client down the river, we will address those in upcoming posts? Did we mention they involve money?