Rogue judges run rampant around the country, but many of them escape punishment because of lax disciplinary systems and little media scrutiny

Marquita Johnson (Reuters)

It must be impossible to write an article about court corruption without focusing on at least one Alabama judge. That seems to be the take-home lesson from a piece at Reuters under the headline, "Special Report: Thousands of U.S. judges who broke laws, oaths remained on the bench." Heck, even the dateline is from Alabama. Write reporters Michael Berens and John Shiffman:

MONTGOMERY, Alabama (Reuters) - Judge Les Hayes once sentenced a single mother to 496 days behind bars for failing to pay traffic tickets. The sentence was so stiff it exceeded the jail time Alabama allows for negligent homicide.

Marquita Johnson, who was locked up in April 2012, says the impact of her time in jail endures today. Johnson’s three children were cast into foster care while she was incarcerated. One daughter was molested, state records show. Another was physically abused.

“Judge Hayes took away my life and didn’t care how my children suffered,” said Johnson, now 36. “My girls will never be the same.”

Fellow inmates found her sentence hard to believe. “They had a nickname for me: The Woman with All the Days,” Johnson said. “That’s what they called me: The Woman with All the Days. There were people who had committed real crimes who got out before me.”

In our experience, judges often get away with such brazen unlawfulness; Hayes did not:

In 2016, the state agency that oversees judges charged Hayes with violating Alabama’s code of judicial conduct. According to the Judicial Inquiry Commission, Hayes broke state and federal laws by jailing Johnson and hundreds of other Montgomery residents too poor to pay fines. Among those jailed: a plumber struggling to make rent, a mother who skipped meals to cover the medical bills of her disabled son, and a hotel housekeeper working her way through college.

How did Hayes explain such judicial hackery? He blamed it on, well, ignorance of the law -- and he was a judge:

Hayes, a judge since 2000, admitted in court documents to violating 10 different parts of the state’s judicial conduct code. One of the counts was a breach of a judge’s most essential duty: failing to “respect and comply with the law.”

Despite the severity of the ruling, Hayes wasn’t barred from serving as a judge. Instead, the judicial commission and Hayes reached a deal. The former Eagle Scout would serve an 11-month unpaid suspension. Then he could return to the bench.

Until he was disciplined, Hayes said in an interview with Reuters, “I never thought I was doing something wrong.”

This week, Hayes is set to retire after 20 years as a judge. In a statement to Reuters, Hayes said he was “very remorseful” for his misdeeds.

Community members are angry that Hayes was allowed to retire rather than being forcefully kicked off the bench:

“He should have been fired years ago,” said Willie Knight, pastor of North Montgomery Baptist Church. “He broke the law and wanted to get away with it. His sudden retirement is years too late.”

Hayes is among thousands of state and local judges across America who were allowed to keep positions of extraordinary power and prestige after violating judicial ethics rules or breaking laws they pledged to uphold, a Reuters investigation found.

Judges have made racist statements, lied to state officials and forced defendants to languish in jail without a lawyer – and then returned to the bench, sometimes with little more than a rebuke from the state agencies overseeing their conduct.

Rogue judges are a problem around the country, Reuters found:

Recent media reports have documented failures in judicial oversight in South Carolina, Louisiana and Illinois. Reuters went further.

In the first comprehensive accounting of judicial misconduct nationally, Reuters reviewed 1,509 cases from the last dozen years – 2008 through 2019 – in which judges resigned, retired or were publicly disciplined following accusations of misconduct. In addition, reporters identified another 3,613 cases from 2008 through 2018 in which states disciplined wayward judges but kept hidden from the public key details of their offenses – including the identities of the judges themselves.

All told, 9 of every 10 judges were allowed to return to the bench after they were sanctioned for misconduct, Reuters determined. They included a California judge who had sex in his courthouse chambers, once with his former law intern and separately with an attorney; a New York judge who berated domestic violence victims; and a Maryland judge who, after his arrest for driving drunk, was allowed to return to the bench provided he took a Breathalyzer test before each appearance.

The news agency’s findings reveal an “excessively” forgiving judicial disciplinary system, said Stephen Gillers, a law professor at New York University who writes about judicial ethics. Although punishment short of removal from the bench is appropriate for most misconduct cases, Gillers said, the public “would be appalled at some of the lenient treatment judges get” for substantial transgressions.

Just from the past year alone:

In Utah, a judge texted a video of a man’s scrotum to court clerks. He was reprimanded but remains on the bench.

In Indiana, three judges attending a conference last spring got drunk and sparked a 3 a.m. brawl outside a White Castle fast-food restaurant that ended with two of the judges shot. Although the state supreme court found the three judges had “discredited the entire Indiana judiciary,” each returned to the bench after a suspension.

In Texas, a judge burst in on jurors deliberating the case of a woman charged with sex trafficking and declared that God told him the defendant was innocent. The offending judge received a warning and returned to the bench. The defendant was convicted after a new judge took over the case.

“There are certain things where there should be a level of zero tolerance,” the jury foreman, Mark House, told Reuters. The judge should have been fined, House said, and kicked off the bench. “There is no justice, because he is still doing his job.”

Judicial misconduct specialists say such behavior has the potential to erode trust in America’s courts and, absent tough consequences, could give judges license to behave with impunity.

“When you see cases like that, the public starts to wonder about the integrity and honesty of the system,” said Steve Scheckman, a lawyer who directed Louisiana’s oversight agency and served as deputy director of New York’s. “It looks like a good ol’ boys club.”

That’s how local lawyers viewed the case of a longtime Alabama judge who concurrently served on the state’s judicial oversight commission. The judge, Cullman District Court’s Kim Chaney, remained on the bench for three years after being accused of violating the same nepotism rules he was tasked with enforcing on the oversight commission. In at least 200 cases, court records show, Judge Chaney chose his own son to serve as a court-appointed defense lawyer for the indigent, enabling the younger Chaney to earn at least $105,000 in fees over two years.

In February, months after Reuters repeatedly asked Chaney and the state judicial commission about those cases, he retired from the bench as part of a deal with state authorities to end the investigation.

Tommy Drake, the lawyer who first filed a complaint against Chaney in 2016, said he doubts the judge would have been forced from the bench if Reuters hadn’t examined the case.

“You know the only reason they did anything about Chaney is because you guys started asking questions,” Drake said. “Otherwise, he’d still be there.”

The mainstream media (MSM) rarely takes a look at crooked judges, so Reuters deserves huge props for tackling the subject. I would love to see them do an expanded version of the story, and I could give them the names of dozens of victims, with details about cheat jobs. After all, I'm "The guy who got arrested for blogging." That was MY nickname among inmates at the Shelby County (AL) Jail.

Here is what the University of Virginia's Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression said about Judge Claud Neilson, the hatchet man on my case:

The Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression, based at the University of Virginia, has been issuing "Jefferson Muzzles Awards" for 24 years to those who have wantonly trampled First Amendment rights.

Claud Neilson, a retired circuit judge the Alabama Supreme Court specially appointed to hear a lawsuit brought against me by Republican political figures Rob Riley and Liberty Duke, was among eight individuals or entities to receive "Muzzles Awards" for 2014-15.

How bad is the disciplinary system for judges? Real bad, reports Reuters:

State and local judges draw little scrutiny even though their courtrooms are the bedrock of the American criminal justice system, touching the lives of millions of people every year.

The country’s approximately 1,700 federal judges hear 400,000 cases annually. The nearly 30,000 state, county and municipal court judges handle a far bigger docket: more than 100 million new cases each year, from traffic to divorce to murder. Their titles range from justice of the peace to state supreme court justice. Their powers are vast and varied – from determining whether a defendant should be jailed to deciding who deserves custody of a child.

Each U.S. state has an oversight agency that investigates misconduct complaints against judges. The authority of the oversight agencies is distinct from the power held by appellate courts, which can reverse a judge’s legal ruling and order a new trial. Judicial commissions cannot change verdicts. Rather, they can investigate complaints about the behavior of judges and pursue discipline ranging from reprimand to removal.

Few experts dispute that the great majority of judges behave responsibly, respecting the law and those who appear before them. And some contend that, when judges do falter, oversight agencies are effective in identifying and addressing the behavior. “With a few notable exceptions, the commissions generally get it right,” said Keith Swisher, a University of Arizona law professor who specializes in judicial ethics.

Others disagree. They note that the clout of these commissions is limited, and their authority differs from state to state. To remove a judge, all but a handful of states require approval of a panel that includes other judges. And most states seldom exercise the full extent of those disciplinary powers.

As a result, the system tends to err on the side of protecting the rights and reputations of judges while overlooking the impact courtroom wrongdoing has on those most affected by it: people like Marquita Johnson.

Reuters scoured thousands of state investigative files, disciplinary proceedings and court records from the past dozen years to quantify the personal toll of judicial misconduct. The examination found at least 5,206 people who were directly affected by a judge’s misconduct. The victims cited in disciplinary documents ranged from people who were illegally jailed to those subjected to racist, sexist and other abusive comments from judges in ways that tainted the cases.

The number is a conservative estimate. The tally doesn’t include two previously reported incidents that affected thousands of defendants and prompted sweeping reviews of judicial conduct.

In Pennsylvania, the state examined the convictions of more than 3,500 teenagers sentenced by two judges. The judges were convicted of taking kickbacks as part of a scheme to fill a private juvenile detention center. In 2009, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court appointed senior judge Arthur Grim to lead a victim review, and the state later expunged criminal records for 2,251 juveniles. Grim told Reuters that every state should adopt a way to compensate victims of judicial misconduct.

“If we have a system that holds a wrongdoer accountable but we fail to address the victims, then we are really losing sight of what a justice system should be all about,” Grim said.

In another review underway in Ohio, state public defender Tim Young is scrutinizing 2,707 cases handled by a judge who retired in 2018 after being hospitalized for alcoholism. Mike Benza, a law professor at Case Western Reserve University whose students are helping identify victims, compared the work to current investigations into police abuse of power. “You see one case and then you look to see if it’s systemic,” he said.

The review, which has been limited during the coronavirus pandemic, may take a year. But Young said the time-consuming task is essential because “a fundamental injustice may have been levied against hundreds or thousands of people.”

Could something like the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi happen here? Our experiences in Alabama and Missouri suggest the answer is "Yes"

Jamal Khashoggi

The murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi --which Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman ordered, according to the CIA --might be the most barbaric act against an individual in most of our lifetimes. But if you compare events leading to the murder with events surrounding my kidnapping and five-month incarceration in Shelby County, Alabama, you see enough similarities to think maybe the Khashoggi murder wasn't so "out there," after all.

In one respect, the Khashoggi incident was less radical than what happened to a U.S. journalist (me) in the Deep South: At least the Saudi criminals had the decency to abduct Khashoggi in a public place; Shelby County deputy Chris Blevins broke into our house, in broad daylight, to nab me -- an act unlawful on so many levels that it's hard to list all the state and federal laws it violates. And yet, U.S. Judge Virginia Emerson Hopkins (Northern District of Alabama) has found sheriff's deputies under the state constitution, have immunity to commit such acts, as being within "the line and scope of their employment." (No kidding.)

On top of that, we've pointed to evidence that suggests Republican thugs who orchestrated my abduction included my wife, Carol, in the Rob Riley-Liberty Duke lawsuit because the plan was to kidnap and murder both of us. If so, Carol's ability to remain free and get word out to the press -- plus the thugs' apparent reluctance to break into our house a second time -- probably is all that saved us.

Were we slated to be beheaded and dismembered, as Khashoggi reportedly was? Likely not, but who knows, maybe the Saudis have given Alabama thugs ideas to implement in their future endeavors.

How similar were the Khashoggi murder and the Schnauzer kidnapping? Let's examine some of the underlying issues in both:


The judiciary as an "entry drug" for corruption

Over 11-plus years, this blog has provided details -- the kind that probably have never been reported before -- showing that American courts are awash in sewage. My research indicates perhaps the No. 1 indicator of a backward, third-world country is a corrupt judiciary -- specifically, the lack of due process, equal protection, and the rule of law. Our reporting shows the world's foremost democracy is becoming more and more like a banana republic.

Mugshot of U.S. journalist Roger Shuler

Jamal Khashoggi recognized similar, deep-seated problems in Saudi Arabia -- and speaking out about the entrenched judiciary likely contributed to his demise. Here are some of his quotes from a recent report at Newsweek:

[We shouldn't] minimize the issue of judicial reform to women only, even though it is important. . . . Since the time of King Abdulaziz, they have refused codifying the laws. And they think codifying the laws is secular. . . . This is what I mean by reform, by true reform of the judiciary, is to codify the law, introduce due process in the court system and make judges [obey] --what is the word? --a codified law…. This is the reform that is needed.

Making judges obey a codified law? Heck, Khashoggi was talking about judicial reform that would be way more advanced than anything we have in the United States. We have a codified law in America, but no one makes judges obey it. We've seen multiple instances where judges clearly have not even read the applicable law and/or did not consider it in their rulings.


Attacking your job -- your ability to make a living -- as a form of retaliation

We've written numerous posts about the cheat jobs Carol and I experienced in the Alabama workplace -- her at Infinity Insurance, me at UAB -- and evidence makes it clear they were political hit jobs, payback for my reporting at Legal Schnauzer, especially about the Don Siegelman case. Khashoggi had similar experiences in Saudi Arabia. From a report at Bloomberg:

In the 2000s, [Khashoggi] was twice fired from his post as editor-in-chief of the Saudi Al-Watan daily newspaper, which under his leadership ran stories, editorials and cartoons critical of extremists.

Yet he didn’t stay long without a job. In between, he served as an adviser to the Saudi ambassador to London, Prince Turki Al-Faisal, a former long-serving intelligence chief, and stayed on as the prince’s media aide after he was appointed the Saudi envoy to the U.S.

“I got fired from my job twice because I was pushing for reform in Saudi Arabia,” Khashoggi said in a March appearance on Qatari-run Al Jazeera’s “Upfront” program as he explained the worsening environment for journalists under Prince Mohammed. “It wasn’t that easy but people were not being put in jails. There was a breathing space.”

Of thugs and jails

Alabama thugs targeted me for jailing -- essentially arresting me for blogging. Statements from the last days of his life indicate Khashoggi spent a lot of time looking over his shoulder, as any "breathing space" dissipated under the regime of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. From a report at the UK Daily Mail:

Khashoggi also criticised Prince Mohammed's lack of 'proper advisers'.

'He is moving toward a Saudi Arabia according to him, a Saudi Arabia according to Mohammed bin Salman only,' said Khashoggi, who was himself a contributor to the Washington Post newspaper.

Khashoggi described two of the prince's aides, including the since-dismissed media adviser Saud al-Qahtani, as 'very thuggish'.

'People fear them. You challenge them, you might end up in prison, and that has happened,' he said.

Lies, lies, everywhere there's lies

Almost from the moment Khashoggi's disappearance hit the press, Saudi officials produced a string of lies -- finally admitting it was a case of premeditated murder. A recent unmasking of Saudi lies came when a Turkish official said Khashoggi was strangled as soon as he entered the Saudi consulate. So much for Saudi claims that Khashoggi was the victim of a rogue extradition mission that turned into a "brawl." Can't have much of a brawl when one of the participants already is dead from strangulation.

Rob Riley and his daddy, former Alabama Gov. Bob Riley

Alabama GOP thug Rob Riley took a similar tack after I was thrown in jail. In an interview with Sara Rafsky, of the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), Riley told lies of Trumpian proportions. Here is a memorable whopper from Rafsky's article, titled "Censorship in Alabama's Shelby County":

Riley said in a telephone interview he has a right to seek injunctive relief in a defamation case and there is legal precedent for doing so. He said someone who decides "to make up a lie, destroy someone's reputation, that's not journalism."

Riley told CPJ: "Shuler has a history of making up things and writing things that are outlandish lies...I am going to pursue every avenue possible to me in the courts to defend my name, my family and my business...He has no proof this is true. He has just decided to be a cyber-bully and make stuff up and I've had enough."

Is any of that true? Not one word of it. Notice that Riley does not cite any case to support his claim that the law allows for a preliminary injunction in a defamation case -- in a matter where the complained of article has not been proven to be defamatory before a jury trial, as required by law. Riley can cite no such law because there is no such law.

Notice that Riley tells a reporter that my reporting consists of "outlandish lies." Did he ever say -- under oath, in a court of law -- that my reporting on his relationship with lobbyist Liberty Duke was false. Anyone can check the public record and find the answer is "No."

Is there much difference between the oily Rob "Uday" Riley and lying royal officials in Saudi Arabia? Not that I can see.


(Note: Legal Schnauzer needs your help. Loyal readers have sustained this blog for years, and support is urgently needed now that my wife, Carol, is recovering from a fainting spell, which led to a recent broken arm. The healing process has started for Carol, but statements from her doctors indicate this likely was fallout from political thugs cheating both of us out of our jobs [and health insurance] in Birmingham -- and the stress of dealing with financial wreckage that comes from being targeted for right-wing attacks.  If you are able to help along our journalism journey, please click on the yellow donate button in the upper right corner of the blog, under the "Support the Schnauzer" headline. We are deeply grateful for your support through the years.)

U.S. judge Virginia Emerson Hopkins -- determined to cheat us in "The Jail Case," but with no ammunition to do it -- plays the pathetic "We Just Disagree" card

Virginia Emerson Hopkins

Judges have all kinds of ways to cheat you -- many of which we have covered on this blog -- but I recently discovered a new one. This comes under the heading of a "News You Can Use" tip, so it could come in handy for you someday.

Imagine you are involved in a legal case, and you (or your attorney) make a citation to law that you know is correct -- and you know it's a winner. You know this because . . . well, (A) You can read; and (B) It involves legal issues that are present in your case.

You, however, are dealing with a crooked judge so what can he do? You've boxed him into a corner. But he wants to cheat you, and he can't counter with a legal argument because you are right -- and he knows it. So, the judge issues an order that says he "disagrees" with your citation to law -- and that's it. No explanation, no citation to law that shows you are wrong (this isn't an option because there is no such citation). Nothing. Just "I disagree," maybe with a little dig at your status as a commoner who cannot possibly understand the mystical vagaries of the law.

It all reminds me of "We Just Disagree," the 1977 hit from English singer-songwriter Dave Mason, who performed with Traffic, Fleetwood Mac, Steve Winwood, Jimi Hendrix, Michael Jackson, and at least two former Beatles.

Who could turn a classic song into an evil courtroom sham? Leave that to U.S. Judge Virginia Emerson Hopkins, of the Northern District of Alabama, who is so crooked that she's creepy -- and to my knowledge, I've never seen her. She must squeak when she walks from all the oil and grease dripping off of her.

Hopkins' disagreeable con game came in her order on our Rule 59 Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment in "The Jail Case," which centers on my wrongful arrest (a kidnapping, really) and five-month incarceration in Shelby County, Alabama. (The Rule 59 motion, two amendments to it, and Hopkins' order are embedded at the end of this post.)

Hopkins dismissed our complaint primarily on two grounds: (1) Statute of limitations, claiming we had filed the lawsuit too late; and (2) State immunity, claiming deputies, under the Alabama Constitution, are protected from suit -- even when they intentionally, maliciously, and violently break the law.

Dave Mason

We cited law in our Rule 59 motion and its amendments that shows, without question, Hopkins is wrong; our complaint was timely filed, and state immunity does not protect deputies who break into a home (without showing a warrant, stating they have a warrant, or stating their reasons for being there), beat up a resident and douse him with pepper spray, threaten to break his arm, and haul him to jail -- all over a 100-percent civil matter, a defamation lawsuit, that involved not one whiff of criminal allegations or procedure.

In other words, we backed Hopkins into a corner, where she could not counter with a valid citation to law. So, what did she do?

(1) She cited law -- correctly by the way -- that governs Rule 59 motions. From her order (Doc. 168-1, dated 8/27/18):

Rule 59 motions should only be granted on grounds of newly discovered evidence or manifest error of law or fact. Jones v. Thomas, 605 Fed. App'x 813 (11th Cir., 2015).

(2) Since our Rule 59 motion and amendments presented 74 pages of examples where Hopkins committed "manifest errors of law or fact," she could not explain all of that away. So, she didn't even try. Here's what she did, directly from her order:

Plaintiffs do not assert that there has been any change in controlling law or that there is newly-discovered evidence. Rather, they assert that the undersigned has made errors of law and of fact. The undersigned has carefully considered all of the arguments that the Plaintiffs have made but disagrees. Plaintiffs simply misunderstand either the opinion or the law or both. Accordingly, the Motion To Alter Judgment is due to be denied.

As you can imagine, Hopkins was not about to admit that she made 74 pages worth of errors. And she could not back up her rulings with actual citations to law. So, she resorted to what we now will call "The Dave Mason Trick." It involves a judge essentially saying, "There ain't no good guy, there ain't no bad guy; there's only you and me, and we just disagree."

Note the little dig that we "simply misunderstand the opinion or the law or both." That's a curious way of putting it, given that Hopkins seems to be admitting there is a difference between her opinion and the law.

She sure as hell is right about that, and we will show you why in an upcoming post.

For good measure, let's check out a video of Dave Mason performing "We Just Disagree." The video has more than 7 million views, and they don't make songs like this anymore:




(To be continued)

Missouri judge Jerry Harmison, an Eric Greitens appointee, finds Carol guilty of an offense even the "victim" stated under oath that she did not commit

Jerry Harmison Jr.

Missouri Judge Jerry Harmison Jr., an appointee of scandal-plagued Gov. Eric Greitens, has found my wife, Carol, guilty of "assault on a law enforcement officer," in a ruling that defies fact, law, logic, and common sense. In the almost 11 years I've been writing this blog, Harmison's "judgment" might stand as the most blatant example of judicial corruption I've ever seen -- and as regular readers know, that's a mouthful.

Sentencing for the "crime" Carol did not commit -- and Harmison's findings show she didn't commit it -- is set for June 11. (Judgment is embedded at the end of this post.) The prosecution removed jail time from the table months ago for the misdemeanor offense, and that seems like a good thing. But that move took away Carol's right to a jury trial and forced her to a bench proceeding before a judge, who proved to be every bit as sleazy as the governor who appointed him.

Harmison, apparently looking to burnish his right-wing, pro-police street cred, was willing to turn a blind eye to a prosecution case that was filled with enough lies to make Donald Trump blush. All four prosecution witnesses lied under oath -- and Carol can prove some of the lies; she probably can prove all of them, with an opportunity to conduct the discovery she was denied prior to trial.

Get this: Harmison apparently based his "judgment" on the following statement: "This court finds the testimony of the state's witnesses more credible and persuasive than the defense witnesses (Carol and me). Is this guy serious? Is a witness "more credible" because he's wearing a uniform and has a gun strapped to his waist -- no matter the garbage he spews forth in court?

Speaking of credibility, every prosecution witness testified that Carol flailed about in the back seat of a patrol car, suggesting she broke her own arm -- and they had nothing to do with it. Never mind that Carol testified she was handcuffed and seat-belted while in the car. Never mind that I testified that an unknown deputy -- who was not present at the trial -- slammed Carol butt-first to the ground, grabbed both arms above the elbow while she was seated, and yanked on them in an upward and backward direction, breaking her left arm before she ever was placed in the patrol car.

But Jerry Harmison is dumb enough to believe a person can inflict a comminuted fracture in her own arm? This man isn't qualified to be a judge in a pissing contest. Does Harmison cite anything that caused him to conclude Carol and I were less credible than the cop witnesses? Nope, not one thing.

Here are a couple of nuggets of good news:

* Under Missouri law, Carol can file a number of post-trial motions -- seeking to have the judgment vacated or set aside for various reasons. She also can seek a judgment of acquittal or a new trial. She also can seek criminal charges for perjury and "deprivation of rights under color of law."

* Under Missouri law, a judgment based on "fraud and collusion" cannot stand and will not preclude Carol's federal, civil-rights claims. [See Kapp v. Naturelle, Inc., 611 F. 2d 703 (Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit, 1979).]

What is wrong with Harmison's judgment? I don't have room to go into everything in one post. We will provide more analysis in upcoming posts, but here are several key points for now.

(1) Statute? What criminal statute?

You might expect a judge to make note of the statute that governs a criminal case he is deciding. But we did not get that with Jerry Harmison. His "judgment" makes no mention of RSMo 565.083 -- which was repealed, by the way, effective Jan. 1, 2017 -- the statute governing Carol's alleged offense. Here is the key language from the statute, saying a person commits the offense if:

Such person knowingly causes or attempts to cause physical contact with a law enforcement officer . . . without the consent of the law enforcement officer.

When that language is applied to the facts, as stated in Harmison's own "judgment," Carol is not close to being guilty. But Harmison makes no mention of the applicable law; it appears he did not even read it. If a judge is going to convict someone of a crime, doesn't he have an obligation to use the law under which she was charged? I kind of think he does? What do you think?


(2) Well, what law did Harmison use to convict Carol?

On page 7 of Harmison's "judgment," we find this rationale: "The relevant evidence in this case is that the Greene County Deputies evicting Roger and Carol Shuler were acting in good faith."

Harmison is citing the so-called "good-faith exception," which defense lawyers routinely use in lawsuits alleging excessive force and Fourth Amendment violations against cops. In other words, Harmison decided a criminal case . . . with civil law. Carol's case is governed by the criminal statute mentioned in item No. 1 above. The charge is against her, and the statute is about her alleged actions; it has nothing to do with whether cops acted in "good faith" -- and there was overwhelming evidence at trial that they did not act in good faith, anyway.


(3) What about that key word, knowingly?

Under the statute, Carol had to act "knowingly" to be convicted, meaning "she was aware of the nature of her conduct or that those circumstances exist." Did the prosecution prove this? Nope. But it didn't matter because Harmison didn't apply the law and make them prove it. From page 5 of Harmison's "judgment":

The defendant, Carol Shuler, testified on her own behalf. She stated the judgment for possession was an interlocutory judgment in the landlord tenant case and did not authorize the Sheriff's Department to evict her and her husband. She stated that on September 9, she was napping and got up for some water. She heard loud noises outside the front door and looked through the peep hole, but it was covered. She saw the door knob moving, and she got scared and grabbed her cell phone. She said the door flew open, and she went flying against the wall. She felt hands grabbing her, and her head was pounded against the wall several times. She was placed in handcuffs, and then she saw it was the police.

Here are four points we can take from this:

(a) Carol was correct that the rent-and-possession judgment was interlocutory (non-final). Officer Scott Harrison admitted this under oath, on page 1 of the Harmison document. Under Missouri law, there cannot be execution on a judgment that is not final. (See State ex rel Turner v. Sloan [MO, 1980]) Neither Harrison nor Harmison could be bothered to look up the law. But Harrison inadvertently admitted that the cops had no grounds, under the law, to be on our rented property, much less to break into our home. Also, Carol believed (correctly) that the judgment was non-final, so there could be no eviction. She believed cops could not possibly be at her home, so she could not have "knowingly" assaulted one of them.

An X-ray of the arm a Missouri judge
apparently thinks Carol broke on her own.

(b) First, Carol did not testify that she heard "loud noises"; she said she heard noises, and that allergy problems caused her hearing to be off that day. Further, her testimony was that she looked out the peephole, and it was covered, so she could not see who was outside. Is this "good faith" in HarmisonWorld? For goodness sakes, the cops intentionally covered the peephole, so Carol could not see who they were, and that is good faith?

(c) Carol testified that she felt hands grabbing her, and she never said she "caused contact" with a cop; he caused contact with her, and the key prosecution witness admitted this. No kidding.

(d) Carol did not know she was dealing with cops until after her head had been pounded against the wall, and she was placed in handcuffs.

Did Carol "knowingly cause contact" with a cop? Hell, she did not even know they were cops, and they covered the peephole to ensure she would not know they were cops. The prosecution did not come close to proving Carol acted knowingly -- even if she did cause contact with a cop, and she did not.


(4) How can you be so sure Carol did not cause contact with a cop?

Because the "victim," Officer Jeremy Lynn, admits it -- as we've been reporting here for months. From page 3 of the Harmison document:

When [the door] was three-fourths open, resistance was experienced. Lynn used his left foot to block the door and forcefully opened the door. Lynn saw a male in the living room, approximately 15 feet away. The male was sitting in a chair with his hands palm down and his feet on the floor, apparently demonstrating he was not a threat. Lynn grabbed the person behind the door and pulled her out to apprehend her. Carol Shuler kept pushing Lynn and trying to pull away from him to resist custody.

Who caused contact here? Lynn admits he did, by grabbing Carol from behind the door. The statement goes on say to Carol "kept pushing Lynn," but that is different from Lynn's written incident report, where Lynn never says Carol pushed him or even touched him. And that goes to possible perjury -- or the filing of a false police report. Does Lynn say what Carol had done to merit being "apprehended"? Nope. Don't you have to do something wrong to have a cop grab and attempt to apprehend you? Not in Missouri, I guess.

Once again, the cop-witness and the judge seem to be clueless about the law. Missouri appellate courts have determined the key question in such cases is "Who initiated physical contact?" (See State v. Armstrong, 968 SW 2d 154 [Mo. Court of Appeals, 1998]) So, who initiated physical contact? Jeremy Lynn admits he did -- in order to apprehend someone who had done nothing unlawful.

Just how incompetent is this Missouri court? At case.net (1631-CR07731--ST V CAROL T SHULER) -- under charges, judgments, and sentences -- it has Carol being found guilty of trespass, first degree. The court bounced that charge almost one year ago. Again, I don't have the imagination to make this stuff up.

We'll stop for now with the above four primary points, but there is much more to examine in this horror show of a "judicial process."


(To be continued)

How can a crooked judge cheat you in federal court? Take a ride on Judge R. David Proctor's "magical mystery tour," and we'll show you exactly how it's done

Crooked federal judge David Proctor and his
Briarwood-based family
(From facebook.com)

Judge R. David Proctor's unlawful dismissal of our "House Case" is like a bad three-act play; he cheats my wife, Carol, and me in the beginning, the middle, and the end of his memorandum opinion. We've already shown how Proctor cheated us in "Act 1" and "Act 3," so now let's turn our attention to "Act 2."

I probably could write a New Yorker style magazine piece of considerable length about the myriad ways Proctor screwed us in the middle section of his opinion. But we will limit our attention to four key issues -- constitutional claims, wrongful foreclosure, tortious interference, and defamation. (Proctor's opinion and our Rule 59 response to it are embedded at the end of this post.)

If you care about justice and integrity, this stuff might be hard to stomach. But we operate under the theory that the first step to cleaning up corruption is to expose it. Please keep in mind that we're talking about a judge who claims to be a devout "Christian," who attends Briarwood Presbyterian Church (PCA) and sends his kids to Briarwood Christian School, supposedly because of the fine moral training they receive there. If so, it's good they go to Briarwood because they apparently will get no moral underpinnings at home -- based on the cheat job "Judge" Proctor administered in our "House Case."

(1) Constitutional claims (First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments)

Proctor rejects these claims because he finds that certain defendants -- Jessica Medeiros Garrison, Bill Baxley, Rob Riley, Liberty Duke -- are not "state actors" for purposes of claims under Sec. 1983. But the law is clear: We don't have to show such defendants are "state actors"; we have to allege that they worked in conjunction with state actors. That is simple, long-established law, and Proctor has to know it. His ruling to the contrary is a glaring sign that he is a cheater. From our Rule 59 motion:

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that private individuals who act jointly with state officials are deemed to be acting under color of state law. In Lugar v. Edmondson. 457 U.S. 922 (1982), our nation's highest court found: "We have consistently held that a private party's joint participation with state officials in the seizure of disputed property is sufficient to characterize that party as a "state actor" for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. The rule in these cases is the same as that articulated in Adickes v. S.ll. Kress and Co., supra, at 152, in the context of an equal protection deprivation: "Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the prohibited action, are acting "under color" of law for purposes of the statute. To act "under color" of law does not :require that the accused be an officer of the State. It is enough that he is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents," quoting United States v. Price. 383 U.S.., at 794." As Proctor acknowledges, the Shulers allege repeatedly that defendants acted "in conjunction with state actors." Thus, the Shulers have alleged facts that defendants were state actors and liable for suit under Section 1983. This court's erroneous finding must be reversed.

Is there any doubt that Proctor ruled contrary to law on this issue? None, zero. He rules contrary to three U.S. Supreme Court cases, so it's hard for a corrupt judge to get more wretched than that.


(2) Wrongful foreclosure

Proctor rejects this claim because he finds it can only be asserted against the "mortgagee" (Chase Mortgage, in this case). But -- surprise, surprise -- that's not what Alabama law says. We address that in the Rule 59 motion:

In In re Sharpe, 391 B.R. 117 (Bankr., N.D.Ala,, 2008), the federal bankruptcy court proposed the following as factors to consider as elements of a wrongful foreclosure claim under Alabama law: whether (I) the actions of the mortgagee were either outside the boundaries of the foreclosure or taken for some purpose other than to secure the debt owed by the mortgagor; (2) the actions of the mortgagee were for some ulterior motive; (3) the power of sale was perverted or used for the mortgagee's or someone else's purpose; or (4) the mortgagee had an ill motive. 391 B.R, at 152 -153. Under Alabama law, the ulterior motive can apply to the mortgagee or "someone else," and the Shulers have properly cited multiple parties who had an ulterior purpose. This is clear error and must be reversed.

As you can see from the highlighted section above, the ulterior motive does not have to rest just with the mortgagee (Chase Mortgage). It can rest with "someone else," and that's a pretty broad term, which could apply to any number of defendants in our "House Case."

Is there any doubt Proctor ruled contrary to law on this issue? None, zero.


(3) Tortious interference

Proctor rejects this claim, stating we had "pled no facts which in any way suggest that any Defendant except Defendant Chase instituted the foreclosure action against them, or was responsible for the decision to foreclose on their home."

That, however, is not the standard, as we show in our Rule 59 motion:

The Shulers must only allege that the defendants interfered with their business relationship with Chase, and the complaint does just that - especially when viewed under the proper standard of review and the requirements of Watts (which holds that the complaint must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party not moving for dismissal -- and that would be Carol and me). The court admits the Shulers have pled facts sufficient to suggest lawsuits brought by Defendants Riley, Duke, and Garrison affected their ability to pay the mortgage - and this confirms tortious interference because the Shulers' relationship with Chase was based on payment of a mortgage. Finally, Proctor violates the holdings of Watts, assuming Riley, Duke, and Garrison did not intentionally interfere with the Shulers' business relationship with Chase. But no one disputes that Riley, Duke, and Garrison intentionally filed lawsuits, and the Shulers' have alleged that the lawsuits were groundless and interfered with the key component oftheir relationship with Chase ­paying the mortgage. When viewed in a light most favorable to the Shulers, and the court is required to view facts in such light, it points to intentional interference.

This is simple stuff: We had a contract with Chase that required us to pay the mortgage, and individuals who caused me to be unlawfully incarcerated for five months, interfered with that business relationship by making it impossible for us to hold up our end of the deal.

Is there any doubt Proctor ruled contrary to law on this issue? None, zero.

(4) Defamation

This might represent Proctor's nuttiest ruling of all. Proctor rejects the defamation claim largely on a finding that GOP operative Jessica Medeiros Garrison statements in an article at the women's fashion magazine Marie Claire were privileged as part of civil judicial proceedings. In essence, that means the statements were exempt from defamation law because they were drawn from official court documents. But there is no evidence that Garrison or Marie Claire writer Liz Welch consulted any legal documents.

In fact, the article is listed as "by Jessica Garrison, as told to Liz Welch." That plainly states Garrison was the author of the article, with Welch serving as more or less a stenographer. A case of truly privileged journalism would involve a third-party reporter, who attended a trial, checked court documents, and attempted to write a somewhat objective article.

But the Marie Claire article has none of that. It was written by a party to the case and shows no sign that it involved objective journalism at all. Jessica Garrison made false statements about me in court documents, and again, during testimony in her default-judgment hearing. And Proctor correctly (gasp!) finds those statements to be privileged as part of court proceedings. Any third-party reporter would be free to write about them, without being subject to a defamation finding.

But a third-party reporter did not write the Marie Claire article; Jessica Garrison wrote it -- the byline clearly states as much. Garrison essentially is trying to get away with defaming me twice -- once in court proceedings (which, technically, is not defamation) and once in the Marie Claire article (which is not privileged and absolutely is defamation.)

Translation: It was incredibly dumb for Garrison to write the article, and it was even dumber for Marie Claire to publish it. Here's how we addressed some of these issues in the Rule 59 motion:

Regarding Garrison's false statement that Roger Shuler reported Luther Strange was the biological father of her child, Proctor cites an Alabama statutory privilege that protects "fair and impartial" reports of civil judicial proceedings. Proctor concludes, apparently out of thin air, that the Marie Claire article (and those largely republished from it at al.com and Yellowhammer News) is a fair and impartial report of court proceedings. This would be laughable ift he matter were not so serious. First, the Marie Claire article is listed as "by Jessica Garrison." In other words, it is written by one party to a civil case - the plaintiff, the one who brought it - without input from the other party. The court considers that "fair and impartial"? The first words of the article -- by Jessica Garrison -- make clear it is not impartial. Second, the byline says the story is "by Jessica Garrison, as told to Liz Welch." It clearly states the story is based on Jessica Garrison's words, as imparted to Liz Welch, with no reference to any court filings. The article is all about Jessica Garrison's words and emotions, and that's why it was published in a women's fashion magazine. The notion that Marie Claire runs articles about court proceedings is absurd. The article is by Garrison, and thus cannot seriously be called impartial or fair.

There you have it -- four clear-cut examples of how a federal judge can cheat you at the trial-court level. And that has serious repercussions for the public. One, it denies justice at the time and place where it should be achieved. And it forces the cheated party to file for an appeal, which can be expensive and time consuming -- and as we have shown in numerous post, it might not result in justice either. Appellate courts have a disturbing tendency to side with their trial-court brethren, no matter how wrong they are. It's easy to do this by use of "Do Not Publish" opinions.

Our "House Case" currently is under appeal to the U.S. Eleventh Circuit, based in Atlanta. We will keep you posted on that process, and we will address the fraudulent use of "Do Not Publish" opinions in upcoming posts.


(To be continued)

Corrupt state judges helped create an environment where Mike Hubbard and his Riley Inc. comrades felt free to use public office for personal enrichment

Josh Moon
(From montgomeryadvertiser.com)

Corrupt state judges helped create the environment that led to the conviction of Alabama House Speaker Mike Hubbard on 12 counts of ethics-law violations, writes a columnist for one of the state's mainstream media (MSM) outlets.

As we showed yesterday, the state's Web press--especially Bill Britt at Alabama Political Reporter (APR)--did most of the heavy lifting on the journalism that helped lead to Hubbard's downfall. But members of the MSM also made significant contributions, especially Josh Moon of the Montgomery Advertiser. John Archibald, of al.com, raised substantive points about the dangers and fears Hubbard is likely to face in prison--assuming his convictions are not overturned on appeal. But Archibald did not go far enough, failing to show how false arrests, false imprisonment, dubious lawsuits, and threats against advertisers have been used in efforts to shut down reporting from the Web press.

Moon provided some of the most insightful post-conviction analysis, with a piece titled "Hubbard conviction not a dark day." Writes Moon:

Friday was an average day in Alabama.

Oh, I know you’ve heard that it was a “dark day,” that former House Speaker, former state Representative and former non-felon Mike Hubbard’s conviction on 12 felony charges in the county where he resides was somehow an additional black mark on a state that’s running out of space for additional black marks.

But the truth is, it wasn’t dark.

Friday was just another day in a state where our politicians continue to give us all the middle finger, as they pilfer taxpayer dollars to pay their friends, their businesses and themselves.

Most don’t do it as blatantly as Hubbard. But most do it. Republican, Democrat, Independent -- the label is unimportant.

Moon showed how compromised legislators "give us the middle finger." And he showed that corrupt state judges helped create the toxic political environment that produced a "leader" like Mike Hubbard. Writes Moon:

[Legislators] accept consulting contracts from businesses they later pass legislation to help. They draw up and push through legislation to help their own businesses and friends. They take dark money from sources so their conflicts and hypocrisy stay hidden from public view.

And it’s not just our legislators.

Our judges are sometimes just as bad, if not worse.

Multiple justices on the Alabama Supreme Court have taken campaign money from corporations and then presided over cases involving those companies. There are campaign functions for judges held at or hosted by law firms, some of which have numerous cases go before that judge.

Every Alabamian should read and remember those words. Much of the state's political corruption flows from back-room deals that are cut in county courthouses. Some of it flows from federal courthouses, populated by judges who are more loyal to their political benefactors than they are to the U.S. Constitution.

As for Archibald, his column titled "Why Hubbard conviction is a really big deal for Alabama," hit close to home for this reporter. Archibald touched on a number of issues, including the unpleasantness that likely awaits Hubbard in an Alabama prison:

So Mike Hubbard, the self-proclaimed architect of the GOP takeover of the Statehouse, the consensus most powerful man in Alabama politics, the standout with his hand out, was convicted on 12 of 23 counts of using his office to fatten his own substantial wallet.

He's to be sentenced in July, and could face two to 20 years in state prison for each count. A state prison, one that get-tough-on-crime legislators have crammed to twice capacity, a state prison where fights are routine and rage simmers. It ain't Club Fed. It's real. Real prison. Real consequence. Real reason to be afraid.

Why do Archibald's words have special resonance with me? I know what it's like to be falsely arrested and incarcerated in Alabama, thanks to Rob Riley and other Mike Hubbard comrades in Riley Inc. I know what it's like to spend five months in an environment "where fights are routine and rage simmers." Archibald leaves out a couple of elements of prison life--despair also simmers there; and theft by inmates (against other inmates) is common. While in the Shelby County Jail, I witnessed a fellow inmate commit suicide by climbing atop two levels of cells and jumping some 27 feet to a concrete floor below, landing head-first about 10 feet away from where I was resting on my bunk.

Steven Ray Dismuke

I doubt I ever will forget the sound of the man's skull cracking on the floor, or the sight of blood flowing from his ears and mouth as his fellow inmates were ushered outside to what passed as our "recreation area." This man was not a nameless inmate to me. His name was Steven Ray Dismuke, and I had spoken with him for roughly two hours the day before about the peculiar circumstances that caused him to land in the Shelby County Jail.

Only after his jump, did I learn he had told other inmates that he suffered from bipolar disorder and schizophrenia and was not receiving treatment for either while in jail. Also, he had been placed in the general inmate population, even though his serious mental-health conditions probably should have placed him in a medical unit that required observation and treatment.

Yes, Mr. Archibald, Mike Hubbard probably will encounter "real reasons to be afraid" in prison. But at least Hubbard was convicted of crimes, by a jury of his peers. While I think you could make a strong argument that Attorney General Luther Strange politically prosecuted Hubbard, the trial itself appears to have been conducted fairly and by the book.

I, on the other hand, wound up being arrested without ever being charged with a crime, much less convicted of one. I never went before a jury, and I still have never seen a warrant that provided any justification for my arrest. Officers on the scene never told me why they were inside my house until after I had been beaten and doused with pepper spray. My arrest has all the appearances of a state-sanctioned kidnapping,  featuring police brutality and gross Fourth Amendment violations.

It all was done, at least on the surface, because I dared to write about a relationship between lobbyist Liberty Duke and Rob Riley, a charter member of Riley Inc.--and apparently one of Mike Hubbard's strongest supporters. But Archibald and al.com never have seen fit to take a serious look at a blatant assault on a free press and the First Amendment. An al.com reporter sought comment from me at various stages in the "proceedings,"  but no one from the staff interviewed me or took a serious look at the flagrantly unlawful rulings of Judge Claud Neilson. Also, I'm not aware of any news outlet examining multiple requests from Riley, Duke, and their lawyers for remedies against me that are not allowed by law.

By the way, I'm not the only journalist to face such threats. Bill Britt, of Alabama Political Reporter (APR), saw his advertising base threatened, and he was hit with a dubious defamation lawsuit by Bryan Taylor, a Riley Inc. member.

Here is a little something I learned while incarcerated, and it might apply to Mike Hubbard. I came to know several inmates who had spent time in both county or municipal jails and in state prisons. Without fail, they all said they preferred to be in state prison. In fact, several inmates checked with jail personnel almost daily in hopes that papers had come for their transfer to state prison.

Why is this? The inmates said that most jails aren't designed to house inmates for a long time. Thus, the food, recreational, and educational opportunities are limited or nonexistent. Prison, however, generally is for those who have been sentenced to at least a year or more, so there tends to be real recreational and educational facilities and higher quality (and quantity) of food.

Several inmates told me the Shelby County Jail was the worst of all worlds. It was built to the specifications of a maximum-security federal prison (because the county wanted to house federal prisoners--and did so for several years). but it still was a jail with almost nothing positive to relieve inmate boredom, frustration, or despair.

So whatever awaits Mike Hubbard, it's likely to be more pleasant than what I've already faced.

Isn't it odd that this assault on a free press has received national and international coverage, but no Alabama mainstream news outlet has taken a serious look? As for Mr. Archibald, he seems concerned that Mike Hubbard might experience fear in prison as a consequence of being found guilty of crimes. Meanwhile, Mr. Archibald and al.com have shown no interest in shining light on the kidnapping of a journalist who had committed no crime--and whose reporting, as a matter of law, has never been shown to be false or defamatory.

U.S. Judge William Acker Jr. And His Corrupt Rulings Represent Ronald Reagan's Lasting "Justice" Legacy

Judge William M. Acker Jr. (right)

To what extent can a federal judge twist facts and the law--not to mention logic--in order to produce an unlawful result that he desires? In the case of U.S. District Judge William M. Acker Jr., a Reagan appointee from the Northern District of Alabama, he produces twists that even Chubby Checker could not imagine.

Acker might be 85 years old, but he can contort himself in impressive fashion when he really wants to cheat a litigant who comes before him. I know because I've been one of those litigants.

We recently used the words of a fellow federal judge to prove that Acker committed a monstrous cheat job in a lawsuit over my unlawful termination at the University of Alabama at Birmingham (UAB). Acker granted summary judgment for the University of Alabama Board of Trustees and various individual defendants, even though no discovery had been conducted in the case. We used an opinion from U.S. District Judge Lynwood Smith Jr., to show that cannot lawfully be done.

But that only scratches the surface of Acker's chicanery in my case. His 10-page memorandum opinion, in which he explains his "reasoning" for dismissing my case, reeks of deceit and disingenuous thinking. When Acker isn't engaging in gross distortions of fact and law, he is lobbing insults at me--apparently because I refused to hire an attorney and had the audacity to represent myself. I've read Acker's opinion probably 10 times, and I still discover new jaw-dropping material. Each time, I come away thinking, "This is the work of a diseased mind." (The full opinion can be read at the end of this post.)

How diseased is Acker's mind? Well, the contempt he holds for everyday citizens comes across most clearly in the numerous pot shots he takes at me. We will address those in a future post, but for now, let's examine what passes for "legal scholarship" in a Bill Acker opinion.

My complaint in the UAB case presented a number of problems for Acker. Perhaps the biggest one involved a legal concept called qualified immunity. Individual state employees generally are protected from lawsuit--they are immune--as long as their actions do not violate a "clearly established constitutional right." (See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 2002.)

The Eleventh Circuit has held that the determining factor is whether the complaint alleges a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. (See Chesser v. Sparks, 248 F. 3d 1117, 11th Cir., 2001) My complaint alleges that the university terminated me in violation of the First Amendment right to free speech on matters of public concern--specifically the prosecution of former Alabama Governor Don Siegelman.

It's hard to imagine more clearly established constitutional rights than those spelled out in the First Amendment. Since my complaint alleged such a violation, that meant the individual UAB defendants could not lawfully be dismissed from the case. In legal terms, they did not enjoy qualified immunity.

How did Acker get around that, seeing that he clearly wanted to let the UAB defendants off the hook? As our headline states, he pulled "facts" right out of his butt. That's a crass way of putting it, but the description fits here. This is from page 6 of Acker's opinion:

Shuler's allegations, taken as true, do not provide a basis for any of the individual defendants to know that what he or she did, or failed to do, in connection with the termination of Shuler (after determining he had engaged in blogging at work after he had been warned not to do so) constituted a constitutional violation or violations and should have been recognized as such by a similarly situated person holding a supervisory position at an institution of higher learning. This court has looked for, but not found, any constitutional protection for an imagined right to blog on the job.

This might be the biggest load of horse feces ever written by a federal judge. First, the allegations in my complaint are the determining factor, and under "Count One, Violation of First Amendment," I clearly allege that I was terminated for blogging about a matter of public concern. Nowhere do I claim to have a right to "blog on the job," and nowhere does UAB even allege that I was "blogging on the job."

After Acker issued his order, I filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, outlining Acker's numerous mistakes of fact and law. Such a motion is governed by Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and mine can be viewed at the end of this post. In item No. 10 ("Shuler Asserted a Valid First Amendment Claim"), I addressed Acker's contortions on the subject of qualified immunity:

This court dips into bizarre territory when it states that Shuler's "blogging on the job" was not a constitutionally protected act. Why is this bizarre? Because Shuler never claims that "blogging on the job" is a constitutionally protected act. In fact, Shuler claims that he was fired largely because he wrote a blog, on his own time and with his own resources, about matters of public concern--and that is a constitutionally protected act. In no pleadings filed in this case does Shuler claim a right to "blog on the job." He specifically states that he was not blogging on the job and that UAB's own grievance committee found this to be true. Even UAB and its defendants do not claim, in any court document, that Shuler was "blogging on the job." One can only imagine where Judge Acker pulled this notion from.

Actually, I don't have to imagine too hard to figure out where Acker got this notion. He got it from the various political and legal forces who pressured UAB to fire me in the first place. These same forces wanted to ensure that I also got cheated in court.

We already have presented evidence that Acker was influenced by unlawful, ex parte communications in my case--and we've shown that such conduct likely constitutes obstruction of justice and possibly other federal crimes. Acker's references to a supposed "right to blog on the job"--words which are not contained in any document filed by either party in the case--are a clear sign that the judicial process was hopelessly tainted in my case.

This is ugly stuff, but we can find one comedic twist to the whole sordid tale. Acker's own words reveal exactly what he is doing--the judge, in fact, largely unmasks himself.

We are left with this discomforting thought: Bill Acker is a horrible judge, but he might be an even worse criminal. As the Iran-Contra Affair and the Savings and Loan Crisis remind us, Acker has plenty of company from the Reagan era.


(To be continued)

UAB-Acker Summary Judgment by Roger Shuler

Acker Motion to Amend

Obama Department Of Justice Finally Takes A Stand, By Cracking Down on Traffic-Ticket Fraud In Philly

If  you asked average Americans to describe President Barack Obama's philosophy on justice issues, you probably would be greeted with blank stares.

That would happen partly because many average Americans don't keep up with justice issues. But it also would happen, in part, because Obama has taken precious few strong stands on fundamental matters of right and wrong. In fact, the Obama Department of Justice (DOJ), under Attorney General Eric Holder, is known mostly for having amoeba-like qualities--it's a shapeless blob that doesn't stand for much of anything. And Holder is making a strong case for himself as the most ineffectual attorney general in U.S. history.

But a breaking story out of Philadelphia has provided insights into what we might call "The Obama Doctrine" on justice issues, and here it is:

"We won't do a thing about cases involving war crimes, financial fraud, or prosecutorial misconduct. But, by God, we are going to make the world safe from traffic-ticket scofflaws."

That seems to be the take-home lesson from last week's report that nine current or former traffic-court judges in Philadelphia have been indicted for conspiracy and fraud, involving a widespread scheme to fix traffic tickets for those who are well connected. A court clerk and two businessmen also were indicted. Here is a description of the charges, from a report at philly.com:

The charges, outlined in a 77-count indictment, described "a well-understood conspiracy of silence" that created two distinct courts: one where typical citizens paid for their infractions, and a second where offenders with the right connections won acquittals or saw their fines or cases disappear. . . .

The indictment alleged that a practice was more the rule than the exception--judges or their assistants shredding documents, shifting cases to friendly judges, and hiding behind code words. Instead of bluntly asking a colleague to quash a ticket, judges allegedly asked for "consideration" on certain cases and then watched them disappear. 

Consideration, the indictment said, was reserved for friends and relatives, ward leaders, and contractors or merchants who could trade favors of their own. Requests came by phone, in person, and in notes dropped in a box at a local bar.

A reasonable citizen might ask, "Why is this a federal matter?" Public-corruption cases almost always involve the use of federal wires or mail systems, and often include the exchange of money, so that gives the DOJ jurisdiction.

Perhaps the bigger question is this: Why did the Obama Justice Department spend three years investigating traffic tickets in Philadelphia while it has ignored far more serious wrongdoing around the country?

Let's consider just a few of the stories we've reported here at Legal Schnauzer:

* Former Alabama Governor Don Siegelman sits in a Louisiana federal prison because of bribery charges that were brought almost one full year after the statute of limitations had expired. The prosecution team, led by Bush-era U.S. Attorney Leura Canary, engaged in rampant misconduct; powerful evidence points to juror misconduct; and U.S. District Judge Mark Fuller gave jury instructions that did not match the applicable law.

* Mississippi lawyer Paul Minor and former state judge John Whitfield sit in federal prisons because U.S. District Judge Henry Wingate gave jury instructions on honest-services fraud that did not come close to matching the actual law. Another former state judge, Wes Teel, has been released after serving his sentence for a crime he did not commit.

* Bonnie Cahalane, a Clanton, Alabama, resident, recently spent almost five months in jail because of an alleged debt connected to her divorce case. Alabama law plainly states that a litigant is not subject to contempt of court or imprisonment because of a property-related debt from the dissolution of a marriage. Chilton County Circuit Judge Sibley Reynolds threw Ms. Cahalane in jail anyway and has unlawfully forced her to place her house for sale.

* Sherry Rollins, a Birmingham resident, and her two daughters have spent more than seven years under an unlawful divorce judgment issued by Shelby County Circuit Judge D. Al Crowson. The order wildly favors Ted Rollins, the CEO of Campus Crest Communities and Ms. Rollins' former husband. Ted Rollins also just happens to belong to one of the nation's wealthiest families, the folks behind Orkin Pest Control. Sherry Rollins initiated divorce proceedings in Greenville, South Carolina, where the family lived, and the case was litigated there for three years. Ted Rollins somehow got the venue changed when it appeared he was going to receive unfavorable outcomes in Greenville. Crowson took the case, even though black-letter law shows he had no jurisdiction.

* U.S. District Judge William M. Acker Jr. granted summary judgment in my employment lawsuit against the University of Alabama System, even though I was not allowed to conduct any discovery. Black-letter federal law says summary judgment cannot be considered, much less granted, when the opposing party has not been allowed to conduct adequate discovery. Acker flagrantly violated his oath to uphold the law by denying the right to conduct discovery that would prove my case.

Three of the cases noted above originated in federal courts, so the DOJ clearly has jurisdiction to investigate those matters. The two others--the Cahalane and Rollins cases--involve state-court public corruption and probable use of federal mails or wires, which also would invoke federal jurisdiction.

All five cases involve wrongdoing that is far more serious than that alleged in Philadelphia. But has the Obama DOJ looked at any of these cases? We've seen no sign of it. And those are only a few such cases that we've raised here--on one blog, in one state.

To be clear, we are all for nailing corrupt traffic-court judges. Those are publicly funded positions, and they should not be sullied by bribery and fraud. But the Obama DOJ would be taken much more seriously if it addressed corruption across the board, especially in cases that involve serious abuses of the public trust.

How flimsy is the Philadelphia case? Two of the indicted judges are charged with fixing one traffic ticket each.

Can we all say, "Good grief"?

Meanwhile, Mark Fuller, Henry Wingate, Sibley Reynolds, Al Crowson, William Acker Jr., and countless other judicial thugs continue to serve.

We are glad to see the Obama DOJ has awakened to the problem of courtroom corruption. But the Philadelphia story appears to be a classic case of worrying about the wart on your butt while your pants are on fire.

Dana Siegelman Makes A Profound Statement About The Perils We All Face From Corrupt Judges

Dana Siegelman

Former Congressman Parker Griffith said this week that the Don Siegelman case was a "political assassination" and an "embarrassment" to the U.S. Department of Justice. Those words, spoken in an interview with Los Angeles radio host Lila Garrett, were perhaps the most powerful statement from a political figure about the nation's most notorious selective prosecution.

The most profound words in the interview, however, might have come from Dana Siegelman, the former Alabama governor's daughter. Making a joint appearance with Griffith, Dana Siegelman cut to the core of her father's case--and shed light on the issue of judicial corruption, which plagues our justice system at both the state and federal levels.

With the exception of Harper's legal-affairs analyst Scott Horton and Justice-Integrity Project director Andrew Kreig, most lawyers speak in polite tones about even the worst federal justices--including Mark Fuller, who ramrodded the Siegelman case in the Middle District of Alabama. Neither Parker Griffith nor Dana Siegelman is a lawyer, so they did not pull any punches. Griffith called Fuller "a weak individual," but Dana Siegelman went much farther--and she illustrated the problem that corrupt judges can pose for all Americans.

The issue came up when Garrett asked about possible recourse, considering that the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to hear the case, and noted that "a raft of lawyers" must be working on a case that involves such a clear injustice. Dana Siegelman's reply?

It’s a funny thing. A lot of top lawyers wanted to take this case right from the get-go because it seemed like a blatant win, and they wanted their names on it. Dad liquidated (our) trust fund for college degrees, and he’s apologized to this day because he spent all of this money trying to get these great lawyers to do this case, and of course, as the case looked less and less appealing, they left. So there is no money left for legal defense, and we have a handful of people working tirelessly pro bono, appealing the sentence, appealing for a new trial . . . and these appeals are long in the making. I think we’ve been appealing for a new trial for almost four years.

Why the futility? Dana Siegelman cuts to the chase--and it affects many Americans, not just her father:

We had a great legal defense team--lots of people who really love dad. They are brilliant lawyers, but you can be the best lawyer in the entire world and if you get in front of a corrupt judge, there’s really not much you can do. And that’s where they found themselves.

Those words are so on target that they hurt--and they are the No. 1 reason we need legal reform in this country, maybe even more so than health-care reform. If you have good insurance, our health-care system probably serves you well--and that is the case for many Americans. Our legal system, however, serves almost no one--except members of the legal tribe. In some cases--as we know because Don Siegelman is a lawyer--the legal tribe will eat one of its own.

In theoretical terms, Dana Siegelman's words are flawed. After all, we have multiple layers of appellate  courts. And any lawyer who witnesses misconduct by a fellow member of the bar, including a clearly corrupt judge, is bound by ethics rules to report it.

But what is the reality? Appellate judges often are more interested in providing cover for their trial-court brethren than in ensuring that justice is served. And the rule that lawyers must report misconduct within the profession . . . well, that's an utter joke. The law is our only self-regulating profession, and lawyers prove what most of us already know--that foxes make poor guards of hen houses.

That creates a situation that is horrific for victims of the system--and it's also hard on the lawyers who try to serve them. Says Dana Siegelman:

I’ve seen dad’s lawyers cry in the courtroom because they were just so exhausted and devastated that it’s turned out to be like this--and all of their hard work was for naught.