Mike Hubbard, and Bob and Rob Riley, received leaked grand-jury information as early as Dec. 2012

Rob Riley

Alabama House Speaker Mike Hubbard; former Governor Bob Riley; and Riley's son, Birmingham attorney Rob Riley, received leaked information related to the Lee County grand jury beginning in at least December 2012, according to court documents released yesterday.

E-mails between Hubbard and Bob Riley, included in the court documents, make it clear former Deputy Attorney General Sonny Reagan was the source of the leaks. Reagan was forced to resign from the AG's office in December 2014 amid allegations that he had shared secret grand-jury information with targets of the investigation.

Documents also show that the grand jury filed a subpoena seeking to question Rob Riley. His lawyer, William Athanas of the Birmingham firm Waller Landsen Dortch & Davis, threatened to file a motion to quash the subpoena, and Rob Riley apparently has managed to escape testifying so far.

All of this adds to evidence that my unlawful incarceration--from October 23, 2013, to March 26, 2014, in Shelby County, Alabama--was connected to the Lee County investigation. Rob Riley and lobbyist Liberty Duke sought my arrest based on a dubious defamation lawsuit that sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, both prohibited as prior restraints under more than 230 years of First Amendment law.

Our ongoing investigation indicates I probably was beaten and maced in my own garage, arrested without an apparent warrant, and jailed for five months--the only journalist in the western hemisphere to be incarcerated in 2013--for more than one reason. My reports on U.S. Circuit Judge Bill Pryor and his connections to 1990s gay pornography almost certainly played a role. But we now know Rob Riley was concerned enough about the Lee County probe to trample his profession's ethical provisions, and perhaps commit state and federal crimes, in order to get inside information.

The first sign of leaks are tied to former ALGOP chairman Bill Armistead and his announcement on December 12, 2012, that Hubbard was under investigation, according to a report yesterday from Bill Britt at Alabama Political Reporter. An e-mail exchange between Hubbard and Bob Riley, dated the next day (December 13, 2012), shows they already had inside information about the grand jury--as did Rob Riley.

From the December 13 e-mails, marked as Exhibit L, starting with Hubbard:

On Dec 13, 2012, at 8:19 AM, Mike Hubbard wrote:

Gov:

Talk with Rob when you can. Armistead and Luther have now teamed up to try and ruin me politically. Not sure what Luther'a end game is others than he views me as a potential threat down the road. Rob knows details.

This response came from Bob Riley:

On Dec 13, 2012, at 9:06 AM, "Bob Riley" wrote:

I was with him during the conversations with you and Sonny last night - ..... Have a couple of people trying to understand what's happening.

Bob Riley

What does this tell us? Bill Britt provides a summary:

Here Riley acknowledged a conversation with Reagan and Hubbard and also indicates that Rob Riley was involved in receiving information about the Lee County Grand Jury as early as December, 2012.

The dirt gets even deeper with Exhibit K, which involves a January 18, 2013, e-mail from Hubbard to Bob Riley, referencing former Hubbard aide Josh Blades:

Confidentially, I received word just now from Josh [Blades] that a mutual friend in the AG’s office (he used to work for you) called to tell him that the prosecutor told him this afternoon that the accusations against me have been thoroughly investigated and totally dismissed by the Grand Jury.”

What does this mean? Here is Britt's brief summary:

The emails show that Riley and Hubbard, along with Rob Riley and Josh Blades, then Hubbard's Chief of Staff, were involved in leaked secrets from the Grand Jury. It also reinforces that Reagan was the leaker because he is the only person in the Attorney General’s Office who had worked in the Riley Administration.

This is the most powerful evidence yet of the deep sleaze in which Hubbard and the Rileys have engaged. This raises all kinds of questions, but for now, we will focus on these:

* Rob Riley and Sonny Reagan are lawyers, and they clearly engaged in efforts to undermine the justice process. Will they face disbarment proceedings?

* The actions of Rob Riley, Bob Riley, Hubbard, and Reagan involve attempts to obstruct the Lee County grand jury. Could this lead to criminal charges--perhaps under the state statute for obstructing governmental operations? Since the federal wires were involved via e-mails, could that lead to federal obstruction of justice charges?

In a world of hyper-aggressive and sensitive cops, what acts constitute legitimate cases of resisting arrest?

Liberty Duke

 Please trust me when I say there is nothing fun about being roughed up by Alabama sheriff deputies--inside your own home, on a civil matter--and hauled off to jail for five months. But a reader did manage to find something amusing about that scenario the other day--and it helps drive home an important point of law that we've never addressed.

We wrote on March 9 about the tendency of cops, in a world where cameras and microphones catch many of their actions, to use certain magic phrases that make it seem a suspect is resisting. With that in mind, I noted that Shelby County Deputy Chris Blevins can be heard on a video of my arrest repeatedly saying, "Don't fight me, don't fight me"--even though his own incident report indicates I wasn't fighting him.

A reader noticed the disparity between the words Blevins spoke and the words he wrote on his report, which we ran at the bottom of our post, and responded with this comment:

I know this was unpleasant for you, LS, but it's kind of funny to see that Officer Blevins was shouting "Don't fight me!" while he states on his report that he was throwing you through boxes multiple times. Who was fighting whom here?

Even I had to chuckle at that. But it raises a serious question: What acts tend to constitute a real case of resisting arrest?

As we noted in our March 9 post, Blevins states multiple times in his report that I was resisting, but he never says what I did that amounted to resisting. He admits that he initiated physical contact with me, that I never turned away from him as if to escape, that my only physical act was to raise my arms in front of my face for protection.

So how on earth did I get hit with resisting arrest--and convicted, resulting in a fine of $845? The only answer to that question, in my case, is that we are talking about Shelby County, Alabama, a place where corruption has reigned for so long that law-enforcement and legal types probably have forgotten what it's like to conduct their affairs in an honest fashion.

But what about a jurisdiction that at least puts on a reasonable show of trying to dispense justice? Even a lot of lawyers find many resisting-arrest cases to be dubious. Ken White, a California lawyer who writes at the Popehat blog, says they often are referred to as "contempt of cop."

But what acts should give rise to a real resisting arrest case? Most statutes, including the one in Alabama, are vague on that question. But it appears that case law provides some guidance. The best information I've found comes from an article titled "Possible defenses to resisting arrest charges" at attorneys.com. From the article:

Resisting arrest is usually defined as intentionally preventing a police officer from lawfully arresting or handcuffing you or taking you to jail. Here are some things that can be considered resisting arrest:

* Physical acts, such as running away, hiding, or struggling with the officer

* Giving false identification, either verbally or by presenting a fake ID

* Trying to help another person avoid arrest

* Threatening the officer

Being slow to comply with an order or swearing at an officer is not, by itself, usually enough to warrant resisting arrest charges. Neither is questioning an officer's actions or authority before ultimately complying with requests.

The article goes on to state that, as we showed in a post last week, you can't be charged with resisting an arrest that was unlawful in the first place. And mine was unlawful on multiple grounds--starting with the fact that it was based on a preliminary injunction in a defamation lawsuit, which has constituted an unlawful prior restraint under First Amendment law for more than 200 years.

Chris Blevins was in my garage only because Alabama GOP political figures Rob Riley and Liberty Duke sought a preliminary injunction that is wildly contrary to law--and Claud Neilson, a corrupt hack of a judge, let them get away with it.

Rob Riley

Were the acts noted above present in my resisting arrest case? A quick look at Officer Blevins incident report (which can be read at the end of this post) shows the answer is no.

I didn't run away or hide or struggle with him (unless being thrown through two stacks of boxes counts as struggling); I didn't give false ID; I didn't threaten or curse him; and I wasn't slow about complying with any orders because I wasn't given any orders--Blevins didn't state why he was there until after I had been knocked to the concrete floor of my basement three times and maced in the face.

Perhaps my only defiant act came when Blevins asked me to step outside, and I refused, telling him to get out of my garage. He had not shown me a warrant or even said he had a warrant, so I saw no sign that he had grounds to be directing me to do anything.

Yes, there are comical elements to this story, but in the end, it is a serious matter. It's left me with a criminal record for a "crime" I didn't commit. I had lived 56 years on this planet without ever coming close to being arrested for anything.

My record was crystal clean, but now it isn't--all because a rogue cop, who had no lawful grounds to be on my property, concocted a bogus case of "don't fight me."

I intend to do everything in my power to make sure my record gets back to the clean state it once was in. And one way or another, I'm going to hold Chris Blevins, Rob Riley, Liberty Duke, Claud Neilson, and others accountable.

Shuler Arrest-Incident Report by Roger Shuler

Alabama cops apparently don't mind ignoring Fourth Amendment law when making dubious traffic stops

An Alabama sheriff's deputy used an unconstitutional traffic stop to initiate my October 2013 arrest, adding to the growing number of grounds by which my five-month incarceration was unlawful. Did the deputy have reason to know he was acting outside the law? Well, he violated a U.S. Supreme Court decision that has been in place for 30 years.

I was the only journalist in the western hemisphere to be incarcerated in 2013, drawing national and international news coverage that focused largely on violations of free-speech rights under the First Amendment. But the actions of Shelby County deputy Chris Blevins trample the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures--and Blevins' acts should be disturbing to every American who drives, or rides in, a vehicle. To make matters even more disturbing, Blevins was not the first Alabama law-enforcement to conduct an unconstitutional traffic stop against my wife and me during roughly a three-week period in fall 2013.

I raised the traffic-stop issue at my resisting-arrest trial in January 2014, trying to show that I could not resist an arrest that was unlawful, on multiple grounds, in the first place. But District Judge Ron Jackson claimed Blevins was making a "pick-up stop," based on a warrant for my arrest, and therefore was not subject to Fourth Amendment provisions. Jackson, as seems customary for Shelby County judges, cited no law to support this notion--and my research indicates there is nothing in the law to support it.

Do citizens pay a price for that kind of judicial arrogance and incompetence? The answer is yes, both literally and figuratively. Jackson found me guilty of resisting arrest and imposed an $845 fine. My picture was on the Shelby County "Most Wanted" list for months, long after the fine had been paid in April.

Where does one go to have his reputation restored when it has been trampled by rogue officers, prosecutors, and judges. We've already shown that Circuit Judge Claud Neilson issued a preliminary injunction in a defamation case against me (brought by Republican political figures Rob Riley and Liberty Duke), violating roughly 230 years of First Amendment law. We've shown that prosecutor Tonya Willingham brought a resisting-arrest charge against me even though Jackson ordered her to produce any warrants for my arrest, and she responded, "Your Honor, we have no warrants."

As it stands now, the public record indicates Blevins entered the garage underneath our house, knocked me to a concrete floor three times, maced me in the face, dragged me to the driveway, handcuffed me and tossed me in the back of a police cruiser--all without having a warrant. (This apparently violates a U.S. Supreme Court precedent styled Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 1979; more on that case coming in future posts.) The record also indicates officers were trying to arrest my wife, but apparently were unwilling to knock down our front door to get at her in an upstairs bedroom.

This is unlawful enough to boggle the mind, but the problems really started when Blevins honked his horn in the driveway and forced me to stop our car.

How do we know that Blevins acted in an unconstitutional matter? Well, it isn't easy to make such a determination because traffic-stop law is murky; it's mostly enforced at the state level, but it is grounded in federal law--especially the Fourth Amendment, under which a traffic stop is considered a "seizure."

In general, an officer can stop a vehicle under two circumstances: (1) He witnesses a violation of traffic laws, which can include moving violations or issues related to a vehicle's condition; (2) He has reasonable suspicion to believe an occupant in the vehicle is involved in criminal activity.

We've already established that Blevins' actions constitute a traffic stop under the law. He drove his police cruiser down our driveway as I was coming home and trying to pull our car into the garage. He activated his horn/siren and emergency lights to get my attention, forcing me to stop. Blevins' own words from his incident report (see report at the end of this post) show that he was conducting a traffic stop:

I observed Mr. Shuler traveling toward his home at 5204 Logan Drive. Mr. Shuler pulled into his driveway, and I drove in behind him. I used my vehicle's air horn to get Mr. Shuler's attention, and he stopped his vehicle in front of his garage.

Blevins' own words describe a "show of force" that caused me to stop and be detained--meaning this was a traffic stop, as described in "The Law of Traffic Stops (Keyed to Alabama Law)," by Montgomery attorney Patrick Mahaney.

Did Blevins have lawful grounds to stop my vehicle? For guidance, we first turn to a case styled Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), which holds:

An automobile stop is thus subject to the constitutional imperative that it not be "unreasonable" under the circumstances. As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.

Could Blevins stop my car because he had probable cause to believe I had committed a traffic violation? The answer is no. Blevins' never stated to me that I had violated any traffic law and never made any mention of writing a ticket or warning. His own words in the incident report make no mention of an alleged traffic violation.

Since Blevins fails under the Whren test, we must turn to his second option--a case styled United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985), which is 30 years old and holds:

Where police have been unable to locate a person suspected of involvement in a past crime, the ability to briefly stop that person, ask questions, or check identification in the absence of probable cause promotes the strong government interest in solving crimes and bringing offenders to justice. Restraining police action until after probable cause is obtained would not only hinder the investigation but might also enable the suspect to flee and remain at large. The law enforcement interests at stake in these circumstances outweigh the individual's interest to be free of a stop and detention that is no more extensive than permissible in the investigation of imminent or ongoing crimes. When police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony, then a Terry stop may be made to investigate that suspicion.

Hensley grew from an armed robbery in the Cincinnati area, where police issued a "wanted flyer" for the driver of the getaway car. Based on the wanted flyer, police eventually stopped a vehicle, and the U.S. Supreme Court found the stop lawful because officers had "reasonable suspicion" that the person was "wanted in connection with a completed felony."

Was I wanted in connection with a completed felony? Heck, I wasn't even wanted in connection to a crime. I was wanted because of a contempt of court order based on an unlawful preliminary injunction in a defamation lawsuit.

As noted above, traffic-stop law can be tricky. For example, four federal circuits have extended Hensley to apply to cases of suspected misdemeanors. But I wasn't suspected of a misdemeanor, not even jaywalking.

Every state-law case that I've seen acknowledges that traffic-stop law, by definition, is grounded in the U.S. constitution--specifically, the Fourth Amendment. And I've yet to see a case that cites federal law to say it's OK to conduct a traffic stop on an individual who allegedly has an arrest warrant in a civil case that involves no allegations of criminal activity.

The word "allegedly" is important here because, the public record at the moment, indicates Blevins entered our home without an arrest warrant--and I've neither seen nor heard anything from him or prosecutor Willingham to show that a warrant existed at all.

What can we take from this? Perhaps its best to turn to an article titled "Alabama Journalist Jailed for Contempt Under Political Stench," which was published on January 15, 2014, at photographyisnotacrime,com (PINAC), a Web site that Miami multimedia journalist Carlos Miller started in 1997. PINAC opposes efforts to limit the public's ability to chronicle police activities.

Reporter Andrew Meyer notes that my case raises troubling issues about the First Amendment (right to a free press), Fourth Amendment (right to be free from unreasonable search/seizure), Fifth Amendment (right not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law), Sixth Amendment (right to a trial by jury), and Fourteenth Amendment (right to due process and equal protection).

Concludes PINAC's Meyer:

Shuler’s story might set the record for amount of constitutional rights casually broken in one case.

Perhaps more than any other journalist I'm aware of, Meyer understands that my case goes way beyond the First Amendment violations--as important as those are. These are violations that should trouble every American, even those who have no interest in ever practicing journalism or writing a blog.

Have you ever driven, or ridden in, a vehicle? If so, these issues should matter to you.

Shuler Arrest-Incident Report by Roger Shuler

Unconstitutional traffic stops became Alabama cops' No. 1 tool in the days leading to my arrest for blogging

My arrest and incarceration in 2013-14 has been widely reported as unlawful under the First Amendment--and that is correct. But it also violates the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures--and it does it on multiple levels.

Police misconduct might be the biggest news story of the past six months or so. Disturbing incidents in Ferguson, Missouri; New York City, and Madison, Alabama, have made international news and caused even some conservative, "pro police" citizens to ask, "What's going on with our cops?" I've certainly had cause to ask that question after watching Shelby County, Alabama, officers repeatedly abuse their right to "show authority"--a process that ended with me being assaulted in my own garage and hauled off to jail, with mace dripping all over me.

Perhaps I'm best known as the only U.S. journalist to be arrested in 2013, and I suspect most citizens quickly understand that involves matters of a free press under the First Amendment. The Fourth Amendment violations might be harder to grasp, but in many ways, they are even more disturbing--maybe because they bring you face to face with officers who are violating the law they are entrusted to uphold.

Why is that so unsettling? Not everyone is a journalist or a blogger, but almost all of us drive or ride in automobiles at some point. Law enforcement has frightening power to abuse citizens in what is supposed to be the relative security of their vehicles. Such abuse is present all over my case--both while my wife and I were driving to a nearby library and while I was trying to drive down our driveway and into our garage about three weeks later.

In both instances, we were subjected to traffic stops that violate the Fourth Amendment--and that means the stops and all actions flowing from them, including my arrest and incarceration, were unconstitutional.

What is the applicable law? It starts with a U.S. Supreme Court case styled Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), which set the framework for traffic-stop law at the federal and state level. From that grew a case styled Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), which held that a traffic stop is a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment--and that puts a significant burden on any law-enforcement officer who is thinking about stopping a vehicle. From the Whren opinion:

The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable seizures." Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile detained by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a "seizure" of "persons" within the meaning of this provision. [Citations omitted].

An automobile stop is thus subject to the constitutional imperative that it not be "unreasonable" under the circumstances. As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.

That brings us to the first of two unlawful traffic stops to which the Shelby County Sheriff's Office subjected my wife and me. It came on September 29, 2013, and we already have presented powerful evidence that Officer Mike DeHart concocted a bogus violation (rolling through a stop sign) in order to serve me with court papers in a lawsuit brought by Republican political figures Rob Riley and Liberty Duke. Even if the traffic stop had been legitimate at the outset, and it almost certainly was not, DeHart violated the Fourth Amendment by extending the stop for an improper purpose, violating long-established law that is outlined in a case styled United States v. Simms, 385 F. 3d 1347 (11th Cir., 2004).

As for the second unlawful traffic stop, it came on the evening of October 23, 2013. Thankfully, it directly involved only me, not my wife; she was taking a nap in an upstairs bedroom, unaware her husband essentially was being kidnapped in the garage two stories below.

I had spent most of the afternoon at a library and was on my way home after grabbing a quick bite for dinner. Unbeknownst to me, Deputy Chris Blevins was waiting for me. He was sitting in a marked police vehicle, parked on a street (MacIan Lane) that runs perpendicular to ours (Logan Drive)--about 100 yards from our house.

As I turned left onto our street and prepared to pull into the driveway at 5204 Logan Drive, Blevins started to follow me. I was waiting for the door to fully rise before pulling into our garage, when Blevins drove down our driveway and activated a siren/horn and his emergency lights.

I was in my vehicle and had just come off the roadway; he was in a vehicle and had just come off the roadway. This was a traffic stop, a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, as outlined in a case styled United States v. Purcell, 236 F. 3d 1274 (11th Cir., 2001).

How else do we know this was a traffic stop? Well, a simple check of the "traffic stop" entry at Wikipedia tells us. It states, in part:

A traffic stop, commonly called being pulled over, is a temporary detention of a driver of a vehicle by police to investigate a possible crime or minor violation of law. . . .

A stop is usually accomplished through a process known as "pulling over" the suspect's vehicle. Police vehicles (except those used by undercover personnel) traditionally have sirens, loudspeakers, and light bars that rotate and/or flash. These devices are used by the officer to get the attention of the suspect and to signal that they are expected to move over to the shoulder and stop.

We also can check an article, titled "The Law of Traffic Stops (Keyed to Alabama Law)," by Montgomery attorney Patrick Mahaney. Writes Mahaney:

The regulation of movement of vehicles on the highway by law enforcement is continually scrutinized under Fourth Amendment standards. The police use of emergency lights, police siren, or other indicia of authority to direct a motorist to pull over and come to a stop, which may include simply pointing to a motorist and giving direction by hand signal for the motorist to stop, reviewing courts have consistently held such police actions squarely falling within the concept of "show of force." . . .

Consistent with prior opinions of the Supreme Court, any show of force by a law enforcement officer, to include the use of police equipment to indicate to a motorist to stop, even a law enforcement officer's hand gesture to a motorist to pull over, places the burden of Constitutional reasonableness on the government. Such actions are customarily termed a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment.

Blevins used his lights and siren as a "show of force" that caused me to stop and be detained. This, by legal definition, was a traffic stop. For good measure, Blevins admitted at my resisting-arrest trial that his actions constituted a traffic stop.

Did Blevins meet his burden of "Constitutional reasonableness" when he stopped my vehicle? In other words, did he "have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation had occurred"?

The answer to both questions is no. And that has profound meaning for my arrest and the five months I spent in jail--all of which was unconstitutional under the First Amendment AND the Fourth Amendment.


(To be continued)

Do e-mail exchanges reveal Mike Hubbard and Bob Riley as political and psychological "victimizers"?

We showed yesterday that e-mail exchanges between House Speaker Mike Hubbard and former Governor Bob Riley present troubling evidence that two of Alabama's most powerful political figures possess attributes found in narcissism and sociopathy.

That becomes particularly disturbing when you research personality disorders and discover that the narcissistic and antisocial (more commonly known as sociopathy) disorders have much in common, especially their tendency to produce "victimizers."

Consider the insights of Stanton Samenow, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist in Alexandria, Virginia, and author of Inside the Criminal Mind. Samenow wrote an article for Psychology Today titled "Narcissistic Personality Disorder and the Antisocial Personality Disorder--A Lot in Common: There Is Little Difference Between the Antisocial Individual and the Narcissist." Here is how Samenow describes the tie that seems to most bind the narcissist and the sociopath:

The most important point is that people who are either antisocial or narcissistic are victimizers. Most likely, every reader of this column has unfortunately known a man or woman who is incredibly self-centered and self-aggrandizing, who is untruthful and cannot be trusted, who fails to see things from any point of view other than his own, and who is able to eliminate fear (and conscience) long enough to pursue any means to an end. Invariably, others are betrayed, deceived, and emotionally (perhaps financially) injured.

How else are narcissists and sociopaths similar? Both tend to lead chaotic lives, or create chaos for others, Samenow writes:

The narcissist, for example, "is uncomfortable in situations in which he or she is not the center of attention." The same is true of the antisocial person. The narcissist evidences "self-dramatization." People who are antisocial can also be quite dramatic. In fact, some count on drama to distract others from their real intentions. And some appear dramatic as they play out their perception that they are the center of the universe around which all else should revolve.

How do these traits present themselves in the Hubbard/Riley e-mails? The most obvious example comes when Hubbard states that he needs to fire four or five people "to really set the tone that new sheriffs are in town and in control." Hubbard, it seems, had picked out his victims, and the grounds for their dismissals apparently were . . . well, nonexistent. Hubbard's victims simply had parts to play in a twisted game that revolved around Mr. Speaker.

As for Riley, he didn't seem to have any qualms with Hubbard's plans. In fact, one gets the impression that Riley had taught Hubbard such tactics and was taking a certain pride in hearing about them.

What is the main difference between a narcissist and a sociopath? Samenow provides an intriguing answer:

Criteria in the (American Psychiatric Association's) DSMIV for Antisocial Personality Disorder (30l.70), include "failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest." Arrestability is not a criterion for diagnosing a Narcissistic Personality Disorder (30l.81). However, if you omitted the diagnostic labels and reviewed the other criteria for each of these "personality disorders," you might not be able to distinguish one from the other.

In simple terms, a sociopath is more likely than a narcissist to have a criminal record. That's ironic because Hubbard currently faces a  23-count corruption indictment--and Bob Riley and his daughter, Minda Riley Campbell, are named in the indictment.

For good measure, published reports have former first son Rob Riley working with Hubbard on a scheme to funnel Indian gaming funds through the Republican State Leadership Committee (RSLC) and back to a group designed to combat non-Indian gaming. Hubbard, Rob Riley, and anti-gambling zealot A. Eric Johnston all claimed to have no idea that the money came from gambling sources, and, not surprisingly, powerful evidence suggests they were lying.

Could Hubbard, the Rileys, and some of their cohorts all go down together in a steaming pile of criminality? It's possible, but we suspect the Rileys will save themselves by throwing Hubbard (and perhaps others) under the proverbial bus.

Stanton Samenow probably would not be surprised by such an outcome. Some warped individuals are better than others at getting away with criminal behavior:

The narcissist may not commit an act that is illegal, but the damage he does may be devastating. In fact, because the narcissist appears to be law-abiding, others may not be suspicious of him, leaving him freer to pursue his objectives, no matter at whose expense.

I have found that the main difference between the narcissist and antisocial individual, in most instances, is that the former has been shrewd or slick enough not to get caught for breaking the law.

E-mails between Mike Hubbard and Bob Riley shine light on the "politics of destructive personalities"

Bob Riley

E-mails between House Speaker Mike Hubbard and former Governor Bob Riley provide circumstantial evidence that someone connected to the Riley administration caused my wife and me to be cheated out of our jobs in 2008-09. The e-mails and their timing also suggest that Hubbard, or an ally of his, helped cost one of the state's most experienced and respected journalists his job.

All of it hints that perhaps the state's two most powerful conservative political leaders have warped personalities.

The notion that someone on Team Riley caused me to be cheated out of my job as an editor at UAB in May 2008 is not new. I long have suspected that, mainly because a UAB human-resources official admitted that I was targeted because of my reporting about injustice in the Don Siegelman prosecution. No one has benefited more from the political destruction of Don Siegelman than Bob Riley and his children, especially the Birmingham lawyer duo of Rob Riley and Minda Riley Campbell.

When I tried to interview Rob Riley via phone in early 2013, his comments made it clear that he and "The Family" do not appreciate my reporting, to the point that Riley Jr. concocted a dubious defamation lawsuit that caused me to be unlawfully incarcerated in October 2013. (By the way, I tape recorded the conversation with UAB's Anita Bonasera, and the audio can be heard at the end of this post; I also have audio of the Riley interview, but it might collide with an unlawful permanent injunction that I'm under, so I will hold off on posting it for now.)

The Hubbard/Riley e-mails don't provide absolute proof about anyone's job loss. But they reveal a mindset where the speaker and former governor seem to have no qualms about ruining careers, almost as a form of political sport.

Bill Britt, of Alabama Political Reporter, provides insight on the Hubbard/Riley mindset in a new article titled "Email Sheds Light on Clerk's Removal and New Sheriff's Methods." Britt comes close to labeling Hubbard and Riley as sociopaths, a diagnosis that I would say is pretty much on target.

The primary lesson from the e-mail exchange, Britt reports, is that "Hubbard wants to protect Riley’s State contracts, and demonstrate his personal toughness to State House staff." Britt points to the ouster of Dianne Harper, long-time clerk of the joint Legislative Contract Review Committee, as an example of Hubbard's "tough guy" approach.

Britt also notes Hubbard's reference to an article about Harper's exit, by former Huntsville Times reporter Bob Lowry. It seems clear from the e-mail, dated February 11, 2011, that neither Hubbard nor Riley appreciates Lowry's ability to investigate such matters. In September 2011, roughly seven months after the Hubbard/Riley communication, Lowry was forced out of his job. Is that coincidence? We doubt it.

Let's take a closer look at the e-mail in question. It begins with Hubbard touting the joyful news that he has just turned 49 years old. The speaker quickly turns to more serious topics:

We are shaking things up at the State House, that's for sure. I need to fire about 4 or 5 people pretty soon to really set the tone that new sheriffs are in town and in control.

Notice that Hubbard does not indicate any of these people are doing a poor job and deserve to be fired. He just likes the notion of others suffering so that his "tone" can be set. Perhaps they will have wonderful birthdays while standing in unemployment lines.

Mike Hubbard

How does Riley react? The former governor doesn't seem to bat an eye. A relatively thoughtful person might say, "Mike are you sure that's a good idea to fire these people? Is it fair, is it necessary?" Or such a person might say, "You know, Mike, you can set the tone by doing a good job as speaker and demanding good work from those around you. You can set the tone by earning respect and treating others with respect. Wouldn't that make more sense than firing people who might not deserve to be fired?"

What was the chance of such a response from Bob Riley? It probably was zero. Here is part of what he said, and there is no indication he has any problem with Hubbard's plans to fire people:

Happy Birthday, Mike. . . . You are setting the agenda and getting more coverage than anyone! Keep it up!

In other words, "Fire even more people if you want to. It's working!" Why would Hubbard mention the firing plans to Riley? Probably because he learned such tactics from the governor himself. You can almost hear Hubbard waiting for a pat on the head from his mentor, like a dog who has brought in a wet newspaper from the sidewalk.

That brings us back to the warped psychology behind the Hubbard/Riley missives. Britt tries to explain it by pointing to a Psychology Today article titled "The Narcissistic Boss." That caught my attention because my former UAB boss, who played a significant role in my unlawful termination, displayed almost all of the following characteristics:

1. has a grandiose sense of self-importance

2. is preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success, power, brilliance, beauty, or ideal love

3. believes that he or she is "special" and unique

4. requires excessive admiration

5. has a sense of entitlement

6. is interpersonally exploitative

7. lacks empathy

8. is often envious of others or believes others are envious of him or her

9. shows arrogant, haughty behaviors or attitudes

As for Hubbard and Riley, I would suggest that they show major signs of sociopathy, with significant narcissistic traits. The main characteristic of sociopathy (also known as antisocial personality disorder) is lack of a conscience, a callous unconcern for the feelings of others. Interestingly, both sociopathy and narcissism are considered among 10 known personality disorders, and the two conditions share quite a few traits. In fact, psychologists place both of them in Cluster B of personality disorders, which are marked by erratic and dramatic behavior.

Both disorders are considered almost impossible to treat, and those who have them can inflict significant emotional damage on others.

This is from "Sociopath Next Door," an article by Allan Schwartz, Ph.D., at mentalhelp.net:

Perhaps the most difficult for the rest of us to understand is that the sociopath has absolutely no conscience. In other words, they are without any sense of morality or guilt. The cannot and do not empathize with others and how they feel. When most of us look at other people we feel a sense of commonality and shared humanity. That is why we find it difficult to believe that there is a type of person who does not share the kind of compassion and connectedness that characterizes most of humanity. . . .

No one knows what causes sociopathy except that there is accumulating evidence that it stems from parts of the brain that are abnormal. In other words, it's a biological problem that may be inherited. Early life experiences, such as having been abused, may contribute to worsening the sociopathy.

Hubbard has been indicted on 23 corruption charges, and the e-mails with Riley could become central to a criminal trial. But the psychological component of the communications might be of most interest to the public right now--and it paints a very ugly picture of politics in Alabama.

Al.com's Kyle Whitmire proves his ignorance about the law surrounding the Don Siegelman prosecution

Kyle Whitmire

Al.com's Kyle Whitmire, in the midst of a column yesterday urging President Obama to pardon NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden, declared that the prosecution of former Alabama Governor Don Siegelman was "fair."

The premise was that Snowden has been wronged and is deserving of a presidential pardon while Siegelman got what he deserved. We agree with Whitmire about Snowden, but the reporter simply reveals his ignorance about the Siegelman case. He also proves that just because an individual attends a court proceeding, it does not mean he has a clue about what went on.

By the way, this is the same Kyle Whitmire who admitted a few weeks back that he possessed court documents showing Republican political figure John Merrill had engaged in an extramarital affair and chose to hide them away in a drawer. That snafu became a statewide story when we broke the news that Whitmire ignored, publishing documents that exposed Merrill's dubious actions in a Tuscaloosa County divorce case styled Brinyark v. Brinyark.

Whitmire's actions in the Merrill case, plus his statements yesterday about the Siegelman case, add to the mountain of evidence that Alabama's largest news organization has a wildly biased viewpoint that favors the GOP. Did Whitmire feel the need to slam Siegelman in order to get back in good graces with his editors after bringing public embarrassment to al.com? I can see how a reasonable person might think that.

How does Whitmire sum up the Siegelman case? From yesterday's column:

Siegelman's sentence was stiff, and the man who delivered it, U.S. District Judge Mark Fuller, has proven himself to be a hypocrite. However, the former Alabama governor is right where he belongs.

Why should we put any stock in that assessment? Well, because our guy Kyle--by God--was at the trial:

The Free Don Siegelman narrative has been repeatedly proven to be fiction. . . .

I was there for Siegelman's trial, and it was fair. The former governor personally secured campaign loans. He all but extorted Richard Scrushy, among others, for money to pay them off. Scrushy obliged, and in return Siegelman reappointed him to the Alabama Certificate of Need Review Board, an appointment that was crucial for HealthSouth.

What good is it to attend a trial when you don't understand the law relevant to the case? Even worse, what kind of reporter are you if you apparently are too lazy to bother looking up the actual law? The answers to those questions place Mr. Whitmire in an unfavorable light--as do his words from Thursday's column. A brief dissection leaves Kyle standing naked in the public square:

* Who has repeatedly proven that the "Free Don Siegelman narrative" is a fiction? Whitmire doesn't say--and that's likely because no knowledgeable reporter or analyst has done it.

* How does Whitmire know the Siegelman trial was fair? He doesn't because he clearly has no understanding of the relevant law. The central charge was federal funds bribery under 18 U.S. Code 666. That statute is so muddled that many public officials have no idea whether they are following the law or not. That's why case law, in the form of McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991), was central to the case.

Both sides agreed that McCormick was controlling law, and it's central finding is this:

. . . only if “payments are made in return for an explicit promise or undertaking by the official to perform or not to perform an official act, are they criminal.”

This summarizes what commonly is called a "quid pro quo" (something for something) transaction. It is illegal, and if the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt that two parties reached an "explicit" agreement on such a deal, it is grounds for a conviction.

If you want to find the guts of the Siegelman case, it's right there in McCormick. But you notice that Kyle Whitmire in his column never mentions McCormick or any of its provisions. He also never mentions that no "explicit agreement" was proven at trial, and no such instruction was given to the jury. In essence, the unlawful jury instruction provided by Judge Fuller (who is likely to face impeachment proceedings related to an assault on his wife) means that Siegelman and Scrushy were convicted of a "crime" that does not exist.

For anyone who wants to understand how the Siegelman case was, in fact, grossly unfair, we encourage a close reading of our post titled "How the 11th Circuit cheated Don Siegelman: A summary." It spells out five key mistakes that an appellate panel made in failing to overturn the Siegelman convictions.

Most alarming is this: By law, Siegelman and Scrushy could not even stand trial. That's because the alleged misconduct at the heart of the case took place almost one full year outside the five-year statute of limitations (SOL). Here's how we explained the facts and law related to the SOL:

So how did the government get away with bringing this case, much less winning it? It drafted an indictment that was vague, and when Siegelman/Scrushy moved for a bill of particulars that would have required a few specifics, the judge denied it. Defense attorneys raised the limitations defense in a proper manner for a case involving a vague indictment. But the trial court, and the 11th Circuit, wrongfully ruled that they had waived the defense.

It's public record that the alleged transaction took place in summer 1999, and the indictment came in May 2005. That's more than five years, so by law, the government had no case--but Fuller let them bring it, and the 11th Circuit allowed unlawful convictions to stand.

Kyle Whitmire would have us believe that such a wildly corrupt process was "fair"? No one with functioning brain cells should buy that.

The Unfrozen Caveman Lawyer is one of many comedic gifts that brilliant Phil Hartman left behind

Unfrozen Caveman Lawyer

As a journalist who seeks to expose court-related corruption, I've been accused of hating all lawyers. But that is not true. For example, I'm a huge fan of Cirroc, the Unfrozen Caveman Lawyer of Saturday Night Live (SNL) fame.

That especially is the case since I recently finished reading You Might Remember Me: The Life and Times of Phil Hartman, by former Chicago Sun-Times arts and entertainment writer Mike Thomas.

Hartman was the veteran comedic genius who brought the Unfrozen Caveman Lawyer to life. If you have been an SNL fan during its extraordinary 40-year run, you probably remember Cirroc's story:

A hundred thousand years ago, he was out hunting on the "frozen wastes" when he slipped and fell into a crevasse. In 1988, he was discovered by some scientists and thawed out. He then went to law school and became . . . Unfrozen Caveman Lawyer.

It was a goofy set-up right out of a comic book, and Hartman played it to perfection. He specialized in oily, ethically challenged characters who displayed a peculiar charm, such as B-list actor Troy McClure and ambulance-chasing lawyer Lionel Hutz on The Simpsons. Hartman's portrayal of former President Bill Clinton, stopping in a McDonald's while out on a run with Secret-Service agents, remains one of the great bits in SNL history.

A lot of comedians have done Clinton, but Hartman's will forever be the gold standard. Hartman's impersonation of Frank Sinatra is another that reached classic status.

As for the new biography, Thomas does a top-notch job of telling the bittersweet story of Hartman's life. Thomas takes us along for Hartman's youth in Canada, where he was known to entertain neighbors by walking in with a hearty "Hello, happy people!" We have a front-row seat for Hartman's days as a graphic artist, designing album covers for groups like America; Poco; and Crosby, Stills, and Nash. We learn about Hartman's formative years as a member of LA's renown improv group, The Groundlings.

While Hartman was known as the adult in the chaotic world of SNL--fellow cast member Jan Hooks nicknamed him "The Glue"--he struggled with a number of issues when out of the spotlight. He had a heavy appreciation for weed, a weakness for beautiful but often mercurial women, and a tendency to close himself off emotionally from those closest to him.

One of those beautiful women, his third wife Brynn, was wrestling with drug and alcohol addictions when she shot and killed Hartman in his sleep--and then turned the gun on herself, in a murder-suicide that rocked the entertainment world in 1998 and left Hartman fans in shock and grief.

He also left a string of memorable characters. Why am I so fond of Cirroc, the Unfrozen Caveman Lawyer? Well, for one, he always wins his cases, using a combination of faux cluelessness, stealthiness, and prehistoric charm to win over juries in a big way. Heck, Cirroc might even be able to find justice for me after my experience of being the only journalist to be incarcerated in the western hemisphere in 2013--and the only one this century to be thrown in jail over a purely civil matter.

In Hartman's honor, I've developed a routine at home that borrows heavily on Cirroc. For years, I've been quite capable of making my own microwave oatmeal for breakfast. But for some reason, I recently discovered that the whole experience is more pleasant if Mrs. Schnauzer makes the oatmeal for me. Here's how the bit usually goes:

Mrs. Schnauzer: How come you aren't able to make your own oatmeal anymore?

Me: I'm just a caveman. I fell in some ice, and scientists thawed me out. Your modern world confuses and frightens me.

Mr. Schnauzer: You didn't seem frightened before?

Me: Well now, when I hear the beeps and buzzers on your modern conveniences, I want to hop in my BMW and run for the safety of my place at Martha's Vineyard.

Mrs. Schnauzer: You have a place on Martha's Vineyard, and I don't know about it?

Me: Why yes, and even there, microwaves scare me. I think, "Are little bats in there flapping their wings to warm up my oatmeal?" I don't know! My primitive mind can't grasp these concepts.

Mrs. Schnauzer: Well, you had better grasp this concept: If you don't remember how to make your own oatmeal soon, a frying pan is going to start flying by your caveman head.

Me: Oh no, you're frightening me again. Pans that fly? How can that be?

I've managed to pull off this routine for several weeks, ever since I checked out the Hartman book from the library. Mrs. Schnauzer has been a good sport so far, but if I push it too far, I'm liable to be back out on the "frozen wastes" in no time. I'll keep readers posted on how Mrs. Schnauzer's patience is holding out.

Meanwhile, here is Cirroc working his caveman magic on a helpless jury:






This wouldn't be a real tribute to Phil Hartman if we didn't include his bit as President Clinton, wooing the public in a D.C. McDonald's:

Supreme Court's ruling in Branzburg provides foundation for jailing of journalists in criminal matters

From freepress.net

Five of the six American journalists who have been jailed in the 2000s, had their freedom taken away based largely on a U.S. Supreme Court case styled Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).

The sixth journalist is me, and my freedom was taken away for five months based on . . . nothing. No U.S. law supports it. In fact, a long line of U.S. Supreme Court and state high-court cases specifically state that a preliminary injunction in a defamation case is an unlawful prior restraint under the First Amendment--and yet, I spent five months in the Shelby County, Alabama, jail after Republican political figure Rob Riley and lobbyist Liberty Duke sought my arrest because I allegedly had violated a preliminary injunction in their defamation case, a civil matter that involved no criminal allegations of any kind.

Never mind that the material in question was not found to be defamatory at trial. That's because, under specially appointed judge Claud Neilson, there was no trial--only a hearing, with no discovery, no cross-examination, almost no evidence, no jury . . . well, you get the idea. It was, in fact, a joke--as I stated to the court that day.

What separates my case from the other five that involve incarceration of journalists? Numerous differences come to mind, but the main one is this: Branzburg was the primary governing law in the other cases, and while I don't agree with the finding in Branzburg, it means that the other incarcerations probably were legal. Mine clearly was not legal, and even knowledgeable legal analysts who differ with me politically, agree on that.

The key issue in the other five cases involved efforts by journalists to protect confidential sources in criminal matters. Here is the core finding from Branzburg:

The First Amendment does not relieve a newspaper reporter of the obligation that all citizens have to respond to a grand jury subpoena and answer questions relevant to a criminal investigation, and therefore the Amendment does not afford him a constitutional testimonial privilege for an agreement he makes to conceal facts relevant to a grand jury's investigation of a crime or to conceal the criminal conduct of his source or evidence thereof.

I disagree with court actions that led to the incarcerations of editor/publisher Timothy Crews (2000), free-lance writer Vanessa Leggett (2001), broadcast journalist Jim Taricani (2004), New York Times reporter Judith Miller (2005), and free-lance blogger/videographer Joshua Wolf (2006). But the Branzburg case provided legal precedent that probably made those rulings lawful.

Rob Riley

While my incarceration clearly was unlawful, litigants like Rob Riley and Liberty Duke (and judges like Claud Neilson) can try to take advantage of an area of law that is more muddled than it should be. The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (RCFP) published a 2002 article, in the wake of the Vanessa Leggett case, showing that Branzburg leaves many questions unanswered--even in criminal cases. From the article, titled "Branzburg Revisited? Landmark ruling limiting reporter’s privilege turns 30, but release of jailed writer sparks call for review":

The jailing of a Houston book author for 168 days drew the attention of the national media and free-speech groups because of the oddity of a writer spending more than five months in jail when she was not even accused of a crime. . . .

Could (Vanessa) Leggett's case compel the U.S. Supreme Court to reconsider a muddled 30-year-old ruling on whether a reporter has a First Amendment right to keep sources confidential, especially in criminal cases?

The question is a sensitive one among journalists. The Supreme Court held in its 1972 decision in Branzburg v. Hayes that reporters had no privilege to refuse to appear and testify before state or federal grand juries. But a concurring opinion in the case, coupled with dissents from four justices, has been construed to give journalists at least a qualified privilege to withhold information in other circumstances. The fractured opinion left lower courts to figure out when and how the reporter's privilege should apply, and those courts have not decided the issues consistently.

The Supreme Court never again accepted a case that required it to clarify when a reporter has a privilege to withhold information. Press groups recognize the imperfection of Branzburg, but they worry that this court's conservative justices would erode reporters' rights if those justices took another look at the issue.

The U.S. Supreme Court has not looked at a case similar to Branzburg since that article was written almost 13 years ago, so the rights of reporters to protect confidential sources in criminal matters remain unclear. But the law in my case, a civil matter involving an unlawful prior restraint, is crystal clear. Writes Ken White, a conservative lawyer at the Popehat blog:

The order underlying Shuler's arrest is unconstitutional.

There is a strong and venerable rule in American law against pretrial injunctions prohibiting defamation. It comes from two sources: equity and the First Amendment

Injunctions are an equitable remedy, with their origins in courts of equity. Courts of equity applied discretion in an attempt to achieve just results, as opposed to courts of law bound to rules set forth in statutes. Courts of equity and law have been combined since the 19th century, but equitable traditions remain. An injunction is an equitable tradition because it is only supposed to be imposed when legal remedies — like monetary damages — are unavailable or inadequate. American courts have long held that equity will not enjoin defamation — that courts may not issue an injunction to prohibit someone from committing libel or slander because the victim can always sue for damages.

Then there is the matter of the First Amendment. Writes White:

Preliminary injunctions against defamation are even more strongly disfavored under the First Amendment. Here's how United Sates Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun put it in staying an injunction that a lower court had imposed forbidding CBS from running undercover footage of a beef processing plant in CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315 (1994):

Liberty Duke

"For many years it has been clearly established that “any prior restraint on expression comes to this Court with a ‘heavy presumption’ against its constitutional validity.” Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419, 91 S.Ct. 1575, 1578, 29 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971), quoting Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181, 89 S.Ct. 347, 351, 21 L.Ed.2d 325 (1968). “Where … a direct prior restraint is imposed upon the reporting of news by the media, each passing day may constitute a separate and cognizable infringement of the First Amendment.” Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 423 U.S. 1319, 1329, 96 S.Ct. 237, 254, 46 L.Ed.2d 199 (1975) (BLACKMUN, J., in chambers). As the Court recognized in Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 2802, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976), prior restraints are particularly disfavored:

'A criminal penalty or a judgment in a defamation case is subject to the whole panoply of protections afforded by deferring the impact of the judgment until all avenues of appellate review have been exhausted…. A prior restraint, by contrast, … has an immediate and irreversible sanction. If it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after publication ‘chills’ speech, prior restraint ‘freezes’ it at least for the time.'

Although the prohibition against prior restraints is by no means absolute, the gagging of publication has been considered acceptable only in “exceptional cases.” Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716, 51 S.Ct. 625, 631, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931). Even where questions of allegedly urgent national security, see New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 29 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971), or competing constitutional interests, Nebraska Press Assn., 427 U.S., at 559, 96 S.Ct., at 2802, are concerned, we have imposed this “most extraordinary remed[y]” only where the evil that would result from the reportage is both great and certain and cannot be mitigated by less intrusive measures. Id., at 562, 96 S.Ct., at 2804.

Rob Riley has a law degree from Yale, but he obviously must have skipped class when important constitutional issues were being presented.

Are law-enforcement officers trained to cover up abuse by slapping bogus resisting-arrest charges on citizens?

(From "Photography Is Not A Crime" Web site)

Do law-enforcement officers intentionally concoct bogus resisting-arrest cases against citizens? Are officers trained to make false statements during confrontations in hopes it might turn attention away from possible excessive force/police brutality? Are judges, prosecutors, and other members of the "justice infrastructure" inclined to side with officers--even when evidence indicates they were in the wrong?

Based on my own experience of being charged with resisting arrest in Shelby County, Alabama, I would say the answer to all three questions is yes.

Someone else must think so, too, because we found the above photo/graphic on the Web. It shows a training officer telling a group of police-academy trainees, "Remember class: Always say, 'Quit resisting,' and 'I feared for my life.'"

These issues particularly resonate now because of two important lessons from recent days:

(1) The case against Alabama officer Eric Parker, in the beating of Indian grandfather Sureshbhai Patel, has wrongly been classified as a misdemeanor (third-degree assault). Under Alabama law, it must be classified as a felony (second- or first-degree assault). This suggests that someone in the aforementioned "justice infrastructure" is trying to let Officer Parker off easy.

(2) No citizen can be charged with resisting an arrest that was unlawful in the first place. Alabama law says that citizens have no duty to submit to anything other than a lawful arrest--and, in fact, we have the right to use reasonable force to resist an unlawful arrest.

As for the questions at the beginning of our post, let's consider the words and actions of Shelby County Deputy Chris Blevins in my case. I saw video of the incident during my resisting-arrest trial in January 2014--and having lived through the incident and seen a replay of it--I can't help but almost double over with laughter at the photo/graphic above. It's as if Chris Blevins was one of the dudes sitting in that class.

On the video, Blevins enters our garage, even though he has not shown a warrant, has not said he has a warrant, and has not said why he is on my property. I clearly tell him to get out of my house, but he ignores that. As I get out of my car and try to get to some stairs to walk up to our kitchen, the dash camera in Blevins' vehicle loses sight of us. Blevins follows me, and the garage door closes behind us--I must have reflexively pushed a button that closed the door, although I don't remember doing it. In fact, I remember saying to myself, "Don't close the door because you want this guy out of here."

We lose video of what takes place inside the garage, but the audio picks up everything. We also have Blevins' own account of the event from his incident report. (See report at the end of this post.)

What do we learn? Here are a few things:

(1) Blevins repeatedly is heard saying "Don't fight me, don't fight me," even with all kinds of noise in the background--which is the sound of him pushing me up against a heavy dog pen, hard enough to move it several feet, and through two stacks of boxes. By Blevins' own words in his report, he initiated physical contact with me, not the other way around, and the only action I took was to raise my arms in front of my face, which I did mainly to keep my glasses and/or nose from being broken. Our photo/graphic above is supposed to be a joke, but it isn't; like most good humor, it's based in reality. Blevins used slightly different words--"Don't fight me," instead of "Quit resisting"--but otherwise, it's like he was sitting there taking notes from the training officer in our illustration.

(By the way, Blevins does state several times in his incident report that I 'resisted,' but he never says how. In fact, his own words show that I did nothing that amounts to resisting arrest. Also, Blevins admitted at my resisting-arrest trial that his actions amounted to a traffic stop, under the law--and that has profound consequences for what took place on the night of October 23, 2013, inside my garage. More on those two issues coming in a future post.)

(2) Is Blevins trying to create the tried and true "I feared for my life" scenario? It sure looks that way when you read his words in the incident report. First, he states that I put my "right hand in my right front pants pocket." This seems to hint that he feared I might have been reaching for a weapon in my pocket--perhaps an assault rifle was stored in there. What was the reality? I had just gotten out of my car so--surprise, surprise--I was putting my car keys in my pocket. (By the way, Blevins says he grabbed my arm as I put it in my pocket. And yet, he says I pushed a button to close the garage door. How did I manage to do that if he had grabbed my arm? Did he push the button to close the garage door? I don't know.)

Then, Blevins states that the garage was "darkened," with "only a dim bulb on the garage opener." Most garages, particularly those (like ours) that are partially underground, tend to be fairly dark. But ours has a large window on the side wall and six to eight small windows across the double garage doors. There was quite a bit of light coming in, and Blevins' vision should have been good enough to see that nothing in our garage posed a threat to him--and he never says I was trying to grab any object anyway.

I think Blevins and his colleagues intended to rough me up a good bit--Officer Jason Valenti can be heard on video threatening to break my arms while assisting in handcuffing me--and I think they also planned to set up a "resisting arrest" scenario, one that was contrary to facts and the law. A resisting-arrest charge, I'm guessing, takes the spotlight off their own misconduct and puts it on me.

As for the "justice infrastructure," prosecutor Tonya Willingham was instructed to turn over copies of any warrants, and she replied "Your Honor, we have no warrants." And Judge Ron Jackson, having just been told that this was not a lawful arrest, convicted me of resisting arrest anyway.

The trial was on January 14, 2014, and I had been in jail since October 23, 2013, with no opportunity to prepare a defense. Jackson denied my request for a continuance, so in essence, I was not allowed to actually prepare a defense on resisting arrest. Even so, I knew that resisting applied only to a lawful arrest, and I argued that this did not involve a lawful arrest--after all, it was a matter of court record that no warrant existed.

Jackson wasn't hearing any of it--his mind clearly was made up before the proceeding even began--so I was faced with an $845 fine, and I now have a criminal record. I also have had the pleasure of seeing my photo listed on "Shelby County's Most Wanted" for several months, long after the fine had been paid.

Last time I checked a couple of weeks ago, the "Most Wanted" photo finally had been removed--only after I alerted the sheriff's office that the fine had been paid for months.

I've written extensively about the emotional and physical trauma of being roughed up inside my own home and being incarcerated for five months. I'm still living with that, but the resisting-arrest case presents a more subtle form of damage that members of the "justice infrastructure" have inflicted on me--and I'm sure countless other citizens have had to deal with it.

It was bad enough that my picture was on the Shelby County Sheriff's Web site for the five months I was an inmate--on a contempt of court charge that is contrary to more than 200 years of First Amendment law. But imagine having your photo on a "most wanted" Web site for a "crime" you did not commit, even after the fine for said "crime" long has been paid.

What kind of smear job does that do to your reputation? Where does a law-abiding citizen go to get his reputation back?

Shuler Arrest-Incident Report by Roger Shuler