How bad is Obama judicial nominee Abdul Kallon? 11th Cir. ignored 3 SCOTUS cases to help him cheat my wife out of rights to home she co-owned for 20 years

U.S. Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Atlanta

Republicans stalling on President Obama's nomination of Merrick Garland to the U.S. Supreme Court are committing a grave injustice. That's because, by pretty much all published accounts, Garland is qualified to sit on the nation's highest court.

If Republicans also are stalling on Obama's nomination of Abdul Kallon to the U.S. Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals -- and that appears to be the case -- they are doing us a favor. That's because Kallon is a dreadful judge, and I've seen his sorry act with mine own eyes multiple times.

Why is Kallon so bad? Well, let's consider the following question that many Americans surely have asked themselves: Why is it so frustrating to deal with judges and courts? Answer: Even when you are right about a key issue, and the court admits you are right, judges still find a way to make it look like you are wrong--and to deny you justice. Abdul Kallon taught me that one.

My wife, Carol, and I experienced a classic example of this phenomenon in Roger Shuler and Carol Shuler v. William E. Swatek, et al, a case that involved an unlawful sheriff's sale that cheated us out of full rights to property we had owned for more than 20 years at the time.

We've shown that  Kallon, who currently sits on the federal bench in the Northern District of Alabama, botched his ruling on a simple issue involving Carol's rights to her own home. Given that Obama has nominated Kallon to a seat on the U.S. Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, this should concern every American. It certainly should concern the some 33 million people who live in Alabama, Georgia, and Florida--the three states covered by the Eleventh Circuit.

Kallon found that he could not consider Carol's claims because he lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine. We argued, in a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and in our appellate brief, that Carol was not a party to the underlying state case, so Rooker-Feldman did not apply to her. In other words, Kallon was wrong, and he had to hear her claims. (Note: For purposes of this post, we will assume Kallon correctly excluded my claims because of Rooker-Feldman. That's not the case, but by focusing only on Carol's claims, we hope to simplify matters and make this post easier to understand. I was, at least, a party to the underlying state action, but Carol was not.)

What happened next was astounding. The Eleventh Circuit found that we were right, and Kallon was wrong -- that Carol's claims were not precluded by Rooker-Feldman and had to be heard by the district court. But the Eleventh Circuit cheated Carol anyway, by borrowing a point Kallon had ruled on (incorrectly) and applying it to Carol's claims -- even though her claims had not been heard in the district court, as the appellate court found they must.

That probably sounds like a mind-twister to many readers, but it's a classic example of how convoluted court corruption can be. Let's see if I can provide a little clarity: The Eleventh Circuit essentially found that Carol had wrongly been deprived of a hearing on her claims in the trial court, but then threw out her claims on grounds that the trial court had not heard--it could not have adequately heard those grounds, of course, because it had not heard Carol's claims at all.

Here is a fundamental holding of law: An appellate court is supposed to rule only on issues adequately heard and raised in the trial court. But that's not what happened in Shuler, et al v. Swatek, et al. It's a sign, in my view, that the Eleventh Circuit was more interested in protecting Kallon than it was in dispensing justice. The law required, as the Eleventh Circuit admitted, that Carol's claims be heard by the trial court. But they never were.

On what did the Eleventh Circuit hang its flimsy ruling? It found that Carol's claims against our troublesome neighbor (the criminally inclined Mike McGarity) and his sleazy lawyer, Bill Swatek, must fail because McGarity and Swatek were not "state actors" for purposes of a civil-rights claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Specifically, here is what the appellate panel found:

Finally, Carol Shuler contends that the district court erred in dismissing her claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 against William Swatek and Mike McGarity for failure to state a claim. Section 1983 provides a right of action only against "a person acting under color of state law." Holmes v. Crosby, 418 F.3d 1256, 1258 (11th Cir. 2005). Although neither Swatek nor McGarity are state officials, Carol Shuler argues that they can be held liable under § 1983 because they obtained a writ of execution against the Shulers' property and caused the writ to be enforced. However, this contention is insufficient to state a violation of § 1983, because "one who has obtained a state court order or judgment is not engaged in state action merely because [he] used the state court legal process." Cobb v. Ga. Power Co., 757 F.2d 1248, 1251 (11th Cir. 1985).

Where did the Eleventh Circuit judges come up with Cobb v. Ga. Power Co. and one of its findings? They borrowed it from Kallon; it's right there on page 31 of his memorandum opinion in our case.

Abdul Kallon

There's a slight problem with borrowing material from Kallon -- he's likely to get it wrong, and that's exactly what he did in this instance. Most of us learn this lesson in third grade -- if you are going to copy off someone's paper, copy from one of the smart kids, not one of the dummies. The Eleventh Circuit copied from a bad judge and -- surprise, surprise -- they got it wrong.

What's the correct law? We cited it in our appellate brief. (See full appellate brief at the end of this post.)

The district court found that Swatek and McGarity were protected from the Shulers‟ 1983 claims because they were not acting under color of state law. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has held that private individuals who act jointly with state officials are deemed to be acting under color of state law. In Lugar v. Edmondson, 457 U.S. 922 (1982), our nation’s highest court found: “As is clear from the discussion in Part II, we have consistently held that a private party's joint participation with state officials in the seizure of disputed property is sufficient to characterize that party as a "state actor‟ for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. The rule in these cases is the same as that articulated in Adickes v. S.H. Kress and Co., supra, at 152, in the context of an equal protection deprivation: "Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the prohibited action, are acting "under color‟ of law for purposes of the statute. To act "under color‟ of law does not require that the accused be an officer of the State. It is enough that he is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents," quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S., at 794.”

How badly did the Eleventh Circuit, likely in conjunction with Kallon, want to make sure Carol's claims were not heard. As you can see above, the appellate court was willing to ignore clear findings from three U.S. Supreme Court cases. That tells me the fix was firmly locked in place.

Is there much a citizen can do in such situations? Not really. The only realistic option is to file a Petition for an En Banc hearing, which we did. (See petition at the end of this post.) Those, however, are rarely granted, and ours was denied.

The only other option is to seek review from the U.S. Supreme Court. For most citizens, the chances of getting hit by a piece of space debris probably is greater than the chance of having a case heard by SCOTUS.. On top of that, the expense of seeking Supreme Court review is prohibitive for many regular folks.

And so, Abdul Kallon (with help from the Eleventh Circuit) made sure that my wife had no chance at justice. This is the kind of judge Barack Obama wants to promote?

If you are a Democrat, that notion should make you want to vomit.

Swatek--Appellate Brief by Roger Shuler

Swatek Petition for En Banc Rehearing by Roger Shuler

Key figure in Upton divorce case has ties to Shelby County's notorious Dr. William Flynn Walker and one of Alabama's worst cases of child sexual abuse

Gincie Walker Upton

A central figure in the Upton v. Upton divorce case has strong connections to probably one of the worst cases of child sexual abuse in Alabama history.

Gincie Walker essentially was the daughter of Linda and Bill Upton when she began a sexual relationship with Bill, who is the multimillionaire president of Vulcan Steel Products in Pelham. That prompted Bill Upton to file for divorce from Linda, his wife of more than 30 years, and led to a case that included numerous dubious rulings by private judge Gary Pate.

Bill Upton, who generally was the beneficiary of Pate's rulings, has since married Gincie Walker (her name now is Gincie Walker Upton), and they live in Mountain Brook. Linda Upton has remarried and still lives in the marital residence after being forced to pay Bill Upton for his share of the property, despite egregious marital misconduct -- to which Bill Upton admitted in a deposition.

Where does child sexual abuse enter the picture? Gincie Walker Upton has been diagnosed with multiple-personality disorder, with roughly 30 distinct personalities. How did Ms. Upton come to have such a severe mental disability? Multiple factors probably are involved, but she was born into a family that apparently took dysfunction to levels most people cannot imagine.

Her biological father is Dr. William Flynn Walker. By all accounts that we've heard, Dr. Walker was a brilliant physician and a major figure in the evangelical religious movement in Shelby and south Jefferson counties. He was a leader at Briarwood Presbyterian Church before going on to start Evangel Christian School, a home-school ministry of Evangel Church PCA (Presbyterian Church of America) in Alabaster.

But Dr. William Flynn Walker's life behind the facade included horrifying acts against children. In October 2005, he was indicted on seven counts related to child sexual abuse. This is from a a Shelby County Reporter article on the case:

A well-known member of the Shelby County home-school community has been indicted by a federal grand jury for interstate transportation of children for illegal sex acts.

William Flynn Walker, 48, of Shelby, was charged in a seven-count indictment filed last week in U.S. District Court in Birmingham.

Walker is charged with transporting three different children across state lines between 1984 and 2004 and engaging in illegal sexual acts with them.

Our research indicates conservative religious and political figures have been remarkably quiet about the case from the outset. In fact, state law-enforcement officials in Shelby County reportedly ignored evidence of Walker's secret life until federal officials finally entered the picture when he transported children across state lines. Here is more from the Shelby County Reporter:

Walker is known in home-school circles for his role in the founding of Evangel Christian School, a Helena-based organization formed as a ministry of Evangel Church, PCA.

However, church leaders refused to comment on Walker’s official role at the church or with the home-school group.

If convicted on federal charges, Walker could face a maximum sentence of 130 years in prison and a fine of $1,750.

He also faces prosecution by the Shelby County District Attorney’s office, stemming from two sex-related charges filed in May.

Walker was arrested in Jefferson County, where he worked as a physician in Birmingham and charged with sexual abuse and first-degree sodomy.

Would Walker have gotten away with sodomy, sexual abuse, and other unspeakable acts involving children if he had not invoked federal jurisdiction by transporting children across state lines? Our guess is yes -- that powerful religious, political, and law-enforcement figures were determined to cover for him, probably because of his ties to Briarwood and Evangel Christian.

Evangel Christian PCA in Alabaster, AL

In August 2006, William Flynn Walker was sentenced to 27 years in federal prison, without the possibility of parole. He was sentenced to 20 years in prison on the state charges. He is due for release in 2033 and will be on state probation for the rest of his life. From a Shelby County Reporter article:

Shelby resident William Flynn Walker, 49, who was indicted last October on seven counts of transporting minors across state lines and engaging in sex acts with minors, was sentenced in federal court last week to serve 27 years in prison without the possibility of parole.

Walker was also sentenced to 20 years in prison in Shelby County district court in April. Walker will serve the two sentences concurrently.

Walker was sentenced on charges that he transported three separate children seven times over state lines to commit sex acts with them between 1984 and 2004.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Jim Phillips confirmed Monday that Walker will also be required to pay $100,000 in restitution for his crimes.

Strangely, the article does not say if Walker pleaded guilty or was convicted by a jury. In another strange twist, a search at al.com turns up nothing about the William Flynn Walker case--and I can find no photos of William Flynn Walker on the Web.

William Flynn Walker is being held at the Federal Correctional Institute at Butner, North Carolina. Here is information about him from the Federal Bureau of Prisons Web site:

WILLIAM FLYNN WALKER

Register Number: 25462-001

Age: 59

Race: White

Sex: Male

Located at: Butner Low FCI

Release Date: 11/15/2023

We are guessing that the 2023 release date is a mistake. A 27-year sentence should put his release at 2033, as stated in news reports.

Bill and Gincie Upton
(From facebook.com)

Was Gincie Walker Upton, as a child, one of her father's victims? Did he have accomplices who abused her and other children? It seems unlikely that Dr. Walker acted alone, although no one else has been implicated in the case. Was Gincie Walker abused in a way that led her to have multiple-personality disorder--and did that condition play a major role in the breakup of the Upton marriage?

This much seems clear: Linda Upton, who adopted four special-needs children and fostered numerous others, genuinely seemed to be trying to help a troubled youngster when she took Gincie Walker into her home. That led her husband to engage in abominable behavior, and Alabama's dysfunctional court system piled on by making sure Linda Upton would receive a division of property that was nowhere near what she was entitled to under the law.

Pennsylvania attorney general is convicted of perjury, in a trial that apparently was brought in retaliation for her unmasking of creepy judges in "Porngate" probe

Pennsylvania AG Kathleen Kane
(From ijr.com)

If you think Alabama politics is sleazy . . . well, check out what's going on in Pennsylvania.

Kathleen Kane, the Democratic attorney general of Pennsylvania, was found guilty yesterday on nine counts of perjury and obstruction related to a grand jury leak. Did Kane actually do anything wrong? It's possible. Was her prosecution conducted for political reasons? There is almost no doubt about it, yes.

Kane had outed a number of Pennsylvania judges and other state officials who made it a habit to send pornographic, racist, and misogynistic messages via the Internet. Her investigation, which became known as "Porngate," led two state Supreme Court justices, and others, to resign.

Seamus McCaffery, a Democrat, was the first justice to resign, in 2014. He had been suspended, in part, for attempting to blackmail a fellow justice. Republican Michael Ekin resigned in March 2016.

How gross were the actions of individuals Kane unmasked? Consider this from a 2015 Washington Post story:

Over the past 15 months, beleaguered Pennsylvania Attorney General Kathleen Kane has released a steady stream of messages retrieved from a state email server that show state officials and employees trading pornographic, racist and misogynistic messages.

There are jokes about rape and sexual assault, photos mocking African Americans and other minorities, and insults leveled at people because of their weight, their sexual orientation or their religion. At least two state Supreme Court justices and numerous officials in the office of the attorney general have been caught in the scandal that has been dubbed “Porngate.”

Want more details? Here they are:

A small sampling: A photo of a pantsless woman on her knees performing oral sex on a man is captioned “Making your boss happy is your only job.” A picture of a white man fending off two African American men while carrying a bucket of fried chicken reads “BRAVERY At Its Finest.” The sender of the email that shows a group of men engaged in sex included this message to friends, “How friggin gay are you?”

“When you see these emails . . . it’s just a swamp of misogyny, racism, homophobia and white privilege. It taints everybody, especially in the judicial branch,” said Bruce Ledewitz, associate dean of academic affairs and a law professor at Duquesne University School of Law. “Some of these things are really disgusting. You get the impression that every white male office holder in the state is a creep.”

Did white male office holders take an underhanded path to get back at Kane for unmasking them as creeps? Sure looks that way. Consider this from a Fox News article about Ekin's resignation earlier this year. (And how appropriate is it that "Porngate" is tied, in a roundabout way, to the Jerry Sandusky child-sex scandal at Penn State?)

Justice Michael Eakin's decision to retire marks the latest fallout since embattled state Attorney General Kathleen Kane began releasing hundreds of emails in 2014 to the media and ethics agencies. Kane has since been indicted on perjury and other charges that she claims were trumped up because she took on the old boys' club of Pennsylvania's judiciary and law enforcement. . . .

The exchange of explicit and pornographic emails by state prosecutors was uncovered as part of Kane's internal review of how the office handled the investigation into Jerry Sandusky, the former Penn State assistant football coach now serving a lengthy prison sentence after being convicted in 2012 of 45 counts of child sexual abuse.

Pennsylvania has an old boys' club that controls the courts and law enforcement? Gee, that's a shock. Alabama has one, too. Right now, the Pennsylvania old boys' club is making Alabama's look good, by comparison. And I didn't think that was possible.

Failure to provide lawful notice makes Jessica Medeiros Garrison's $3.5-million default judgment void, meaning it is a nullity worth absolutely zero

Jessica Medeiros Garrison and Alabama AG Luther Strange

GOP operative Jessica Medeiros Garrison took to the Web last fall to crow about a $3.5-million default judgment an Alabama circuit judge awarded in a defamation case against me. Legal Schnauzer has been ranked among the top 50 law blogs in North America, but Garrison dubbed it a "ridiculous little blog."

Garrison's arrogance, which was on full display in her as-told-to article at women's fashion magazine Marie Claire, might start dwindling now that we can show her $3.5-million "bonanza" is void. In other words it is a "nullity," worth zero. And those aren't my words; they come from Alabama law on the subject.

The crowing Ms. Garrison will never get enough from that judgment to buy a hot dog at Sneaky Pete's. In fact, the judgment might wind up costing her a lot more than she ever will receive.

How do we know? The answer probably can be found in a variety of Alabama cases, but the best one we've found is styled Abernathy v. Green Tree Servicing (Ala. Civ. App., 2010). In Abernathy, a Franklin County woman faced a default judgment from Green Tree, allegedly because a sheriff's deputy left court papers with the woman's mother. Abernathy wound up having no idea she was being sued. In a complicated series of events, Abernathy had to file two motions seeking relief from the default judgment; in the second instance, notice had been sent to her, but not to her attorney.

Abernathy lost in the trial court, but she took the matter to the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals. Here was the gist of her argument:

Abernathy contends, among other things, that Green Tree did not provide her with appropriate notice of its November 12, 2009, application for a default judgment and that, as a result, the trial court erred when it entered the November 13, 2009, default judgment. Specifically, she argues that Rule 55(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., required that her attorney be given three days' written notice before the entry of the November 13, 2009, default judgment and that the failure to provide such notice constitutes reversible error. We agree.

How did failure to give proper notice affect Green Tree's claim.? You might say it was gutted. From the appellate court:

The failure to provide the notice of the application for a default judgment as required by Rule 55(b)(2) renders the default judgment "void, and not merely voidable," Bracknell v. S.E. Belcher, Inc., 517 So. 2d 588, 591 (Ala. 1987), and "requires a vacation of the default judgment," Southworth v. University of South Alabama Med. Ctr., 637 So. 2d 896, 898 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994).

Like Abernathy, I had appeared in my case; in fact, I appeared once in regular clothes (before I had been arrested because of the Rob Riley/Liberty Duke case) and at least twice in jail clothes during my five-month stay at the "Shelby County Hilton." That is what triggers the three-day notice requirement. In essence, the appellate court was saying there is no excuse for not giving notice of a default application when the defendant has appeared in the case.

The bottom line? I never received any notice of Garrison's default judgment application, or its hearing. The whole process took place without me knowing about it. Davy Hay, a Chilton County attorney who was "representing" me at the time, said the record showed it was not just a matter of me not receiving notice -- there was no indication notice was even sent.

(I put "representing" in quote marks because I was not pleased with the work Davy Hay supposedly did on my behalf. In fact, I'm not sure he did anything on my behalf. We parted ways, and I was left with the notion that I certainly would not recommend Mr. Hay's services to anyone. More on that in an upcoming post.)

Don Blankenship

Judge Don Blankenship, in denying our motion to vacate the default judgment, blamed the lack of notice on me -- because I did not notice the court of our new address in Missouri after we had been forced from our home of 25 years in Alabama due to a foreclosure that almost certainly was wrongful. (See Blankenship's ruling at the end of this post.) Normally, I would notice a court and opposing parties of any address change during a court case -- even though we hadn't changed addresses for 25 years. But in the turmoil from dealing with a foreclosure and having to move to another state, I forgot all about the Garrison case. Her "ridiculous little complaint" didn't mean much when you are staring possible homelessness in the face.

Court documents show that my e-mail address was on every document I filed with the court. Garrison or her attorney, Bill Baxley, easily could have sent me an e-mail to determine my whereabouts. They never did that. I think they didn't do it because they didn't want me there; they wanted Garrison and Attorney General Luther Strange to blabber in court without pesky questions from the opposing side -- questions that might center on their professional, and personal, relationship.

Aside from that, Blankenship simply put the burden for notice on the wrong party. The law in Abernathy clearly shows the burden is on the plaintiff -- Garrison in this case. She did not fulfill her obligation, and that  makes her $3.5-million default judgment void. In fact, her little piece of paper is worthless, as the Abernathy court makes clear:

Our supreme court has stated that, when the three-day notice provision of Rule 55(b)(2) is violated, a trial court is "without discretion in the matter" and errs to reversal if it refuses to set aside the default judgment. Bracknell, 517 So. 2d at 591. Moreover, our supreme court has written that the failure to provide the notice required by Rule 55(b)(2) "requires vacation of the default judgment regardless as to whether defendant has shown a meritorious defense or not." Cockrell v. World's Finest Chocolate Co., 349 So. 2d 1117, 1120 (Ala. 1977) (emphasis added).

Hay should have included the lack-of-notice argument in his written motion, but he did not. He did, however, argue it during the hearing -- as Blankenship makes clear in his order. That means the issue properly was before the court, And as Abernathy shows, Blankenship had no discretion in his ruling; vacation of the default judgment was required.

What about the time I have to get the default judgment voided? What about Blankenship's outrageous screwups in the case? We will address those issues, and more, in upcoming posts.

For now, we know that Jessica Garrison's $3.5-million default judgment was a "ridiculous little" piece of garbage all along.


(To be continued)

Blankenship Upholds Jessica Garrison Default Judgment by Roger Shuler on Scribd

In the speech where he hinted that gun nuts might want to assassinate Hillary Clinton, Donald Trump raised even scarier issues about an Alabama judge

Donald Trump during his "Second Amendment people" speech
(From cnn.com)

When GOP presidential candidate Donald Trump seemed to suggest last week that "Second Amendment People" might want to assassinate Democratic opponent Hillary Clinton over gun rights, it overshadowed perhaps a more significant issue in the same speech. It's almost certainly more significant if you have concluded that Trump was not serious in his statement about Clinton.

What's the issue that got overlooked? Well, it involves a federal judge from Alabama, a guy named Bill Pryor. Reporter Jay Michaelson picked up on it in a Daily Beast articled titled "Donald Trump’s Supreme Court Pick Would Kill the ‘Right to Remain Silent’ Warning." From the Michaelson piece:

Just a few sentences after the “Second Amendment” remark, Trump boasted, “we have such great Justices, you saw my list of 11 that have been vetted and respected.” At the top of the list—prepared not by Trump but by the Heritage Foundation, the conservative-to-libertarian think tank funded by the Coors family, the Koch Brothers, the Bradley Foundation, the Scaife Foundation, and the Olin Foundation, some of the same funders who have blocked the nomination of Judge Merrick Garland—is Judge William Pryor of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

Michaelson then reminds Americans of extremist views Pryor has expressed in the past -- and how they could radically alter our democracy if a President Trump were to nominate Pryor for the U.S. Supreme Court. After noting Pryor's staunch -- and in my view, wildly unlawful -- opposition to abortion rights under Roe v. Wade, Michaelson writes:

Pryor is also (in-)famous for a 2000 speech he gave (to the Heritage Foundation, incidentally) in which he called Miranda v. Arizona one of the two “worst examples of judicial activism.” (The other, of course, was Roe.) If you’ve ever watched a cop series on TV, you know Miranda—that’s the case that required police to tell arrestees “you have the right to remain silent.” 

In Pryor’s world, those warnings wouldn’t exist.

The U.S. Supreme Court more or less gutted Miranda with a 2013 ruling styled Salinas v. Texas. If BIll Pryor were to wind up on the high court, via a Trump presidency, it might wipe out Miranda altogether.

Consider a few troubling implications from such an outcome:

* Miranda applies not only to those arrested and charged with a crime, but also to those who have been detained in a "custodial investigation." In other words, some of these people have not even been accused of doing anything wrong.

Bill Pryor, in a gay-porn pose
from the 1990s and badpuppy.com

* So Bill Pryor wants people who have not even been accused of a crime to be forced to talk? How does he think law enforcement should accomplish that? By turning silence into a crime and forcing people to be incarcerated? By turning torture into a common component in the U.S. "justice" system? As an appointee under the George W. Bush administration, perhaps Pryor would be expected to have a fondness for torture.

In an otherwise fine article, Michaelson makes one mistake. Here's how he refers to Pryor:

Now, Bill Pryor is, by all accounts, a distinguished and ethical jurist. Born in 1962, he has had a brilliant career, serving as Alabama’s youngest attorney general from 1997-2003 before being nominated by President George W. Bush to a federal appeals court. 

Those of us who have followed Pryor's career closely know he is neither distinguished nor ethical -- and his career has been anything but brilliant.

We have shown that, as a college student, Pryor posed nude for photographs that wound up at the badpuppy.com gay-porn Web site, and he almost certainly failed to mention that in his confirmation hearings, which would constitute lying to Congress. Because of his gay-porn background, Pryor is subject to being controlled, even blackmailed, according to multiple news reports. Pryor perhaps is best known for launching (while Alabama AG) an investigation of former Democratic Governor Don Siegelman, leading to perhaps the most notorious political prosecution in American history.

Pryor's investigation, which turned into a federal probe, started after Siegelman had been in office for roughly three months. (Question: How could Pryor have probable cause to open such an investigation when Siegelman had been in office barely 12 weeks? Answer: He couldn't, which points to the investigation being driven by politics, not facts or law.)

As for Donald Trump, he vanquished the Republican primary field largely because of his ability to entertain and shock audiences. His comment about Hillary Clinton was perhaps his most shocking statement yet. But that should not lull Americans into thinking that Trump is a mere sideshow. He's running for the highest office in the land, and the thought of Bill Pryor on the Supreme Court should scare the daylights out of any thinking American who cherishes civil liberties and the rule of law.

Meanwhile, we have this question: Is Trump's campaign so out to lunch that no one is aware of Pryor's ties to 1990s gay porn? Trump claims that everyone on his "great" list of 11 potential justices has been vetted? Sure doesn't look like it with Bill Pryor. Does that suggest Trump is lying, or he just has no clue?

California biotech company, a Stanford University startup, sues UAB and veteran scientist Robert Kimberly for fraud and breach of contract

A California biotechnology-research company has filed a federal lawsuit against UAB and one of its veteran researchers, alleging a breach of contracts that caused $11 million in financing to fall through.

Pikamab Inc., of Menlo Park, California, alleges breach of contract, fraud, and negligence against UAB and Robert P. Kimberly, M.D. (See complaint at the end of this post.) Kimberly is director of UAB's Center for Clinical and Translational Science. He is a professor in the Division of Clinical Immunology and Rheumatology. Kimberly and UAB (technically, the defendant is the the University of Alabama Board of Trustees) claim they are protected from suit by sovereign immunity. They also claim the applicable statute of limitations precludes the Pikamab lawsuit. (See motion to dismiss at the end of this post.)

The lawsuit is before U.S. Judge Jefffey S. White, in the Northern District of California.

According to its complaint, Pikamab is a start-up company that grew from research conducted at Stanford University and the Hospital for Special Surgery (HSS) in New York. The company is attempting to commercialize cutting–edge treatments for cancer, inflammatory disorders, and autoimmune diseases, using an invention related to stratified medicine. The invention is based on a number of patents and patent applications owned by Pikamab CEO Vijay Ramakrishnan, Ph.D,; Stanford; and HSS.

Kimberly and Pikamab entered into an agreement in 2009, and Kimberly became a member of the company's scientific advisory board. The complaint alleges that Kimberly steered Pikamab to award UAB two research contracts, with Kimberly to be the lead investigator on both. From the complaint:

Kimberly convinced Pikamab that UAB had access to unique databases (each called a “Cohort”) that categorized the biological characteristics of medical patients for certain diseases, such as lupus and lupus nephritis. Indeed, in 2011 (prior to the contracts at issue being signed), Kimberly represented that UAB was the only institution that could perform the contract work and stated that he would perform the contract with an utmost level of diligence by stating to Ramakrishnan in a telephone call: “ I will do a great job on these studies” (the “Misrepresentation”).

Court documents indicate Kimberly did not do such a great job, at least in Pikamab's view. The first contract, for $128,000, involved development of a theragnostic product related to certain cancer therapies. The second contract, also for $128,000, involved development of a product for treating lupus and lupus nephritis.

Where did the dispute begin? From the complaint:

When a research institution like UAB undertakes formal research on behalf of a sponsor, it is an industry custom that the investigating institution provide a comprehensive report setting forth, among other things, raw data as well as information sufficient to verify the methodology, scope and accuracy of the research (the “Deliverables”).

Pikamab alleges that Kimberly delivered almost nothing in the way of deliverables, in both contracts:

Defendants utterly failed to provide any Deliverables . . ., even though each contract specifically provided that the Defendants were to provide progress reports and final reports on the research. . . . Notwithstanding his reporting obligations, Defendants delivered a purported final report in the form of a 10-line email on April 30, 2012 that was completely useless. Moreover, from that 10 line email, Pikamab discovered that Defendants lied, misled, and did not perform the relevant studies as per the contract requirements.

A company pays UAB $256,000 for research studies and detailed reports -- and for one of the contracts it gets a 10-line email in return? For the other contract, it gets an irrelevant set of garbled data that was not requested? That raises this question: What kind of research operation is UAB running? The discovery process and possible trial might yield an answer that is quite unflattering for one of Alabama's most important economic drivers.

Robert Kimberly

Is that why UAB is seeking to have Pikamab's lawsuit dismissed, which would foreclose any possibility of discovery or a trial?   The Birmingham firm Maynard Cooper Gale is representing the university, and in documents we've seen so far, there is no effort to defend Kimberly's handling of the contracts. The defense arguments, so far, are legal and technical in nature.

There also is no effort to address Pikamab's damages, which are substantial, according to the complaint:

As a result of Defendants’ wrongful conduct above, Pikamab was unable to close on least $11 million dollars in financing. Such financing was contingent upon Pikamab being able to provide verifiable research results supporting the Invention. In addition, Pikamab was unable to close on strategic licensing deals with bio-pharma companies who were eager to be involved in the Invention, but who required proof-of-concept data. But Defendants’ breaches deprived Pikamab of the information needed to satisfy the requirements of investors and bio-pharma partners. Because of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Pikamab ran out of money and was unable to finance new studies. Moreover, Pikamab wrote to other investigators of the lupus Cohort, but none were interested in investigating or resolving Pikamab’s complaints.

That is pretty damning stuff. It accuses UAB of cutting the legs out from under a company that holds the promise of helping to develop advanced treatment for cancers, lupus, lupus nephritis, and other diseases. What could possibly be the underlying motive behind this? Why would UAB do this in both contracts?

As we've reported numerous times in the past, UAB has a history of Medicare fraud, research fraud, and scientific misconduct. (See here, here, and here.) Such cases usually have been quietly settled or kept mostly from public view. It will be interesting to see if Pikamab gets an opportunity in a California federal court to pull back the mask on UAB's highly profitable, but ethically suspect, research enterprise.

Pikamab--Complaint vs. UAB by Roger Shuler on Scribd

Pikamab--UAB motion to dismiss by Roger Shuler on Scribd

New phone tape captures Alabama's "Luv Guv," Robert Bentley, calling me a "slimy guy" and partially blaming "casino gambling people" for his divorce -- no kidding

A taped phone conversation released yesterday captures Alabama Gov. Robert Bentley calling your humble blogger a "slimy guy." Bentley also makes a negative reference to attorney Donald Watkins. The tape adds another level of authenticity to reports that Bentley used state and federal resources to target Watkins and me -- the two citizen journalists who broke the story last summer of Bentley's extramarital affair with advisor Rebekah Caldwell Mason.

It becomes more intriguing when you consider this timeline: I broke the story of the Bentley/Mason affair on August 31, 2015, the same date Bentley and State Rep. Allen Farley (R-Bessemer) talked in the evening, with Bentley calling me a "slimy guy." Nine days later, on September 9, my wife, Carol, and I were violently and unlawfully evicted from our apartment in Springfield, Missouri, and Carol was left with a shattered left arm that required trauma surgery. We've already asked this question: Were Bentley and/or Mason involved in arranging the bogus eviction in Missouri? Was that part of their plan to target me? Was having us roughed up and brutalized also part of the plan?

The new audio suggests the answer might be yes.

Yellowhammer News yesterday released the audio,  and al.com followed with a report that Farley made the tape and released it, in part because recent events had caused him not to trust Bentley. The tape captures Farley saying he wants to take information from an "avalanche" of press reports about misconduct in the Bentley administration and ask Attorney General Luther Strange to conduct an investigation.

"I want the AG to step up and make sure state dollars were properly spent by the governor," Farley says. "This is a bombshell, but we have to deal with it."

Bentley seems less than enthused about the idea. "Allen, I don't think you need to get Luther in it, personally. There's nothing we're trying to hide . . . Whoever is doing this is using rumors and innuendos that are not fact. . . ."

Who does Bentley think is throwing around these "rumors and innuendos"? He makes that abundantly clear. "Casino gambling people are feeding this story. . . . They want to use the divorce to feed the story and get it out because they are trying to discredit me. . . . This didn't cause my divorce, although it did in part . . . they fed my wife this stuff."

Get a load of that arrogance. Bentley actually is blaming "casino gambling people" -- whoever that is -- for his own abominable behavior with Mason, which caused his divorce. Talk about "slimy."

On a personal level, it's quite a "blow" to be called a "slimy guy" by someone as slimy as Bentley -- by a guy we know spent time caressing Mason's boobs and exploring her nether regions, even though he marched into office as a "Christian, family values" candidate. His values were so strong that his wife of 50 years, former First Lady Dianne Bentley, filed for divorce last August and more or less told the "Luv Guv" to take a hike -- after she was finished taking him to the cleaners.

My given name never comes up in the Bentley-Farley conversation. But my blogging name is front and center. Consider this back and forth from Farley (AF) and Bentley (RB), early in the tape:

AF: There is an avalanche of speculation across the media. . . . When these people are contacting me, I say the governor is my friend, and I've been over a couple of times and prayed with him. This is devastating. When they say, "What do you think of this allegation about trips taken by the governor on the jet, and overtime by people who guarded him, and personal things that have been alleged . . .

RB: I read some of that stuff from Donald Watkins. . . .

AF: There is this guy Legal Schnauzer, or something . . .

RB: Legal Schnauzer is the one who accused Rob Riley and got sued . . . he's a slimy guy.

That last part is laughable. Rob Riley might be the most unethical and oily individual ever to engage in American politics. And I'm a "slimy guy" because Riley filed a bogus defamation lawsuit against me -- a case where, by law, my reporting was shown to be neither false nor defamatory? Sounds like the people who think Bentley is mentally losing it might be right.

Bentley reveals himself to be both a liar -- repeatedly claiming, falsely, there was no affair -- and an idiot. He apparently thinks it's lawful, and routine, for a journalist to be kidnapped (taken without a warrant) and thrown in jail for five months because of a civil case that alleges publication of defamatory matter. We have a governor, it turns out, who knows absolutely nothing about the First Amendment.

Perhaps Bentley needs to take a refresher course in the meaning of the word "slimy." A quick Google search reveals this definition: "disgustingly immoral, dishonest, or obsequious."

If you want to talk about slimy qualities, Governor, try looking in the mirror.

In telephone interview, Alabama steel executive Bill Upton was not anxious to discuss his divorce case or his admitted extramarital affair with Gincie Walker

Steel manufacturing in China

Bill Upton, president of Pelham-based Vulcan Steel Products, has not been shy about speaking out on issues that affect his industry. For example, Upton has been outspoken about Asian competitors, especially in China, dumping steel on the U.S. market for far less than fair market value.

Upton, however, was much less talkative when we gave him an opportunity to discuss his divorce from Linda Upton, to whom he had been married for more than 30 years and who played a significant role in getting the family's steel businesses off the ground.

We contacted Bill Upton via telephone and requested an interview, noting that public records indicated Upton v. Upton had been decided based on a number of legal irregularities. Upton immediately became defensive and said, "There's nothing unusual about it at all."

That's a curious statement, given that Upton admitted in court documents to having an extramarital affair with Gincie Walker, a young woman who had left an abusive home in Shelby County and been raised as the Upton's daughter for roughly 10 years. Was Bill Upton saying there is "nothing unusual at all" about a multimillionaire business executive having sex with a young woman who had called him "Daddy" for about a decade? We also wanted to know how Bill Upton had received a highly favorable court ruling, despite egregious marital misconduct that, by law, should have given Linda Upton an upper hand in the division of marital property.

We wanted to know about these issues, but Bill Upton didn't seem anxious to discuss them. Here's how the discussion wound down:

"You had an affair with Gincie Walker, right?"

No reply.

"Did you have an affair with Gincie Walker . . . is that correct?"

No reply.

"Hello."

Silence.

Bill Upton no longer was on the line. I called back and left a voice message, renewing my request for an interview and asking why he apparently had hung up on me. I'm still waiting for Mr. Upton to return that message. Bill Upton and Gincie Walker now are married.

Gincie Walker Upton

This is an executive who has been more than happy to discuss international trade issues with Reuters and other news outlets. From one report:

Small manufacturers say they have increased productivity to compete. . . . But small manufacturers insist labor costs are not relevant when in many cases heavily-subsidized goods from China have been sold in America for below what the local manufacturers pay for raw materials.

"Labor costs have nothing to do with it," said Bill Upton, president of Pelham, Alabama-based Vulcan Threaded Products Inc. Vulcan makes steel bars and rods for everything from air conditioning units to sprinkler systems, is the last American firm of its kind, and won a trade case against Chinese competitors in 2008.

"We have a lean, efficient operation and we can compete against anyone in the world on a level playing field. But there's no way we can compete against finished goods that cost less than the raw materials," Upton said.

Bill Upton becomes a veritable Donald Trump when asked about steel-industry issues. But ask him about a divorce case where he received a judgment, thanks to Private Judge Gary Pate, that clearly was not supported by facts or law . . . and well, the silence becomes deafening.

Want to experience the difference? Please check out the video below of our aborted interview with Bill Upton on issues connected to his divorce. Below that, is an interview with Upton about China and steel dumping. We invite you to check it out and note how it differs from the first video:

Jessica Medeiros Garrison's purchase of an $835,000 house in Mountain Brook causes her $3.5-million default judgment for "defamation" to spring a leak

Jessica Medeiros Garrison and Luther Strange

Jessica Medeiros Garrison's recent purchase of an $835,000 home in Mountain Brook pops a hole in the $3.5-million default judgment Jefferson County Circuit Judge Don Blankenship awarded her in a defamation case against me.

The house purchase, when viewed in light of Blankenship's order and actual Alabama law, indicates Garrison should have received no damages, even if the finding that I defamed her is assumed correct -- which it wasn't.

Garrison, a Republican operative best known for her close relationship to Alabama Attorney General Luther Strange, sued me in fall 2013 -- about the same time Shelby County deputies beat me and doused me with pepper spray in my own home and dragged me to jail for a five-month stay. Garrison's complaint alleged that my posts about her extramarital affair with Strange were false and defamatory. She received a default judgment after my wife, Carol, and I were forced to go through a dubious foreclosure on our home of 25 years and wound up being forced to move to Missouri (where I grew up). After the move, I received no notice of actions in the Garrison case -- essentially, I was rendered unable to defend myself, even though I appeared in the case at least twice while in jail -- and that led to Blankenship's default ruling, which has no basis in fact or law.

We will take a closer look at the default judgment in upcoming posts, but for now, our emphasis is on the off-the-charts damages Garrison was awarded. Nothing in the record suggests Garrison's claim merited anything beyond nominal damages, and probably not even that. Newly discovered evidence -- in the form of her recent house purchase that gets pretty close to $1 million -- suggests she should have gotten damages, maybe, sufficient to secure her a hot dog from Sneaky Pete's.

The law of damages in a defamation case is complex, and we won't go into a comprehensive review of the subject. But the off-the-wall nature of the damages, and Garrison's subsequent purchase of a pricey house, point to at least three key issues related to defamation damages. (Defamation, by the way, refers both to libel [unlawful written communications] and slander [unlawful verbal communications]

Defamation per se or per quod

Under Alabama law, the only way to receive damages in a defamation case, especially significant damages, is to prove that you've been the victim of defamation per se or per quod. What does that mean? Here is an explanation from a case styled Blevins v. W.F. Barnes Corp. (Ala. Civ. App., 1999):

“The foundation of an action for libel or slander is a malicious injury to reputation, and any false and malicious imputation of crime or moral delinquency by one published of and concerning another, which subjects the person to disgrace, ridicule, odium, or contempt in the estimation of his friends and acquaintances, or the public, with resulting damage to his reputation, is actionable either per se or per quod․”

In every-day language, a per se claim (meaning "on its face") involves allegedly false imputations regarding criminal conduct (an indictable offense of infamy or moral turpitude), and at least nominal damages are assumed when such a claim is proven before a jury. In short, Garrison had to prove she had a per se claim to receive nominal or compensatory damages. (See Drill Parts v. Joy Mfg., 619 So. 2d 1280 [Ala. Supreme Court 1993])

A per quod claim does not involve imputations regarding a crime of infamy or moral turpitude. In a per quod claim, the plaintiff must allege and prove special damages.

We invite you to view Blankenship's ruling, the one granting Garrison $3.5 million, at the end of this post. Does he make a finding of either defamation per se or defamation per quod? No, he does not. Even Garrison does not claim I imputed criminal conduct or acts of moral turpitude. For such a substantial award, there would have to be a finding of defamation per se. But there is no such finding. That means the monstrous damages have no support in law, and neither would mere nominal damages.

In his order, Blankenship breaks the award into $1.5 million in compensatory damages and $2 million in punitive damages. But we've already shown that, without a finding of defamation per se or per quod, there is no basis for compensatory damages at all. And without compensatory damages, there can be no punitive damages. (See Tanner v. Ebbele, Ala. Civ. App., 2011.)

Bottom line? Garrison's damages, under the law, equal zero.


Defamation and mental anguish

According to Blankenship's order, Garrison mostly claimed damages related to mental anguish. The order states, "Plaintiff further testified that the comments contained in the blog were embarrassing, hurtful and degrading." The order further states that since "comments posted to the blog have become widely known," Garrison "constantly suffers from embarrassment and anxiety." (Note: The court's words suggest Garrison was harmed by comments that readers posted to Legal Schnauzer, not by anything I reported. Law in the Internet age has held that publishers of Web sites or blogs are not legally responsible for comments left by third parties.)

Under Alabama law, there can only be a finding of mental suffering once defamation per se has been proven. (See Tanner v. Ebbele.) Without a per se finding from Blankenship, there can be no damages for mental suffering.

Also, this is where the newly discovered evidence of Garrison's home purchase enters the picture. Her purchase of an $835,000 house in Mountain Brook is almost twice what she paid for her previous "Tiny Kingdom" home. If Garrison was suffering so mightily from embarrassment and anxiety, how was she able to establish financial standing that would allow her to buy such a pricey house? Wouldn't such a traumatized person barely be able to hang on to the house she already had?


Defamation and job performance

According to Blankenship's order, Garrison claimed the "defamation" had affected her in the workplace. From the order: "[Garrison] testified further that the comments made it difficult to perform her job." (Again, the court's words suggest it was reader comments, not my reporting, that caused problems for Garrison.)

How badly was Garrison harmed in her professional life? Well, since being "defamed," she's been able to purchase a house that is worth almost twice what her previous house was worth? That suggests Garrison's professional standing actually has improved since my posts hit the Web. Shoot, maybe Garrison should ask me to "defame" her more often.

The bottom line? Using Blankenship's own words, and his version of Garrison's testimony in court, there is no legal support for any damages against me. But that hardly is the only way her judgment has sprung a leak.


(To be continued)

Davy Hay--Default Judgment Order by Roger Shuler on Scribd

Evidence is overwhelming that Missouri sheriff Jim Arnott committed a federal crime by ordering my wife's arrest and imprisonment without probable cause

Jim Arnott, sheriff of Greene County, Missouri, almost certainly committed a federal crime when he ordered my wife, Carol, to be arrested and imprisoned in the aftermath of an unlawful eviction last September 9. At least one of Arnott's deputies also likely committed a federal crime when he slammed Carol to the ground and yanked on her arms so viciously that her left humerus was snapped in two. (See X-ray below.)

Both probable crimes evolve from the right to be free from unreasonable seizures, which is supposed to be guaranteed to Americans by the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. As we showed in a previous post, unlawful seizures can become criminal by violating 18 U.S.C. 242 (Deprivation of rights under color of law).

A seizure, of which an arrest is considered the "quintessential" example, is constitutional only if the officer has a "sufficient legal basis" for making it--in other words, he must have "probable cause."

Did Arnott have probable cause to order Carol seized for allegedly assaulting a law enforcement officer? When you study Missouri law on the subject, the answer is: "Not even close."

Did the deputy who appeared to be primarily responsible for brutalizing Carol and breaking her arm have probable cause to seize her? Again, the facts and the law lead to only one answer: "Not even close."

Greene County deputy Scott Harrison drove Carol in a squad car to the county jail and informed her that she was facing a felony charge of assaulting an officer, with a likely bond of $100,000. This apparently was based on Arnott's instructions. Carol, handcuffed behind her back with a shattered left arm, was in excruciating pain, and someone at the jail finally realized that she might be seriously injured. Carol was taken to nearby Cox North Medical Center, where X-rays showed a break so severe that it would require trauma surgery.

After realizing that Carol was badly hurt, while none of his deputies appeared to have a scratch on them, Arnott apparently decided that bringing assault charges against Carol--when she actually was the victim of an assault--might not be such a good idea.

Did Arnott have "sufficient legal basis"--any basis at all--for his claim that Carol had assaulted a law-enforcement officer. No, he did not--not for a felony or a misdemeanor.

Under Missouri law, two forms of assault--first and second degree--are felonies. The notion that Carol committed either of these would be laughable--if the repercussions were not so serious. (Arnott watched his deputy beat up Carol from about five feet away; I witnessed the same event from about 15 feet away.) A $100,000 bond would have meant a payment of $10,000 to get Carol's release from custody. I'm not sure how I would have come up with that money, so it's likely Carol would have been in jail for months--for a "crime" she did not commit--if her arm had not been broken.

The description for first-degree assault of a law-enforcement officer is found at Missouri Revised Statutes 565.081. Here is the gist of it:

A person commits the crime of assault of a law enforcement officer, corrections officer, emergency personnel, highway worker in a construction zone or work zone, utility worker, cable worker, or probation and parole officer in the first degree if such person attempts to kill or knowingly causes or attempts to cause serious physical injury to a law enforcement officer, corrections officer, emergency personnel, highway worker in a construction zone or work zone, utility worker, cable worker, or probation and parole officer.

It's hard to envision even an ethically challenged individual, such as Jim Arnott, to seriously claim that Carol tried to kill or cause serious physical injury to an officer on September 9, 2015.

The description for second-degree assault of a law-enforcement officer is found at Missouri Revised Statutes 565.082. This section is quite a bit longer than the one for first-degree assault, but here is the key language (with some repetitive language removed, for easier reading):

A person commits the crime of assault of a law enforcement officer . . . in the second degree if such person:

(1) Knowingly causes or attempts to cause physical injury to a law enforcement officer . . .  by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument;

(2) Knowingly causes or attempts to cause physical injury to a law enforcement officer . . . by means other than a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument;

(3) Recklessly causes serious physical injury to a law enforcement officer . . . ; or

(4) While in an intoxicated condition or under the influence of controlled substances or drugs, operates a motor vehicle or vessel in this state and when so operating, acts with criminal negligence to cause physical injury to a law enforcement officer . . . ;

(5) Acts with criminal negligence to cause physical injury to a law enforcement officer . . . by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument;

(6) Purposely or recklessly places a law enforcement officer . . .  in apprehension of immediate serious physical injury; or

(7) Acts with criminal negligence to create a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to a law enforcement officer. . . . 

Carol had no deadly weapons or dangerous instruments, she caused no physical injury (serious or otherwise), she was not intoxicated or under the influence of controlled substances . . . well, you get the idea -- none of these even come close to applying.

X-ray of Carol Shuler's broken arm
prior to surgical repair

According to Deputy Harrison's statements to Carol, Arnott had no intention of charging her with misdemeanor assault. But let's look at third-degree assault of a law-enforcement officer anyway, as found at Missouri Revised Statutes 565.083. Here is the gist of it (again, with repetitive language removed for easier reading):

A person commits the crime of assault of a law enforcement officer . . . in the third degree if:

(1) Such person recklessly causes physical injury to a law enforcement officer . . . ;

(2) Such person purposely places a law enforcement officer . . . in apprehension of immediate physical injury;

(3) Such person knowingly causes or attempts to cause physical contact with a law enforcement officer . . . without the consent of the law enforcement officer. . . .

Evidence indicates that Carol caused no physical injury to anyone. She had been given permission to enter the apartment to retrieve personal belongings, and that's what she was trying to do--she didn't purposely come in contact with an officer or anyone else. Officers initiated contact with her, not the other way around. Even as loose as the language is in this section, Arnott had no probable cause to believe Carol had committed even a misdemeanor assault -- as his own actions indicate because he apparently was planning on a felony charge.

As for the officer who broke Carol's arm, there is no doubt that he seized her. Here is the definition that applies in such cases:

"[A] person is `seized' ... when, by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained" such that, "in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980).

Did the officer have probable cause to seize Carol? Absolutely not, and his own words and actions indicate that. Never did he indicate Carol had violated any law that merited a show of physical force or authority. Never did he say she was under arrest or give any reason for slamming her to the ground and yanking on her arms.

I've had a tendency to write about this as a personal story -- Carol and I, after all, have been married for 26 years -- or a Missouri story. But it's much bigger than that. All Americans, in all states, are supposed to be free from unreasonable, violent, and bogus seizures.

When law-enforcement officers violate those rights, they cross into criminal territory.