"Sambo" myth lives on as Black men like Alabama A&M President Daniel K. Wims and Justice Clarence Thomas show they can get ahead by playing the role

What kind of "leader" does not even attempt to collect a $547-million debt that is owed to his employer.  The answer, according to longtime Alabama attorney Donald Watkins, is a leader who seeks to perpetuate the myth of "Sambo," a mindless, subservient Black man who specializes in sucking up to White people -- especially those who have money, power, fame, or some combination of the three.

Under the headline "Alabama A&M University President Daniel K. Wims Perpetuates the Old Sambo Stereotype of Black Men in the Modern Era, Watkins writes:

Social-media Influencer Kenny Akers has one of the best explanations for the old Sambo caricature. It explains why Alabama A&M University President Daniel K. Wims' apparent waiver of the school's $527,280,064 debt from the state of Alabama perpetuates the Sambo stereotype in the modern era. 

Here is what Kenny Akers said about the Sambo stereotype:

“The Sambo stereotype -- rooted in racism and ignorance -- has had a profound impact on the perception and treatment of African-Americans throughout American history. This enduring caricature, perpetuated by White slave owners, portrayed black men as simple-minded, docile, and content in their servitude.

The origins of the Sambo stereotype can be traced to the colonization of America, where African slaves were brought to work on plantations. Slave owners, seeking to justify and maintain the institution of slavery, created and propagated this image of the “happy slave.”  By portraying black men as childlike and content with their enslavement, slave owners aimed to undermine any resistance or rebellion and maintain control over their human property.

The Sambo stereotype was deeply ingrained in the fabric of American society during the era of slavery. It was used to justify the brutal treatment and dehumanization of African-Americans, as it depicted them as inherently inferior and suited for servitude.  This degrading portrayal not only stripped Black men of their agency and intelligence but also perpetuated harmful stereotypes that continue to affect perceptions of African-Americans today.

The legacy of the Sambo stereotype extends beyond the era of slavery. It has persisted throughout American history, influencing popular culture, media, and societal attitudes towards African-Americans. The portrayal of Black men as buffoonish, submissive characters in minstrel shows and other forms of entertainment further reinforced this damaging stereotype.

The consequences of the Sambo stereotype are far-reaching. It has contributed to the systemic racism and discrimination faced by African-Americans, limiting their opportunities for social and economic advancement. The perception of Black men as unintelligent and docile has perpetuated stereotypes that have led to racial profiling, unequal treatment in the criminal justice system, and limited access to educational and employment opportunities.

Efforts to challenge and dismantle the Sambo stereotype have been ongoing. African-American activists, scholars, and artists have worked tirelessly to counter these harmful narratives and promote a more accurate and nuanced understanding of black identity and history. By highlighting the achievements, intellect, and resilience of African-Americans, they have sought to challenge the dehumanizing portrayal perpetuated by the Sambo stereotype.”

President Daniel Wims works tirelessly every day to reinforce the old Sambo stereotype in Alabama, rather than “challenge and dismantle it.”

Is the Sambo stereotype going to wind up costing Alabama A&M, big time? Watkins suggests the answer is yes, especially in a world, where MAGA has become a powerful social and political force, and some Black men have shown they can advance in a White world by playing the Sambo role to the hilt. Writes Watkins:

U.S. Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas is the national role model for Wims and others of his ilk who bring the Sambo caricature to life in the MAGA world.

From a philosophical standpoint, Daniel Wims and Clarence Thomas are Siamese twins in the modern era. Both men got their current jobs even though they faced allegations of sexual harassment against women in the workplace. Both men are mired in controversy. Both men project a "happy slave" mentality. Both men are loved by their masters.

Finally, Daniel Wims has successfully transformed Alabama A&M University from a premier institution of higher education into an attractive landing pad for aspiring next-generation Sambos and alleged sexual predators. 

As we close out the 2023 year, some people view this paradigm shift at Alabama A&M University as progress in Alabama and America. I view it as "buck dancing" buffoonery.

New York Times tries to set the boundaries for discussion of Trump-Colorado disqualification, but the paper's own legal expert seems out to lunch on this one

If most Americans read Section 3 of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (and Section 3 is short), they should understand why the Colorado Supreme Court disqualified Donald Trump from the state's presidential ballot, according to a post today at The New York Times: The Morning newsletter. Unfortunately, The Times article includes an example of how at least one prominent American -- an accomplished, intelligent guy you would expect to know such things -- still does not grasp the once-obscure, Civil War-era provision of law under which Trump was disqualified.

The man I'm talking about in The Times article is a lawyer and an expert on the U.S. Supreme Court (SCOTUS), so how are everyday "kitchen table" Americans supposed to understand this stuff. To many of them, the Trump DQ probably seems like one of those events that "just doesn't seem right.," especially if they were planning to vote for Trump. I can provide three pieces of information that might be comforting to some folks: (1) The disqualification, at the moment, applies only to Colorado -- a state Trump was not likely to win anyway; (2) Like it or not, The Colorado Supreme Court got it right, and Trump really is disqualified as a matter of law. The Colorado Supremes became the first court to rule correctly on the question of Trump's eligibility -- courts in Michigan and Minnesota had gotten it wrong, and a finding from Maine is expected any moment, possibly today. I know point No. 2 will not provide solace for Trump voters, but as a general notion, if should be of some comfort to know our judiciary still can get things right sometimes -- and that does not always happen, by  a long shot; (3) The Trump matter is expected to wind up before SCOTUS, in an expedited manner, so that could provide drama and produce a ruling in a relatively short time. As for the drama, SCOTUS' handling of the Trump matter should tell us whether the beleaguered court has any credibility left at all, whether it even cares about upholding the law on a matter that really is not all that complicated. (Note: We will have more in upcoming posts on challenges SCOTUS faces because of the Trump case.)

Since Section 3 and surrounding issues can seem complex, many Americans might be wondering how they can get a grip on it. My No. 1 suggestion is to read the analysis of Ilya Somin, a constitutional scholar at George Mason University's Antonin Scalia Law School who was the subject of a Legal Schnauzer post yesterday. A link to my post is here, and a link to Somin's full piece is here. It's a bit lengthy, but it's the most clear-eyed explanation I've seen of what Section 3 is, how the Colorado court worked through various issues surrounding the Trump matter, and how the court ultimately reached the lawful, correct conclusion. Somin's work is well worth the time to read, no matter your political leanings. 

What about insights from The New York Times at The Morning newsletter? David Leonhardt and Ian Prasad Philbrick write:

At its core, the Colorado lawsuit trying to keep Donald Trump off the 2024 ballot involves a clash between Constitutional textualism and voter empowerment.

If you simply read the 14th Amendment, you will understand the argument that Trump should be disqualified from serving as president again. Section 3 of the amendment states that nobody who has taken an oath to support the Constitution should “hold any office” in the United States if that person has “engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof.” On Jan. 6, 2021, of course, Trump encouraged a mob that later attacked Congress, and he praised the attackers that day and afterward.

There are important legal technicalities, including a debate over whether the authors of the amendment intended for the word “officer” to describe appointed officials rather than elected ones. But many legal scholars, including some conservatives, have concluded that the amendment applies to Trump. “The ordinary sense of the text” and “the evident design to be comprehensive” indicate that it bars Trump from holding future office, ​​William Baude and Michael Stokes Paulsen, who are members of the conservative Federalist Society, concluded in a recent law review article.

The clearer philosophical argument against the lawsuit is democratic rather than technical: If the American people do not believe Trump is fit to be president, they can vote against him next year. For that matter, the Senate, an elected body of representatives, had the power to convict Trump during the impeachment trial over his Jan. 6 actions and bar him from future office, and it did not do so.

Now, though, the seven justices of the Colorado Supreme Court (in a 4-3 vote, no less) have decided that Trump cannot appear on the state’s primary ballot. Lawyers are asking other courts to make similar decisions (as this Lawfare page tracks). Ultimately, the nine justices of the U.S. Supreme Court are likely to decide the case.

Here is where The Times article starts to swerve off the tracks. Write Leonhardt and Philbrick:

Were [SCOTUS] to bar a leading candidate from running for president, it could disenfranchise much of the country. It would in some ways be “a profoundly anti-democratic ruling,” as our colleague Adam Liptak, who covers the Supreme Court, said on “The Daily.” As Adam explained:

Donald Trump is accused of doing grave wrongs in trying to overturn the election. But who should decide the consequences of that? Should it be nine people in Washington, or should it be the electorate of the United States, which can, for itself, assess whether Trump’s conduct is so blameworthy that he should not have the opportunity to serve another term?

The lawyers making the case against Trump have a response to this. For one thing, the Constitution already restricts the voters’ judgment in other ways, as Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, a law professor at Stetson University, told us. Nobody under the age of 35 can become president, nor can Barack Obama or George W. Bush again, because both have served two terms. And a judge in New Mexico last year barred a county commissioner from holding office because of his role in the Jan. 6 attack.

For another thing, Trump may represent a threat to the national interest that no politician in decades has. He has encouraged violence, described his critics as traitors, lied constantly, used the office of the presidency to enrich himself, promised to target his political rivals for repressions and rejected basic foundations of American democracy. He is, according to this argument, precisely the kind of autocratic figure whom the founders wanted the Constitution to prevent from holding power, even if voters felt otherwise in the moment.

These will be the terms of the debate in coming weeks.

Liptak is the guy I was referring to in the second paragraph above. He unquestionably is one of the top legal journalists in the country, a true expert on the nation's highest court. But he is off target on the Trump-Colorado matter. How so? Let's consider some of the points raised in The Times article:

(1) Leonhardt and Philbrick write:

Were [SCOTUS] to bar a leading candidate from running for president, it could disenfranchise much of the country. It would in some ways be “a profoundly anti-democratic ruling,” as our colleague Adam Liptak, who covers the Supreme Court, said on “The Daily.”

Schnauzer Response: Leonhardt and Philbrick, unintentionally I suspect, are confusing the matter here. Section 3, the law at the heart of the Trump-Colorado case, is not about disenfranchising voters; in fact, it's not about voters at all. It's about candidates -- specifically which candidates are qualified to run for, and hold office.

In an August 2023 post, we introduced you to Professors William Baude of the University of Chicago and Michael Stokes Paulsen of the University of St. Thomas — both members of the conservative Federalist Society (FedSoc). From the post:

Two prominent conservative legal scholars determined that former President Donald Trump is ineligible to be president under a provision in the Constitution barring people who engaged in insurrection from office.

[Baude and Paulsen] studied the question for more than a year and detailed their findings in an article set to be published next year in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, according to The New York Times.

Said Baude: "When we started out, neither of us was sure what the answer was," Baude told the outlet. "People were talking about this provision of the Constitution. We thought: 'We're constitutional scholars, and this is an important constitutional question. We ought to figure out what's really going on here.' And the more we dug into it, the more we realized that we had something to add."

The professors' conclusion, he said, is that Trump "cannot be president — cannot run for president, cannot become president, cannot hold office — unless two-thirds of Congress decides to grant him amnesty for his conduct on Jan. 6."

That goes to the crux of the issue in the Trump-Colorado case. Section 3 is about candidates and their qualifications, not voters -- and two conservative scholars, members of the Federalist Society, determined months ago that Trump was disqualified under the constitution. Now the Colorado Supreme Court has agreed with them.

Why does Adam Liptak not get it, at least not yet. Let's consider his words, as reported by Leonhardt and Philbrick:

Donald Trump is accused of doing grave wrongs in trying to overturn the election. But who should decide the consequences of that? Should it be nine people in Washington, or should it be the electorate of the United States, which can, for itself, assess whether Trump’s conduct is so blameworthy that he should not have the opportunity to serve another term?

Liptak essentially makes the same mistake that Leonhardt and Philbrick make -- he concentrates on voters, not candidates. Yes, the electorate picks its favorites from among candidates who qualify to be on the ballot. But who decides who qualifies for ballot? That's a constitutional matter, spelled out in Section 3 -- and as is usually the case, constitutional questions require action from the courts. 

The Colorado Supreme Court has correctly decided the issue, and we soon will see if SCOTUS follows suit.

We leave you with an important thought from Noah Bookbinder, executive director of Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW), the watchdog group that filed the Colorado lawsuit:

Disqualification for insurrection is not a punishment. It is simply one of the constitutional requirements for office, like that you have to be 35 and a native born citizen to be president. 

That is the simplest and shortest explanation I've seen for why a court, not voters, was required to determine Trump's eligibility in Colorado.

For those interested in further reading, The Times provides links to a number of articles about the Section 3 issue:

• “The Colorado Supreme Court just decided that the U.S. Constitution still matters,” John Avlon argues for CNN. “The 14th Amendment was put in place to use in moments like this.”
• Anastasia Boden of the Cato Institute calls the Colorado ruling “a good-faith attempt to grapple with a vague constitutional provision.”
• Michael Mukasey has argued in The Wall Street Journal that the provision doesn’t apply to Trump. “If Mr. Trump is to be kept from office, it will have to be done the old-fashioned way, the way it was done in 2020 — by defeating him in an election.”
• “Section 3 of the 14th Amendment should not be used to prevent Americans from voting to elect the candidate of their choice. The best outcome, for the court and the country, would be for a unanimous court … to clear the way for Trump to run,” Ruth Marcus writes in The Washington Post.

Donald Watkins' reporting on a string of scandals at Alabama A&M apparently has struck a nerve, so the university is threatening to file a defmation lawsuit

Alabama A&M University is threatening to sue attorney and online investigative journalist Donald Watkins for his reporting on scandals swirling around the Huntsville campus. In a report this afternoon, Watkins writes under the headline "Alabama A&M University Threatens Watkins’ Right to Freedom of Speech as a Journalist":

After three months of deafening silence on its plans to collect $527,280,064 that U.S. Departments of Education and Agriculture declared on September 18, 2023, was due and owing to Alabama A&M University by the state of Alabama, the university is finally ready to fight in court.

Alabama A&M has hired a national law firm – MaynardNexsen (which has 24 offices from its base in Columbia, South Carolina – and a team of lawyers to wage this court fight.

According to a December 20, 2023, “Cease and Desist” letter from MaynardNexsen, the state of Alabama is NOT the opponent in this court fight.  This is NOT a court fight to collect Alabama A&M’s $527,280,064 debt from the state.  

No, that kind of court fight takes real courage, which Alabama A&M is sorely lacking.

This is a legal fight to shut me up as an independent online journalist who cannot be bought. Alabama A&M wants me to stop editorializing about this $527,280,064 debt and the school’s failure to collect it. 

A&M's demands do not end with the threat of a lawsuit, Watkins reports:

Alabama A&M also wants me to remove my published editorial opinions from the Internet related to the $527,280,064 debt. 

Additionally, Alabama A&M wants me to forego my First Amendment right to publish future articles and editorial opinions about Alabama A&M University.

The threatening letter was sent to me after I published an article yesterday about Dr. Roderick Watts, chairman of the Alabama A&M board of trustees, and his apparent conflict of interest arising from a legal dispute with the state over this $527,280,064 debt.

Has Watkins' reporting struck a raw nerve with someone in authority? It sure looks like it -- and it might not be limited to A&M. The state of Alabama -- 'led" by Republican Gov. Kay Ivey, an avowed Trumper --  has a vested interest in not paying the debt, so Ivey and others in state government could be involved in the threatening-letter campaign. Writes Watkins:

Here are the pertinent excerpts from Alabama A&M’s threatening letter:

“This law firm has been retained by Alabama Agricultural & Mechanical University (Alabama A&M or the University) in connection with your defamatory and improper publications regarding Alabama A&M and members of its staff and leadership, including Dr. Daniel K. Wims (the Alabama A&M Parties). The Alabama A&M Parties have authorized us to send this pre-suit communication to you.

You are publishing false, defamatory, and disparaging comments regarding the Alabama A&M Parties to the public, and this defamatory and disparaging conduct is not isolated, but is systematic, continuous and ongoing. There is no legitimate interest served in you continuing to smear the names of the Alabama A&M Parties on your internet postings, including the website DonaldWatkins.com and Facebook. We are ready to show -- in court if necessary --- that your postings are false and defamatory, including some that are defamatory per se, falsely accusing the Alabama A&M Parties of vile, improper conduct in statements that are intentionally harmful to their reputations. . . .

In addition to false, defamatory, and very disturbing statements about members of the faculty and staff and others associated with Alabama A&M, your internet postings specifically include false claims about the following: Dr. Wims having been terminated from prior employment positions; Dr. Wims having allegedly made improper sexual advances; Dr. Wims stating that Alabama A&M would not be seeking money from the State of Alabama; Dr. Wims having misled students, faculty, staff members, alumni, and community supporters of Alabama A&M; Dr. Wims being a sexual predator; Dr. Wims having an addiction for sexual encounters with men and women; Dr. Wims exploring counseling options for a sexual addiction; as well as purposeful and malicious mischaracterizations of prior legal proceedings involving Alabama A&M.

Because your statements have no basis in fact, your conduct violates well-established Alabama law. Alabama A&M's faculty members, staff, and leadership are educated and respected professionals in the community and have spent many years building positive reputations. Your defamatory and disparaging conduct has already caused and is continuing to cause irreparable damage to the Alabama A&M Parties' reputations and character. In addition to the personal attacks, your postings are also intentionally targeting Alabama A&M' s business interests in attempts to interfere with its business relationships and harm its reputation.

Therefore, the Alabama A&M Parties demand that you immediately cease and desist from engaging in any further activities that defame them, disparage their professional interests, or any further attempts to tortiously interfere with and harm the University's business, including the contractual relations of Alabama A&M.....”

Has Watkins' reporting actually been false and defamatory? I doubt it. I've received a few cease-and- desist letters over the years, and my impression is that they are the first in a line of scare tactics some law firms like to use. Was it wise for Alabama A&M and its high-priced lawyers to threaten Donald Watkins? Given Watkins stellar record as a courtroom litigator, I would say it was an off-the-charts stupid thing to do. For one, A&M could be setting itself up for a countersuit that might result in hundreds of thousands of dollars (if not millions) in damages, plus attorney fees paid to the wronged party. Two, my guess is that A&M will have a difficult time proving its case -- and the burden of proof will be on the university. Third, Maynard Nexsen sets itself up for potentially serious repercussions. Firing off threatening letters might seem like fun at first -- until the fallout sets in. That can include a legal-malpractice lawsuit against the firm, depending on the law in the jurisdiction where the case is heard. It can include sanctions, imposed by a court or other authoritative body. And it could lead to suspension or revocation of law licenses if the case involves a state that takes the policing of rogue lawyers seriously. In short, Donald Watkins is not the kind of person you want to take on in court, and he clearly takes this matter seriously, writing:

As a professional journalist, I take every threat to freedom of speech very seriously.  This is particularly true when the suppressor of freedom of speech is a public institution in Alabama -- a state that arrests and jails journalists just like they do in Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China.

The 1964 landmark case protecting freedom of speech for journalists – New York Times v. Sullivan – actually arose from a Montgomery, Alabama, public official’s defamation claims against Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and four other Black pastors who were leading the civil-rights movement in the early 1960s.

White public officials across the South used state-court defamation claims as a tool of intimidation against Black activists. Their goal was to stop Blacks from questioning and challenging the conditions of their second-class citizenship in the racially segregated South.

Alabama A&M is doing the same thing here. 

Alabama A&M is acting as a surrogate for the political forces in Alabama who seek to keep Black Alabamians downtrodden “from the cradle to the grave.”  This is why the target of Alabama A&M's pre-litigation exercise is me, rather than the state of Alabama. The “Cease and Desist” letter is used as a tool for intimidation.

You can read my response to Alabama A&M’s threat to curtail the exercise of my freedom of speech rights by clicking here.

I am a freelance professional journalist with more than 900 copyrighted and published news articles and editorial opinions. My published articles and editorials regarding the conduct of public entities and public officials conform to the legal principles enunciated in New York Times v. Sullivan and its progeny.     

        I stand by the truth of the statements contained in the cache of editorial opinions                    referenced  in Alabama A&M's threatening letter, as well as my First Amendment right         to express such opinions.

Constitutional scholar Ilya Somin shows how the Colorado Supreme Court correctly concluded that Donald Trump is disqualified from the 2024 election

Ilya Somin, George Mason University

 

Reaction to the Colorado Supreme Court disqualifying Donald Trump from the state's ballot under 14th Amendment (Section 3) -- finding that Trump engaged in an insurrection related to the Jan. 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol -- has been all over the place. It starts with Republican politicians responding with a mix of dishonesty, cluelessness, efforts to sew confusion, and desperate attempts to defend a man who engaged in the most abominable presidential behavior in American history, which probably explains why Section 3 never has been used before against a former president or presidential candidate -- until this week.

In fairness, Republican politicos were not the only ones who had goofy reactions to the Colorado ruling. At least two well-known law professors were not much better. Several judges who heard similar lawsuits in other states apparently did not know the law or intentionally chose not to apply it correctly. Analysis from columnists in the mainstream press was mostly a jumbled mess.

This issue is not all that complicated, as Robert Reich has noted in several recent Tweets, including this one:

Billie Eilish can't run for president. She is under 35. Arnold Schwarzenegger can't run for president. He was born in Austria. Donald Trump can't run for president. He engaged in and supported an insurrection. It's in the Constitution, folks.

It is hard to figure why people who should know better can't seem to grasp the simple nature of Section 3 -- and the reality that the Colorado court got it right -- and Donald Trump, in fact, is disqualified under the constitution.

So, who gets it, who provided valuable clarity for a public that surely is confused by a little-known provision of law that dates to the Civil War? My votes goes to Ilya Somin, a professor of law at George Mason University''s Antonin Scalia Law School and author at Reason Magazine, The Volokh Conspiracy and other outlets in the popular press, in addition to numerous scholarly journals. In an article at Reason and The Volokh Conspiracy, Somin writes under the headline "Colorado Supreme Court Rules Trump is Ineligible for the Presidency Under Section 3 of the 14th Amendment; The Colorado court got this issue right. The case is now likely headed to the US Supreme Court":

The Supreme Court of Colorado ruled this week that Donald Trump is ineligible to be on the ballot for the 2024 presidential election because he is disqualified by Section 3 of the 14th Amendment. Section 3 states that "No person" can hold any state or federal office if they had previously been "a member of Congress, or… an officer of the United States" or a state official, and then "engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof." The Colorado court ruled that Trump "engaged in insurrection" because of his role in instigating the January 6, 2021 assault on the Capitol, and is therefore disqualified. This—and the lower court ruling it reviewed—are the first decisions that address the Section 3 case against Trump on the merits; several previous rulings in other states have dismissed Section 3 claims against Trump on various procedural grounds.

I can't give anything like a complete analysis of the 213 pages of majority and dissenting opinions here. But I think the 4-3 majority got it right. Trump is indeed ineligible.

The per curiam majority opinion does an excellent job of handling all the major issues at stake: whether the January 6 attack was an insurrection, whether Trump's role in it was extensive enough to qualify as engagement, whether the president is an "officer of the United States," and whether Section 3 is "self-executing" (that is, whether state governments and courts can enforce it in the absence of specialized congressional legislation). In the process, the justices partly affirmed and partly overruled the trial court decision, which held that Trump did indeed engage in insurrection, but let him off the hook on the badly flawed ground that Section 3 doesn't apply to the president.

The case is now likely headed to the US Supreme Court. The justices may well hear it on an accelerated schedule, so as to resolve the case before we go too far into the GOP primary process. The Colorado Court has stayed its decision until at least January 4, to allow time for appeals to the US Supreme Court.

Somin notes that the 4-3 vote of the Coloarado high court is deceptive:

The 4-3 vote is not as close as it looks. Two of the three dissenting justices did so on the ground that Colorado state election law doesn't give the state courts the authority to decide Section 3 issues. They did not endorse any of the federal constitutional arguments on Trump's side. And these state statutory issues probably cannot be reviewed by the US Supreme Court, because state supreme courts are the final arbiters of the meaning of state law (with a few exceptions that do not apply here).

Was the Jan. 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol an insurrection? Somin answers in the affirmative, and he does not find it to be a close call:

I think it's fairly obvious that the January 6 attack on the Capitol amounts to an insurrection, and the Colorado justices also concluded this is not a close issue:

[F]or purposes of deciding this case, we need not adopt a single, all-encompassing definition of the word "insurrection." Rather, it suffices for us to conclude that any definition of "insurrection" for purposes of Section Three would encompass a concerted and public use of force or threat of force by a group of people to hinder or prevent the U.S. government from taking the actions necessary to accomplish a peaceful transfer of power in this country.

This is an important point that I have tried to highlight in some of my own writings about the case. January 6 qualifies as an "insurrection" even under a fairly narrow definition of the term that is limited to the use of force to take over the powers of government. We don't need to rely on much broader definitions advocated by some legal scholars.

The Colorado Court didn't address the argument that there was no insurrection because the rioters and Trump sincerely believed he won the election, and therefore thought they were acting to protect the Constitution. But, under that reasoning, most of the ex-Confederates whom Section 3 was originally enacted to disqualify would also have been exempt, since they sincerely believed the secession of the southern states was legally authorized by the Constitution (and they had far better legal arguments for their position than Trump for his).

What was the toughest issue the Colorado court had to address. This is Somin's take:

As I see it, the hardest issue raised in the case is whether Trump's involvement in the insurrection was extensive enough to count as "engaging" in it. On this question, the justices affirmed the detailed and compelling analysis of the district judge, much of which rests on factual findings that can only be reversed for "clear error." They also emphasized this important point:

As our detailed recitation of the evidence shows, President Trump did not merely incite the insurrection. Even when the siege on the Capitol was fully under way, he continued to support it by repeatedly demanding that Vice President Pence refuse to perform his constitutional duty and by calling Senators to persuade them to stop the counting of electoral votes. These actions constituted overt, voluntary, and direct participation in the insurrection

As I pointed out in a recent Bulwark article about the case, this goes beyond encouraging violence (as Trump did before the attack) or failing to try to stop it. It amounts to using the attack as leverage to try to force Congress to keep him in power. Using a violent insurrection in this way surely qualifies as "engaging in it," even if Trump's other actions fell short of doing so. Even if this somehow still falls short of "engagement," this and Trump's other actions surely at least gave "aid and comfort to the enemies" of the United States.

The court also gave a thorough and compelling explanation for its rejection of the argument that the president is not an "officer of the United States" covered by Section 3. Here is a key excerpt:

When interpreting the Constitution, we prefer a phrase's normal and ordinary usage over "secret or technical meanings that would not have been known to ordinary citizens in the founding generation."District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577 (2008). Dictionaries from the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification define "office" as a "particular duty, charge or trust conferred by public authority, and for a public purpose," that is "undertaken by . . . authority from government or those who administer it." Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 689 (Chauncey A. Goodrich ed., 1853); see also 5 Johnson's English Dictionary 646 (J.E. Worcester ed., 1859) (defining "office" as "a public charge or employment; magistracy");United States v. Maurice, 26 F. Cas. 1211, 1214 (C.C.D. Va. 1823) (No. 15,747) ("An office is defined to be 'a public charge or employment,' . . . ."). The Presidency falls comfortably within these definitions…..

The preference for "ordinary meaning" is a standard tenet endorsed by most originalist judges. The quote from Heller to this effect is by the late Justice Scalia, a major icon of originalist jurisprudence.

And it's pretty obvious that the ordinary meaning of "officer of the United States" includes the holder of the most powerful office in the federal government! As the Colorado Supreme Court puts it, "President Trump asks us to hold that Section Three disqualifies every oath-breaking insurrectionist except the most powerful one and that it bars oath-breakers from virtually every office, both state and federal, except the highest one in the land. Both results are inconsistent with the plain language and history of Section Three."

The opinion also addresses the argument that the presidency was excluded because it wasn't specifically listed, but some other positions (e.g.—members of Congress) were:

It seems most likely that the Presidency is not specifically included because it is so evidently an "office." In fact, no specific office is listed in Section Three; instead, the Section refers to "any office, civil or military." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 3. True, senators, representatives, and presidential electors are listed, but none of these positions is considered an "office" in the Constitution. Instead, senators and representatives are referred to as "members" of their respective bodies.

I would add that senators, representatives, and electors are less clearly officers than the president, because they do not have individual authority to issue orders to subordinates, a point I expounded on in my Bulwark article.

The Court similarly addressed the issue of whether Section 3 is self-executing. The key point here is that every other part of the Fourteenth Amendment is considered self-executing, despite the fact that Congress can provide for additional enforcement through its power to enact "appropriate" enforcement legislation under Section 5. There is no good reason to exempt Section 3 from this general principle:

The Supreme Court has said that the Fourteenth Amendment "is undoubtedly self-executing without any ancillary legislation, so far as its terms are applicable to any existing state of circumstances."

The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). To be sure, in the Civil Rights Cases, the Court was directly focused on the Thirteenth Amendment, so this statement could be described as dicta. But an examination of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments ("Reconstruction Amendments") and interpretation of them supports the accuracy and broader significance of the statement….

There is no textual evidence that Congress intended Section Three to be any different…. Furthermore, we agree with the [plaintiffs] that interpreting any of the Reconstruction Amendments, given their identical structure, as not self-executing would lead to absurd results. If these Amendments required legislation to make them operative, then Congress could nullify them by simply not passing enacting legislation. The result of such inaction would mean that slavery remains legal; Black citizens would be counted as less than full citizens for reapportionment; non-white male voters could be disenfranchised; and any individual who engaged in insurrection against the government would nonetheless be able to serve in the government, regardless of whether two-thirds of Congress had lifted the disqualification.

Justice Samour, the only one of the three dissenters who based his position on any federal constitutional issue, argues that Section 3 cannot be self-executing because making it so would deprive candidates for office of the "due process of law." But the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment only provides a guarantee of due process before a person can be deprived of "life, liberty, or property."

Disqualification under Section 3 doesn't threaten any of these. Loss of eligibility for holding various types of public offices pretty obviously doesn't threaten anyone's life or property rights. And it isn't a threat to liberty, either. No one claims that the Twenty-Second Amendment deprives people of "liberty" merely because they become ineligible for the presidency if they have already served two terms.

The U.S. Supreme Court already has touched on this issue, and Somin disagrees with how the Supremes handled it. He writes:

The Supreme Court has held (wrongly in my view) that a degree of constitutional due process is required for deprivation of some types government benefits, particularly those that provide essential needs, such as welfare benefits for the poor.

Eligibility for the presidency isn't an essential need in the same way. If Trump is no longer eligible for the presidency, he isn't going to starve or become homeless. And even when it comes to deprivation of vital welfare benefits for the poor, the Supreme Court has held that due process requires only an administrative hearing, not a "judicial or quasi-judicial trial." The five-day trial held by the district court in the Colorado case in which both sides presented extensive evidence and expert testimony easily meets any plausible due process requirements for a case like this, even if we assume that the Due Process Clause applies (which I think it does not).

I am not qualified to comment on the Colorado statutory issues raised by the other two dissenting justices. To me, it would be strange if the law did not give state courts the power to adjudicate cases over Section 3 disqualification, just as they routinely consider other candidate eligibility issues. But I am no expert on Colorado election law, and therefore might be missing something. I will only reiterate that the federal Supreme Court probably lacks the power to review the Colorado state court's resolution of these issues of state statutory law.

The same point applies to the Colorado court's conclusion that, under state law, candidates ineligible for the presidency are barred from appearing on primary ballots, as well as those for the general election.

Somin provides clear-eyed analysis of Section 3 -- what it says, and how the Colorado court worked through issues related to the once-obscure provision. Many Americans probably need clarity on an issue they've never seen addressed before. Somin provides such clarity, and I hope his work will reach a wide audience.

The bottom line: Somin concludes that Donald Trump is disqualified, and the Colorado high court got it right. As we will show in upcoming posts, quite a few high-profile individuals got it wrong. And as Robert Reich says, this case is not as complicated as it might first appear.

Alabama A&M's conflicted board of trustees operates under financial threats related to the $527-million debt the state of Alabama owes to the university

Dr. Roderick Watts, Alabama A&M

Several members of the Alabama A&M Board of Trustees have ties to companies that provide goods and services to the state of Alabama. According to a report today at donaldwatkins.com, some of those board members have been informed that their status as state vendors will be in jeopardy if A&M attempts to collect  on a $527-million debt the U.S. government has determined the state owes A&M as a result of chronic underfunding by the state over roughly 30 years.

Donald Watkins, a longtime Alabama attorney who has become a leading voice in online investigative journalism, says this edict from the state helps explain A&M's failure to seek payment on a debt that clearly is owed and likely could positively affect A&M's fortunes far into the future. In short, Watkins states, some trustees apparently are afraid to buck the state. That raises at least two questions: (1) Does Alabama's not-so-subtle message to A&M board members amount to an unlawful threat under the Alabama Criminal Code? (2) If so, does that constitute extortion as a matter of law?  The answer to both questions appears to be yes, which raises this question: Is the state of Alabama going to get away with it?

How did such a disturbing situation arise? Under the headline "The Watts Family Pocketed $21 Million in State Funds, But Alabama A&M Board Chairman Roderick Watts Refuses to Collect a $527 Million Debt the State Owes A&M," Watkins provides details:

Enrestoration Inc., is a residential health-care company that is dedicated to helping individuals with mental health and related challenges move toward recovery, health, and greater independence through community living, meaningful work, and clinical care. 

Enrestoration offers a full range of care, with programs in Etowah County, Alabama, and the surrounding counties for those ready for new challenges and structured transition.

Enrestoration is a family-owned business that was originally incorporated on June 19, 1989 by distinguished nursing educator and businesswoman Roberta O. Watts. Roger William Watts, Sr. (her husband), and Roderick DeWayne Watts (her son).  It was dissolved on June 5, 1990.

The Watts family incorporated Enrestoration, Inc., again on November 17, 1994.

On July 7, 2022, Roberta and Roger Watts removed themselves as an "Incorporator/Member/Partner" in their individual names and substituted Target Management Trust as the “Director/Manager/Organizer Activity” and “Registered Agent.” The company also named Target Management Trust as a “Director” and Bethlehem Management as an “Incorporator.” 

Target Management Trust is an Alabama real estate investment trust that is housed in a commercial building owned by Roger Watts at 201 Wall Street in Gadsden. 

The beneficiaries of Target Management Trust are not disclosed in public records.

Roberta Watts is still listed as Enrestoration’s corporate “Secretary," according to records maintained by the Alabama Secretary of State.

Enrestoration Inc. appears to operate in an "off the grid" manner, and Watkins says that probably is due to Roderick Watts' position on the A&M Board of Trustees and the company's status as a state vendor. Reports Watkins:

Enrestoration is a "for profit" company. It is a completely separate and distinct entity from the Roberta O. Watts Medical Center owned and operated by Quality of Life Health Services, Inc. The Quality of Life entity is a private, "non-profit" 501(c)(3) charitable organization.

Interestingly, the owners of Enrestoration are NOT listed anywhere on the company’s website. Likewise, neither the beneficiaries of Target Management Trust, nor the owners of Bethlehem Management, are listed on the company's website.

However, the "Agency Experience" section of Enrestoration's website states that the company "is owned and operated by a highly qualified community/mental health nurse educator, University of Alabama Nursing Hall of Fame recipient, with a specialty in community mental health." These credentials fit Roberta O. Watts.

How best to describe this peculiar arrangement? Watkins uses these words: Enrestoration Operates in a Stealth Mode Until it is Time to Collect a Vendor Payment from the State of Alabama. Watkins provides details:

Enrestoration is a major healthcare provider to the Alabama Department of Mental Health. According to Open Alabama Checkbook. Enrestoration has received a whopping $21,227,483 from the state of Alabama in the last seven years fiscal years (running from Oct.1st through September 30th). 

The payments were doled out to Enrestoration during this period are as follows:

1.     $4,087,768.12 in 2017

2.     $3,695,568.25 in 2018

3.     $3,613,551.19 in 2019

4.     $3,477,880.63 in 2020

5.     $2,600,353.52 in 2021

6.     $1,972,204.36 in 2022

7.     $1,780,157.26 in 2023

Even when reporting Enrestoration's publicly available compliance information to the Alabama Department of Mental Health, the company only listed bare-bones information. Furthermore, the company’s reporting official only uses her first name, “Peggy.”

Other oddities surround Enrestoration Inc., Watkins reports:

Enrestoration is not accredited by the Better Business Bureau. In fact, it does not appear from the company's website that Enrestoration is accredited by any recognized accrediting agency in the mental-health profession.

Because Enrestoration, Inc., is an unaccredited, Black-owned business that pockets annual multimillion-dollar payments from Alabama taxpayers, the company's true owners and management team apparently felt a need to "fly under the radar" in order to avoid any public scrutiny of its company profile, services offerings, and substantial revenue streams.

Why the concern about public scrutiny? Watkins posits this: Roderick DeWayne Watts is an Heir Apparent to Enrestoration's fortune. Then Watkins adds:

Roberta and Roger Watts have two children, one of whom is Dr. Roderick DeWayne Watts.

Dr. Watts is Chairman of the Alabama A&M University board of trustees. I profiled Dr. Watts in an October 23, 2023, article titled, “Alabama A&M Board Agenda Omits Authorization to Collect $527 Million owed to University by State.”

Even though Dr. Watts is an alumnus of Tuskegee University, Alabama Gov. Kay Ivey appointed him to the Alabama A&M board of trustees on May 16, 2017. She likes him. Dr. Watts was reappointed by Ivey for a second term and was confirmed by the Alabama Senate on March 31, 2022.

Dr. Watts is a staunch supporter of President Daniel K. Wims, despite Wims’ checkered employment record in higher education and a documented history of formal sexual harassment complaints filed against Wims by men and women employees in his workplace. 

In October 2021, Watts voted in favor of selecting Wims as Alabama A&M’s president over two more objectively qualified candidates for the job.

Watts does not appear to be a hard-nosed advocate for A&M's best interests. It's more of a "go along, to get along" style. Writes Watkins:

Today, Dr. Watts leads a notoriously weak and ethically challenged board of trustees that is backing President Wims' refusal to collect the $527,280,064 debt owed to Alabama A&M by the state of Alabama. 

Dr. Watts and his board members have also acquiesced in Wims' rapid conversion of Alabama A&M from a respected institution of higher education into a hotbed of activities for MAGA operatives, a home for sexual predators in top management positions, and a platform for MAGA vendors to gouge the university for doing little to no work.

We have confirmed that any hesitation by Dr. Watts in backing President Wims' refusal to collect the university’s $527,280,064 from the state of Alabama will result in the Department of Mental Health’s immediate cancellation of Enrestoration's multimillion-dollar annual contracts for health-care services to the state. This places Dr. Watts in an apparent conflict-of-interest situation.

Instead of resigning to avoid his apparent conflict of interest, Dr. Watts decided to betray Alabama A&M University and Bulldog Nation in October by refusing to direct Wims, other university executive officers, and school attorneys to use all lawful means necessary to collect this $527,280,064 debt.

Dr. Watts is not alone in his apparent conflict of interest. State money has also flowed to other trustees who support Wims' de facto waiver of this $527,280,064 debt.

In a series of upcoming articles, we will expose the other pro-Wims trustees who have received vendor payments from the state of Alabama and who are backing Wims' refusal to collect this $527,280,064 debt. 

Like Dr. Watts, these conflicted trustees have knowingly and willingly placed their personal financial interests ahead of their sworn duty to secure, protect, and grow Alabama A&M’s portfolio of financial assets.

Stay tuned as we expose the staggering conflicts of interest at Alabama A&M University that are preventing the institution from collecting its $527,280,064 debt.