Trump and Gorsuch pressure Anthony Kennedy to retire, hoping to replace him with SCOTUS justice who would be favorable in rulings on Mueller investigation

Donald Trump, Neil Gorsuch, and Anthony Kennedy

Donald Trump and Neil Gorsuch conspired to pressure U.S. Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy to retire, according to a report from a D.C.-based investigative journalist. The move is designed to let Trump appoint a justice who would be in his corner should issues related to the Robert Mueller investigation wind up before the nation's highest court.

Gorsuch, from Colorado, was Trump's first appointee to SCOTUS, and he combined with Kennedy's sons and Trump to force an opening on the Supreme Court via the elder Kennedy's exit, reports Wayne Madsen. The mainstream media, led by The New York Times, also reports that Anthony Kennedy was pressured to resign, but it's story is much more cautious than the one Madsen produced.

Madsen's report suggests the No. 1 characteristic Trump will look for in a nominee is one who might side with him in any case that comes before the court regarding the Mueller probe.

Meanwhile, some Democrats -- in a rare showing of spine -- say a president who is under criminal investigation should not be allowed to make a nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court, according to HuffPost.

The Times makes no mention that the pressure was designed to possibly give Trump an upper hand in the Mueller investigation. And the newspaper portrays such pressure to create a high-court opening as standard political theater. Madsen, however, says such collusion to influence SCOTUS could be criminal. From the Wayne Madsen Report (WMR):

There are multiple reports coming out of congressional and media circles in Washington, DC that Donald Trump colluded with Supreme Court Associate Justice Neil Gorsuch and the sons of Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy to convince Justice Kennedy to retire. Kennedy's announcement that he is retiring sent shock waves through the country, with fears that Trump's replacement will provide a solid 5-4 court majority that will help Trump roll back several fundamental constitutional rights.

More importantly, a 5-4 Republican majority on the court is seen by Trump as protecting him from any indictment or recommendation for impeachment arising from the Justice Department investigation of Trump and his associates being conducted by special counsel Robert Mueller.

If Trump colluded with Gorsuch and Kennedy to "pack the court" in Trump's favor, that would represent impeachable offenses by both Trump and Gorsuch. The Supreme Court's independence from interference by the other two branches of the federal government -- executive and legislative -- is sacrosanct under the Constitution.

The 81-year old Kennedy was not only pressured to retire by his Trump-appointed court colleague, Gorsuch, but also by his son, Justin Kennedy, a personal friend of Donald Trump, Jr.

Justice Kennedy also saw pressure to step down from his other son, Gregory Kennedy, a Stanford Law School classmate of Peter Thiel, Donald Trump's high-tech adviser. Thiel's Palantir Technology, which has several U.S. intelligence and law enforcement contracts -- including one with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for identifying immigrants in the United States for deportation -- is partnered with Gregory Kennedy's former firm, which is ominously called Disruptive Technology Advisers, LLC and which is billed as a "merchant bank" in Los Angeles.

Trump and Gorsuch were particularly forceful in encouraging Anthony Kennedy to step aside, reports Madsen:

Reportedly, Trump personally pressed Gorsuch, who once clerked for Kennedy, to ask the associate justice to retire. Whether or not Trump told Gorsuch that the move was to ensure that the president would remain immune to the court upholding any moves by Mueller, Gorsuch, as a constitutional expert with experience working at the court, would have known what the request meant. Gorsuch would have also known that by cajoling him to pressure a Supreme Court justice to retire, Trump's actions were not only unconstitutional and illegal, but also exposed himself to charges of judicial malfeasance and potential impeachment.

Compared to Madsen's report, The New York Times article has a "let's shrug our shoulders" feel to it. From The Times:

There were no direct efforts to pressure or lobby Kennedy to announce his resignation Wednesday, and it was hardly the first time a president had done his best to create a court opening. “In the past half-century, presidents have repeatedly been dying to take advantage of timely vacancies,” said Laura Kalman, a historian at the University of California, Santa Barbara.

But in subtle and not so subtle ways, the Trump administration waged a quiet campaign to ensure that the president had a second opportunity in his administration’s first 18 months to fulfill one of his most important campaign promises to his conservative followers: that he would change the complexion and direction of the Supreme Court. . . .

There is nothing unusual in urging older justices to retire for partisan reasons. During the Obama administration, prominent liberals called for Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg to retire so that Obama could name her successor.

Kennedy’s departure is a triumph for Trump, who has taken particular satisfaction in his judicial appointments. Naming justices and judges is easier than forging legislative compromises, and Trump understands that his judicial appointments represent a legacy that will long outlast his presidency.

Meanwhile, a few Democrats were making a rare display of toughness regarding the SCOTUS opening. From Amanda Terkel, of HuffPost:

Some Democratic senators and their allies are starting to make the argument that not only should there be no Supreme Court pick until after the November elections, but that there shouldn’t be one at all while the president remains under criminal investigation.

Special counsel Robert Mueller is investigating President Donald Trump as part of his probe into Russia’s interference in the 2016 election to defeat Hillary Clinton. Trump is not, however, a criminal target of Mueller’s.

During a judiciary committee hearing Thursday, Sen. Cory Booker (D-N.J.) noted that a challenge to the investigation could very well end up before the Supreme Court at some point ― potentially creating a conflict of interest for a president who has asked nonpartisan officials for their loyalty.

“If we’re not going to thoroughly discuss what it means to have a president with this ongoing investigation happening, who is now going to interview Supreme Court justices, and potentially continue with his tradition of doing litmus tests, loyalty tests, for that person, we could be participating in a process that could undermine that criminal investigation,” Booker said. “I do not believe this committee should or can in good conscience consider a nominee put forward by this president until that investigation is concluded.”

Booker was not alone in speaking out:

Sen. Jack Reed (D-R.I.) also mentioned the Russia investigation Wednesday in his statement on Justice Anthony Kennedy’s upcoming retirement, saying Republicans will be “conveniently ignoring the serious investigation into Russia’s pro-Trump campaign interference in our democracy” if they try to rush a nominee through.

According to HuffPo, the Russian investigation is likely to hang over the Trump nomination, for a variety of reasons:

The Russia investigation is likely to come up more if Trump chooses Brett Kavanaugh, a circuit court judge who is on the president’s shortlist of potential nominees. Kavanaugh is one of the most outspoken champions of unitary executive theory ― essentially, unchecked presidential power over the executive branch ― on the bench, and Democrats would no doubt press him about his views on the constitutionality of the special counsel and other matters regarding the probe.

Trump and his GOP allies in the Senate have said they want to have a nominee confirmed by the midterm elections in November. Democrats have argued that they are being hypocrites, as Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) refused to give a hearing or a vote to Merrick Garland, President Barack Obama’s nominee to replace the late Justice Antonin Scalia, in March 2016. McConnell argued at the time that a Supreme Court confirmation should not happen until after the election.

Trump, of course, won that election, and he nominated Gorsuch for the bench, stealing the seat away from liberals and securing a 5-4 conservative majority.

U.S. cities and counties are going heavily into debt to pay for the costs of police brutality, with big Wall Street banks profiting from the violence of rogue cops

Police brutality comes with heavy financial costs.

Twelve U.S. cities and counties borrowed almost $878 million to pay for the costs of police brutality and misconduct, according to a new report from a Chicago-based research and strategy group. The report, titled "Police Brutality Bonds: How Wall Street Profits from Police Violence," comes from the Action Center On Race and the Economy (ACRE).

The borrowing figure cited above does not include more than $1.03 billion paid to investors. When that is included, the total reaches $1.87 billion.

This issue hits close to home here at Legal Schnauzer, given that deputies in Greene County, Missouri, brutalized my wife, Carol, during an unlawful eviction in September 2015, leaving her with a comminuted fracture (broken in more than two places) in her left arm that required trauma surgery and put her overall health at risk -- requiring treatment for blood loss, shock, nerve damage, kidney damage, and elevated pressures.

To help cover up such brutality, Missouri prosecutors brought a "cover charge" against Carol, in the form of an "assault of a law enforcement officer" criminal case, in which the alleged police "victim" admitted he grabbed Carol first, meaning she could not be guilty of the offense as described by state statute. From the ACRE report:

As the costs of police misconduct rise, cities and counties across the United States are going into debt to pay for it. Often this debt is in the form of bond borrowing. When cities or counties issue bonds to pay these costs, banks and other firms collect fees for the services they provide, and investors collect interest. The use of bonds to pay for settlements and judgments greatly increases the burden of policing costs on taxpayers, while producing a profit for banks and investors. Using bonds to pay for settlements or judgments can nearly double the costs of the original settlement. All of this is paid for by taxpayers.

We call the bonds used to cover police related settlement and judgment costs “police brutality bonds”, because they quite literally allow banks and wealthy investors to profit from police violence. This is a transfer of wealth from communities—especially over-policed communities of color—to Wall Street and wealthy investors. The companies profiting from police brutality bonds include well known institutions like Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs, and Bank of America, as well as smaller regional banks and other firms.

In our research into the use of police brutality bonds, we found that cities and counties across the United States issue bonds to pay for police brutality settlements and judgments. The cities range from giant metropolises such as Los Angeles to smaller cities like Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. Our report includes details on police brutality bonds in twelve cities and counties, including five in-depth case studies: Chicago, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, Cleveland, and Lake County, Indiana.

All of this spending, the study finds, does not appear to curb police violence. Reports ACRE:

While the legal system assumes that hefty financial consequences for police violence serve as a deterrent to abusive policing, this does not appear to be the case. Instead, settlements and judgments—including those a city or county can’t pay without going into debt—appear to be an acceptable cost of the business of policing for cities and counties across the country. We have identified several factors contributing to this broken system.

* Violent Police Officers and Their Departments Are Shielded from Financial Consequences. Research has found that police officers are “virtually always” indemnified by their employers, meaning that the cities will cover the costs of defending officers in court cases, and will pay for any judgments or settlements that result from actions officers take in the course of their employment. Furthermore, most police departments are also insulated from the financial consequences of excessive settlement and judgment costs and are not subject to budget cuts when their settlement and judgment costs rise. Those cuts come from elsewhere in the city budget.

Comminuted fracture of Carol Shuler's left
arm, courtesy of police brutality in Missouri.

 * Settlements can function as a kind of “hush money” working to prevent accountability for violent officers and their departments. Settlements and judgments can provide a measure of restitution to victims of police violence and/or their families, but settlements can also function as “hush money” in cases where survivors or their families, in exchange for the settlement award, sign away their rights to discuss the case or the officers involved.

* There is a striking lack of transparency and disclosure around cities’ reliance on borrowing, and in each of our case studies, there is a lack of full, accessible accounting of the costs. Most cities in our sample were unable, or unwilling, to provide a full accounting of how much they are spending on borrowing for settlements and judgments. Accountability and change are impossible without transparency.

What needs to be done? ACRE has some ideas:

As we fight to hold violent officers and police departments accountable to our communities and to curb abusive policing, we must also work to hold banks and investors accountable for their role in perpetuating and profiting from our existing system. Police violence should never be a source of profit for banks or investors, or a reason we do not have the resources we need to invest in the infrastructure and services that make our communities safer and more livable. We need to dismantle this system of policing and build a justice system that prioritizes the needs and well-being of all people. While we work toward that, here are our key recommendations:

1. If cities must borrow to pay for settlements and judgments, banks and investors should not be allowed to profit from that.

2. Police officers must be forced to take out individual liability insurance policies to cover the costs of settlements and judgments caused by their misconduct.

3. Governmental bodies at the local, state, and federal levels must account for and provide full transparency about which officers are behaving in ways that lead to settlements and judgments, how they are or are not being held accountable, who is paying for their misconduct and how, and who is profiting from these payments.

With Anthony Kennedy retiring at SCOTUS, will Trump overlook Bll Pryor's history with gay porn and Bad Puppy to pick a closeted nominee from Alabama?

This summary is not available. Please click here to view the post.

Russian operatives used Philando Castille shooting death to breed social unrest in U.S., raising possibility they are involved in abuse directed at Legal Schnauzer

The Philando Castille shooting, which was captured on video
and spread via Facebook.

Russian trolls used the 2016 police-shooting death of Philando Castille to help sew racial unrest in the United States, according to a new CNN report. It provides perhaps the strongest evidence yet that Russian meddling efforts are not limited to politics, but attempt to disrupt American society at large.

The report also raises a question that hits close to home: Is the abuse that has been directed at my wife, Carol, and me, because of my reporting on sensitive topics at this blog, driven in part by Russian interests? At first, that question might seem a tad over the edge. But when you consider the political environments in the two states where we have lived -- Alabama and Missouri (not to mention the ongoing investigation of a Russian scandal tied to the current occupant of the White House) -- the question does not seem quite so far-fetched.

Some readers' initial reaction likely will go something like this: "Schnauzer you are a relative nobody. Why would powerful and wealthy interests in Russia have any interest in you?" My response? "Philando Castille was a nobody, too, until a Minnesota cop shot him seven times during a traffic stop, creating an opportunity for Russian trolls to take disruptive actions."

Evidence suggests that Russian interest is not driven by a person's fame or notoriety; it's more about potentially explosive issues that person represents. In the case of Philando Castille, the issue involved the intersection of police brutality, racial unrest, and the Black Lives Matter movement. In my case, perhaps, the issue involves the new world of digital, non-traditional journalism, where a reporter such as yours truly can break stories without restrictions from editors and obligations to advertisers.

If there is one hatred that Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin, and their supporters share it is for a free press. Wikipedia keeps a list of journalists who have been killed in Russia, and it includes at least a dozen names -- while some sources believe the true number is closer to 200. Donald Trump has called freedom of the press "disgusting." The ACLU reports:

Trump the candidate also blacklisted reporters and entire news outlets from campaign events, referred to journalists as “scum” and “slime,” and mocked a reporter for having a disability. He vowed to sue women who reported incidents of sexual harassment and assault, along with the outlets that covered their accounts, and threatened a lawsuit against a Hispanic journalist group for calling out his bigoted remarks.

"I would never kill them but I do hate them,” he said of reporters. “And some of them are such lying, disgusting people.”

Gee,  its comforting to know the U.S. "president" does not plan to kill any journalists -- at least not yet. One of Trump's most prominent surrogates -- Attorney General and former U.S. Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-AL) -- already has established an environment of terror toward journalists in his native Alabama. I know because I was arrested and thrown in jail for five months because of content on this blog. Let's consider the abuse that has been sent our way over roughly the past 10 years:

* Carol and I were cheated out of our jobs -- her at Infinity Insurance, me at UAB;

* I became the first U.S. journalist since 2006 to be incarcerated -- and apparently the only one in U.S. history to be jailed due to a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction that both have been unlawful under the First Amendment for more than 230 years;

* Our home of 25 years in Birmingham was stolen via a wrongful foreclosure;

* After being forced to move to Missouri, where I grew up, we were hit with an eviction that was unlawful on at least 10-12 grounds;

* During the eviction, Missouri deputies brutalized Carol and shattered her left arm so severely that it required trauma surgery and roughly six months of physical therapy. The violence was such that it put Carol's overall health, even her life at risk. Medical records show she was treated for blood loss, shock, nerve damage, kidney damage, elevated pressures, and more.

Mugshot of U.S. journalist Roger Shuler after cops
in Jeff Sessions' Alabama beat and arrested him
inside his own home -- for blogging. 

Were Russian interests involved in some -- or all -- of this? We will take a close look at that question in upcoming posts. My answer to the question probably would have been "no." But that was before I read that Russian trolls became deeply involved in efforts to spread unrest following the Philando Castille shooting.

A CNN investigation found at least two apparent American protest groups -- "Don't Shoot" and "Blacktivist" -- that proved to be driven by Russian trolls. Less than 10 hours after the Castille shooting, on July 6, 2016, "Don't Shoot" began to promote an event called "Justice for Philando Castille." But no one in the tight-knit Minneapolis activist community had heard of the group or the people behind it. That's because it all was a Russian creation. And the subterfuge did not stop there. Reports CNN:

In September 2017, CNN uncovered a sham organization called "Blacktivist." The group described itself as a black American activist campaign and had been active on social media for years. It even had a bigger following than the official Black Lives Matter Facebook page.

CNN confirmed Blacktivist was not a real American group, however. It was a troll operation run from 4,000 miles away in St. Petersburg, Russia, by a Kremlin-linked group known as the Internet Research Agency.

The revelations helped to show Russia's use of social media to interfere in American life extended beyond the presidential election, and into efforts to exacerbate existing divisions in the U.S.

The investigation of Special Counsel Robert Mueller has addressed the issue of Russian trolls:

In February, [Mueller's] team indicted 13 Russian nationals involved in the Internet Research Agency troll group, saying it had sought to exacerbate existing divisions in American society.

By the time of Castile's death in July 2016, the troll group, operating out of a St Petersburg office, was allegedly a multi-million-dollar effort, with dozens of people working night and day running a network of thousands of fake American social media accounts, posing as activists on everything from Black Lives Matter to Texas secession.

By 2016, American prosecutors allege, the Internet Research Agency was "primarily intended to communicate derogatory information about Hillary Clinton."

The Philando Castille story now shows that Russian tricksters did not just want to harm Hillary Clinton's presidential operations. Their meddling went way beyond that, possibly to include attacks on a journalist who reported uncomfortable truths about crooked conservatives in two states -- Alabama and Missouri -- where connections to Russian interests are not hard to find.


(To be continued)

Missouri judge's sentencing shenanigans block Carol's right to appeal, but they might carry unintended consequences for "His Honor," Mr. Harmison

Severe bruising shows on Carol Shuler's left arm,
just moments before X-rays revealed a comminuted
fracture that was caused by police brutality in Missouri.

If Missouri judge Jerry Harmison Jr. believed my wife, Carol, actually had assaulted a law-enforcement officer, wouldn't he have imposed a sentence that amounted to more than a $10 fine? Of course. Wouldn't Harmison have handled Carol's sentencing in a way that imposed a final judgment on her? Naturally.

Harmison did neither, and that suggests -- at least to my eyes -- that he is a nincompoop, he is a raging incompetent, or he is playing games, for some reason. If he is playing games, it probably has to do with an underhanded effort to keep Carol from appealing her case. If deceit is at the heart of Harmison's ruling on sentencing, our research indicates it could blow up in his face.

It might be as simple as this: Considering the voluminous number of errors Harmison made in Carol's case, he simply might not want an appellate court to review his handiwork. He even seemed to buy the state's cop-witnesses' preposterous story that Carol broke her own arm by flailing about in the back seat of a patrol car, even though she was seat-belted and handcuffed. (Motion regarding trial errors is embedded at the end of this post.)

So, where does Carol stand because of Harmison's quirkiness? She has been found guilty of assault on a law enforcement officer, but there is no final judgment to support that finding. As humorist Dave Barry used to say, "I'm not making this up."

The case against Carol has been shaky from the outset -- with no named accuser and no corroboration or verification (meaning there was no probable cause for arrest, much less prosecution), and with a "victim" (Officer Jeremy Lynn) who admitted in writing and on the witness stand that Carol did not commit the alleged offense, as described in Missouri statutory and case law.

But the state's "case" really turned zany last week when Carol was sentenced to a suspended imposition of sentence (SIS), with two years of unsupervised probation, and a $10 payment to a crime victim's fund.

What does a suspended imposition of sentence (SIS) mean in Missouri? Here is one definition:

Suspended imposition of sentence or SIS is a sentencing option available to the trial court. In SIS, usually the defendant is placed on probation. If the defendant violates probation and faces revocation, the Judge may order any sentence within the full range of punishment for the crime convicted. If the defendant successfully completes probation, no sentence is actually ordered. Therefore normally an SIS is not considered a ‘conviction’ for anything other than law enforcement purposes.

For example, Suspended Imposition of Sentence (SIS) probation is generally available for Class B Misdemeanor DWI / BAC offenses in many counties in Missouri. This means that if the defendant pleads guilty, s/he will be given a sentence that is "suspended," and will be placed on probation for two years by law. If the probationary period, is completed successfully the conviction will not show on the permanent record. However, it will be recorded in the courts internal records and therefore in case of similar violation in the future the courts will treat it as a prior offense.

As a case styled State v. Lynch, 679 S.W.2d 858 (1984) spells out, an SIS adds a significant level of complication to a court case. Here is the question for us: Is Harmison ignorant of the implications that come with an SIS, or is he intentionally using an inappropriate sentencing scheme to suit his own purposes? Here is background on the Lynch case:

In a court tried case, defendant was convicted of second degree burglary, a violation of § 569.170, RSMo 1978. Imposition of sentence was suspended by the trial judge, and defendant was placed on probation for one year. Defendant sought to appeal his conviction, but on the state's motion defendant's appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for the reason that there was no final judgment. Thus, the controversy centers on whether a suspended imposition of sentence is a final judgment. It is not. This seems simple enough, but the facts of this case and the dilemma in which defendant finds himself give cause to ponder the controlling legal rubric.

Three things jump out at us here:

(1) The defendant in Lynch was convicted of second-degree burglary and received one year of probation. In Carol's case, the "victim" admitted Carol did not commit the offense, as defined by Missouri statutory and case law, yet she wound up with two years' probation. That seems a tad excessive, when compared to Lynch.

(2) Lynch was not able to appeal his case because the SIS meant there was no final judgment in his case;

(3) An SIS is not a final judgment. And you know any issue must be perplexing when a judge breaks out a word like "rubric."

The Lynch justices go on to essentially say their finding makes no sense, but they are powerless to change it because the Missouri General Assembly (a fancy term for a legislature) is, well . . . grossly incompetent. The opinion was written in 1984, and it appears nothing has changed much in the Show-Me State since then. From Lynch:

The next basic premise is that judgment in a criminal case does not become final for purposes of appeal until sentence is entered. Imposition of sentence must occur before the appellate process can begin. State v. Murphy, 626 S.W.2d 649, 650 (Mo.App.1981).

State ex rel. Wagner v. Ruddy, 582 S.W.2d 692 (Mo. banc 1979) states that "[t]he very term `sentence' has been defined to mean `judgment or final judgment,' and a criminal case is not ripe for appeal if no sentence has been pronounced." Id. at 694. This statement is congruent with the following holding of State v. Harris, 486 S.W.2d 227 (Mo.1972):

For purposes of this provision [§ 547.070], final judgment requires the imposition of sentence. State v. Jaeger, Mo. Sup., 394 S.W.2d 347, 352[7]; State v. Kelley, 206 Mo. 685, 105 S.W. 606, 608. When a defendant has been found guilty by a jury verdict which assesses the punishment, an appeal by the defendant prior to the pronouncement of sentence and entry of judgment is premature.

Does this seem head-scratching? It should because it's goofy, by any definition. The downside, for Carol, is that she cannot appeal the guilty verdict against her -- at least (it appears) until her probation is over in two years. The upside is that there is no final judgment -- and virtually no punishment -- against her.

Whether Harmison knows it or not, there are several other upsides for Carol, which have the promise of turning the finding against her into a virtual nullity.


(To be continued)

After last week's sentencing, Carol's punishment amounts to "nothing," which is appropriate since the cop "victim" admitted she did not commit the offense

Jerry Harmison Jr.

After fighting a bogus "assault of a law enforcement officer charge" for roughly 17 months, my wife, Carol, has been found guilty of an offense that even the "victim" admits she did not commit. But that is not the nuttiest outcome of State of Missouri v. Carol T. Shuler (1631-CR07731). Not even close.

Judge Jerry A. Harmison Jr. sentenced Carol last week to . . . well, nothing. I'm not kidding. She stands with no lawful punishment against her, and the "sentence" involves provisions that cannot be imposed on her -- under both Missouri law and findings of the U.S. Supreme Court.

As we've covered Carol's case, month after month, we've shown the Missouri "justice" system -- including judges, public defenders, prosecutors, and sheriff' officials -- is an abominable sewer of incompetence and corruption. Nothing tops that off quite like Harmison's sentencing, which would be laughable if it did not involve serious issues of liberty, constitutional violations, Carol's broken arm (courtesy of cops), and an unjust "guilty" finding that, in theory, could hang over Carol's life like a cloud the rest of her days.

That, however, will not happen -- by law -- because a of peculiar provision of Missouri law -- one Judge Harmison apparently has no clue about how to administer. Please follow us for an explanation of the nuttiest outcome we've seen in any legal case, anywhere.

We showed last week that Harmison's punishment, in essence, was a $10 fine. But that's where the zaniness only begins. Let's start by looking at the judge's sentencing notation on the docket at case.net.:

STATE BY APA BERGEON. DEFENDANT IN PERSON FOR SENTENCING HEARING. COURT CONSIDERS DEFENDANT'S SIX POST-TRIAL MOTIONS AND DENIES ALL SIX POST-TRIAL MOTIONS. SENTENCE ON COUNT I: SIS, 2 YEARS UNSUPERVISED PROBATION. DEFENDANT MUST CONTINUE COUNSELING AT BURRELL MENTAL HEALTH DURING PROBATION WHILE RESIDING IN MISSOURI. $10.00 CVCF, SOE TO 29 DAYS. COURT COSTS WAIVED. JAH/mks

What do we learn here?

(1) Carol filed six post-trial motions -- showing there was insufficient evidence for a conviction; the probable cause statement was insufficient for a warrant, much less a prosecution; and cop-witnesses admitted they had no lawful grounds to be on our property, which means their search and seizure violated the Fourth Amendment, and all evidence obtained unlawfully had to be suppressed. (Motion for Acquittal is embedded at the end of this post.) In fact, Harmison had a duty under the law to hear Carol's Motion to Suppress, but there is no indication he even looked at it. The result? Carol was found guilty on illegally obtained "evidence," and even without that reality, there was no evidence to show she assaulted anyone.

X-ray of comminuted fracture
in Carol Shuler's left arm,
courtesy of Missouri cops.

(2) Harmison claimed he read all of Carol's motions, but he clearly did not grasp them, did no legal research to confirm that her findings were correct, and never checked the transcript to find the state's cop-witnesses had, in fact, admitted Carol did not commit the offense (as described under Missouri statute and case law), and they had no lawful grounds to be on our property, much less breaking into our home.

(3) As for punishment, the court imposed:

a. An SIS (Suspended Imposition of Sentence), involving two years of unsupervised probation;

b. She must continue counseling at Burrell Behavioral Health as long as she is residing in Missouri. She's been attending counseling sessions for months at Burrell, long before her encounter with Officer Jeremy Lynn and other thugs from the Greene County Sheriff's Office (GCSO), So, this really is no punishment at all;

c. Pay $10 to the Missouri Crime Victim Compensation Fund (CVCF), which Harmison said cannot be waived. Language in Missouri Sec. 25.9 (Sentence and Judgment) indicates those costs can be waived, so I suspect Harmison either is lying or ill-informed on that point.

d. Court costs were waived.

The Greene County Prosecutor's Office filed charges against Carol in September 2016 -- with her arrest on the last day of January 2017 -- which means they spent 21 months worth of taxpayer funds on an "offense" even the "victim" admits Carol did not commit. The sum punishment -- $10 to a Crime Victim Compensation Fund, and even that probably should have been waived.

Remember that line in the second paragraph above where we said Carol's punishment amounted to "nothing"? Well, we're not joking. And we invite you to join us on a Magical Mystery Tour that will prove our courts are screwed up beyond comprehension -- and not just in Alabama.


(To be continued)

Here is the tip of a legal iceberg that shows Missouri thugs' efforts to "preclude" Carol's federal claims are due to fail, assuming an honest judge applies the law

Jerry Harmison Jr.

We have established that Missouri "law men"
brought a false assault of a law enforcement officer charge against my wife, Carol, so they could attempt to "preclude" her from bringing a federal lawsuit for excessive force, police brutality, and related claims. We've shown that Judge Jerry Harmison Jr., in essentially sentencing Carol this week to a $10 fine, apparently committed a legal blunder of epic proportions. Where might this tale of crookedness and corruption lead? Let's take a look:

Our justice system has become so diseased that cops, prosecutors, lawyers, and judges actually conspired to bring baseless criminal charges against Carol because thuggish deputies broke her arm during our unlawful eviction in September 2015. In other words, our experience shows that if cops brutalize you and break your bones -- causing you to land in the hospital for trauma surgery -- they are more likely to bring false criminal charges against you to avoid accountability for gross civil-rights violations.

The pattern goes something like this: Cops abuse a citizen physically (and we've seen that repeatedly across the country since the Michael Brown case in Ferguson, Missouri -- most recently with the abuse of NBA player Sterling Brown, who has filed a lawsuit in Milwaukee.); cops and prosecutors abuse the victim in state criminal court (and judges let them get away with it); then, they all try to cheat the victim in federal court.

As Muhammad Ali might have said, particularly when he was a young Cassius Clay: "The more they abuse you, the more they screw you."

Will it work in Carol's case? Not if a federal judge can be found who follows the law. But since when in postmodern America has a judge been known to follow the law -- in Alabama, Missouri, state, court, federal court?

As we showed in our previous post in this series, our federal claims (I have civil-rights claims, along with Carol) will be governed by preclusion law -- also known as res judicata or collateral estoppel -- at the state level. And Missouri preclusion law is not complicated.

Dozens of cases spell out the basics of preclusion law in Missouri, and we will borrow them from a case styled Stacy v. Massa (W.D., Missouri, 2013). From the Stacy opinion:

In Missouri, issue preclusion applies when:

(1) the issue in the present action is identical to the issue decided in the prior adjudication; (2) the prior adjudication resulted in judgment on the merits; (3) the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted was a party or is in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior suit.

Much is happening in Carol's case at the moment -- including an apparent attempt to cheat her that might blow up in the faces of midwest "law thugs," with possible comical consequences -- and we will go into details in upcoming posts. But we already can make a reasonable analysis on the four issues cited above in Massa:

(1) Will the issue in the criminal action be identical to that in the federal civil-rights action? No, not even close. The issue in the criminal case: Did Carol "knowingly cause, or attempt to cause, physical contact with Officer Jeremy Lynn?" We have not yet filed the federal case -- Missouri has a five-year statute of limitations -- so all of the claims have not been set. But the central issue will be this: Who broke Carol's arm, who caused that to happen via an unlawful eviction, and was the forcedused reasonable? None of those issues was decided in the criminal case.

(2) Did the prior adjudication result in a judgment on the merits? No.In fact, I'm not sure you could say it was adjudicated at all. Jerry Harmison Jr., the third judge assigned to the case (Becky Borthwick recused for unspecified reasons after two days), followed in the footsteps of his predecessor (Margaret Palmietto) and allowed the prosecution to get away with stonewalling on discovery. In essence, Carol was not allowed to gather evidence central to her defense, so it's hard to see how anyone could claim the case was decided on its merits. The prosecution's case had no merit, as we've shown repeatedly on this blog -- and we will show in upcoming posts. On top of that, it appears that one result of Judge Harmison's screw-up is that there is no final judgment at all in Carol's case, much less one based on the merits..

(3) Was the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted a party in the criminal matter? Carol was a party in the criminal matter, and she will be a party in the civil matter. I was not a party in the criminal matter, and I will be a party in the civil matter. So, the answer is no.

(4) Did Carol have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior case? This question is so ridiculous it almost makes me laugh. How can you have a "full and fair opportunity to litigate" when the prosecution is not forced to turn over discovery, and multiple motions to compel are ignored? I could write dozens of paragraphs on this question, but for now, we can narrow it down to one issue: Harmison was required by Missouri law to rehear Carol's Motion to Suppress Evidence, and that's because Palmietto's earlier denials were interlocutory and not conclusive or binding on future proceedings. [See State v. Pippenger, 741 S.W.2d 710 (Mo. App. W.D. 1987)]. Did Harmison fulfill his obligation to address suppression issues? Nope. He avoided them -- twice. If he had followed the law, and ruled according to law, there would have been no trial. So, the answer to our question is no, not even close.

We are just getting started in our analysis that shows the scheme to preclude Carol's federal claims is due to fail. Missouri state law. Eighth Circuit federal law, federal law from other circuits, and U.S. Supreme Court all show Carol's civil-rights claims are not precluded, as a matter of law. And we soon will show how the outlandish nature of Carol's sentencing could add significantly to Greene County's civil liability for its inability to police its police force.


(To be continued)

Missouri "law thugs" left Carol with a bogus criminal conviction to "preclude" her federal civil claims, but they might have only shot themselves in the foot

Judge Jerry A. Harmison Jr.

Why did Missouri "law men" bring a bogus assault of a law enforcement officer charge against my wife, Carol, when even their own "victim" admits in an incident report (and under oath in court) that she committed no such offense? The answer can be summed up in one word: preclusion.

We will define preclusion more fully in a moment, but in essence, it means that a criminal conviction in one court can "preclude" a federal civil-rights claim in another court. The record shows that the whole "assault" charge was brought some 20 months ago in order to save Greene County and its corrupt sheriff's department from being held accountable for brutalizing Carol and breaking her arm during an unlawful eviction in September 2015.

But here is the enormous kicker (it's going to require several posts to explain and could induce a number of guffaws): The Missouri law thugs might have succeeded only in shooting themselves in the proverbial foot, while leaving Carol with no punishment and no judgment at all.

No kidding. (Please follow us for this post and followups over the next several days, into early next weeks, as we try to explain what appears to be a courtroom version of what happened when the Titanic  collided with an iceberg. The happy news is that it looks like Carol will not be one of the victims in this calamity -- other than having her reputation smeared and dealing with baseless criminal charges for 20 months. But for now, she seems to be snuggled in a rescue boat as some evil SOBs are about to slide into freezing water that might suck away their life forces -- or at least we can hope that's what happens to them.)

This all hits home now because yesterday Carol was sentenced for a "crime" that Judge Jerry Harmison's own judgment shows -- in multiple places -- she did not commit. Carol filed six post-judgment motions, showing that Harmison is a judicial buffoon who got just about everything in the case wrong. But like a lot of judges, Harmison is too arrogant, stupid, or crooked (maybe all three) to correct himself. So he dismissed Carol's motions out of hand, upheld her guilty verdict, and sentenced her to -- get this -- what amounts to a $10 fine. 

(They really think she assaulted a cop, but her punishment essentially is a $10 fine? We'll get back to that question in future posts.)

But here is the delicious part: In acting like a smug, corrupt smart-ass, Harmison might have let Carol off the hook entirely, while leaving the Greene County legal machinery with a significant mess to clean up -- and it could be costly. [A notation about Harmison's findings yesterday can be found at case.net (State v. Carol Shuler, No. 1631-CR07731), and we will explain its implications in upcoming posts. For now, we will focus on preclusion -- while saying it appears Harmison screwed up big time, or in a rare show of integrity, he intentionally let Carol off the hook. I think that last possibility is extremely unlikely.)

Now, back to the preclusion issue? How stupid were the Missouri thugs to bring bogus criminal charges in order to impede Carol's efforts to achieve civil justice? The answer requires two words: very stupid (and that was before Harmison's antics of yesterday). That's because the law on preclusion -- we'll call it "The P Word" -- does not accomplish what the thugs thought it would. That means they wasted their time and ours, while significantly enhancing their potential liability in a federal civil-rights lawsuit that Carol and I will file shortly.

Preclusion essentially means that, under certain circumstances, an issue that has been raised and litigated in one forum cannot be re-litigated in another -- in a case involving the same parties. For example, an issue litigated in a state criminal proceeding might not be raised in a subsequent federal civil proceeding.

Prof. Sheldon H. Nahmod

"The P Word" is driven by two complex and confusing legal doctrines -- res judicata and collateral estoppel. Sheldon H. Nahmod, a professor at Chicago-Kent College of Law at Illinois Institute of Technology, explains the issue in a blog post titled "A Section 1983 Primer (6): Claim and Issue Preclusion." Many federal civil-rights claims are brought under 42 U.S. Code 1983. Prof. Nahmod explains preclusion and its possible impact on such claims:

This post addresses the important practical topic of claim preclusion (res judicata, which concerns claims that were or could have been raised), and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel, which concerns issues that were raised and adjudicated) in section 1983 cases. Preclusion concerns arise in section 1983 federal court litigation when there is a prior final state judicial or administrative proceeding that involved the same parties (or their privies) and implicated (or could have implicated) the same issues.

To what extent may those claims or issues be relitigated in a subsequent section 1983 federal court proceeding? As it turns out, the answer in each case depends, as a matter of federal law, on the forum state’s preclusion law.

That means we need to examine Missouri's preclusion law to determine its possible impact on our civil-rights claims that will be raised in Missouri federal court. For now, we learn two things:

(1) Missouri preclusion law involves qualifiers that "law man" thugs in Carol's case likely have not considered;

(2) When we go beneath the surface to research the relevant law in some detail, we find that Carol's federal claims will not be precluded at all. And that does not even include my civil-rights claims, which are significant -- even though I was not wrongfully arrested and brutalized the way Carol was.

Bottom line: Missouri thugs brought a bogus criminal charge against Carol in an effort to "preclude" her federal claims arising from excessive force and a severely broken arm that required trauma surgery. We've called the assault claim a "cover charge" because that's exactly what it is -- an effort to abuse the criminal-court process to cover up police misconduct and ensure no one is held accountable for the abuse heaped on Carol and me.

Unfortunately for the thugs, they are relying on law that does not work the way they think it does. Even more unfortunate for them, Judge Harmison appears to have messed up by mistakenly letting Carol off the hook altogether, perhaps enhancing the civil liability that Greene County is trying so hard to avoid. 

We've shown over and over on this blog that corrupt cops, lawyers, prosecutors, and judges aren't too smart. This is another example of a "justice system" that is infested with individuals who have little or no integrity and even fewer functioning brain cells. In this instance, it appears they've created a courtroom train wreck that could correctly be described as comical -- if it didn't involve such serious issues, if it had not caused Carol's reputation to be smeared for months. 

As an example, consider this question: In the highlighted section above (shaded in green), preclusion is described as being limited to final state judgments or administrative proceedings. But what if there is no final state judgment? Hmmm . . . 


(To be continued)

When Fultondale attorney Greg Morris inquired at Alabama State Bar, he was told not to remain involved with our case -- even receiving an apparent threat

What happened when Fultondale attorney Greg Morris called the Alabama State Bar to ask a question about an affidavit he was preparing for our pending federal "Jail Case"? Without intending to, Morris might have unearthed the most clear-cut evidence yet of the corruption that has turned Alabama's "justice system" into an ethical sewer. The evidence suggests much of that corruption -- maybe all of it -- originates with the state bar itself.

Who made the statements that point to improper, maybe criminal, interference in our case? That remains unclear, but it was one of three assistant general counsels in the bar's "Center for Professional Responsibility" -- Jeremy McIntire, Tripp Vickers, and Mark Moody.

Morris states that he is "75 to 80 percent" sure he spoke with McIntire. Douglas McElvy, who was acting general counsel at the time, told me in a phone conversation that ethics questions almost always to go to him or Vickers -- and he suggested that Morris almost certainly spoke to Vickers.

The bar recently announced that Judge Roman Shaul has been named full-time general counsel, so McElvy likely will be hitting the exits soon and never will conduct the investigation he promised. We intend to give Shaul an opportunity to examine the ugliness that resides in the office he inherited -- and probably has been there for years.

It's not clear Morris had an ethics question, and I'm still not sure why Morris even called the state bar about a straightforward affidavit that was to show we had asked him to represent us at a Rule 26 meeting in "The Jail Case" -- and neither he, nor Carol or I, had done anything to violate U.S. Judge Virginia Emerson Hopkins orders. In fact, all three of us had been the victims of Hopkins' unlawful rulings and/or verbal abuse. Had Hopkins not berated Morris when he appeared at the meeting -- and then threatened us with sanctions -- Morris never would have had a reason to prepare an affidavit or call the state bar.

Roman Shaul

But when Morris placed the call, he got quite an ear full from the "counsel" on the other end -- be it McIntire or Vickers. Here is a summary of the message Morris received from someone supposedly involved with "ethics" related to Alabama court rooms:

* Do not file an affidavit in the Shuler case;

* If you do file an affidavit, it's likely to make matters worse;

* Tell Roger, "No, you do not have permission to proceed.You stay away from that";

* If the judge wants to hear from you, she will let you know;

* Do not get any further involved. You are not helping yourself, and you likely are not helping Mr. Shuler.

That last one sounds an awful lot like a threat, to harm Morris or his law practice. We assume that would be harm in a professional sense, but given the nastiness at the heart of Alabama's "justice" system -- and sources tell us that the hideously corrupt Jeff Sessions and Riley Inc. (former Gov. Bob Riley, son Rob "Uday" Riley and Co.) have unusual sway at the state bar -- who knows what form such a threat could take?

This much is certain: We have Greg Morris' statement in a word-for-word format, and it clearly suggests unlawful behavior that could point to a RICO case -- civil, criminal, or both.

It's almost as if obstruction of justice has become the new favored pastime in Alabama, surpassing even college football.

(To be continued)

Medical records show my lawyer-brother David Shuler called Burrell Behavioral Health to make false claim that I had threatened to shoot cops if they tried to evict

David Shuler

One week before our unlawful eviction in September 2015, my lawyer-brother David Shuler sent an email accusing me of calling 911 to issue a threat that I would shoot any law-enforcement officers who attempted to evict Carol and me. We since have learned David -- surprise, surprise -- was lying, that the call came from Burrell Behavioral Health, our health-care provider.

Newly obtained evidence shows that David's deceit goes much deeper than we originally understood. He launched the bogus story about a threat to shoot law-enforcement -- a threat that I never made, on a subject I never discussed with him.

David's role in concocting the 911 ruse, which almost got Carol and me killed and led directly to her broken arm, comes from two pieces of evidence -- my medical records and the 911 call itself.

Let's first consider my medical records. Here is an entry dated 8/5/15, from psychiatric nurse Matt Charles, who was my caregiver at the time for Burrell:

Update 8/5/15 -- Allegedly, patient's brother has contacted the case-management supervisor regarding Roger. Roger's brother states that Roger has threatened to shoot anyone who tries to evict him. After discussing this with the CSS and case-management supervisor, a plan was made to hotline these concerns regarding Roger.

What does it mean to "hotline" these concerns? We're not sure, but we believe a message was sent to the Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services.

What do we learn from this note in my medical file? There is no evidence that I threatened to shoot anyone, cop or otherwise -- and I did not, in fact, make such a threat. Also, I've never discussed anything of substance with David since I've been back in Missouri; it became clear early on that he was not to be trusted, so I've shared almost nothing with him.

In short, attorney David Shuler made up the threat and my role in the 911 call -- pulling both from some deep, dark crevice with which many lawyers seem equipped.

As for evidence of David's deceit in the 911 call itself, we will address that in an upcoming post.


(To be continued)

In screwy postmodern America, a crooked judge like Jerry Harmison Jr, of Missouri, can convict you of a "crime" without even saying what law you've broken

Jerry Harmison Jr.

Is it possible to be convicted of a crime in an American court for doing . . . well, nothing? Based on our experience with my wife Carol's "assault of a law enforcement officer (LEO)" case in Missouri, the answer is yes.

To examine that question, let's look at Judge Jerry Hamison Jr.'s judgment in Carol's case. (The judgment is embedded at the end of this post.) We invite you to check out Harmison's first paragraph. Does it say one word about what Carol is charged with? Nope.

Harmison spends the better part of six pages regurgitating the testimony of various witnesses (including Carol and me) and begins his analysis in the final paragraph on page 7. Best we can tell, this includes his primary reasons for reaching a guilty verdict:

The relevant evidence in this case is that the Greene County Deputies evicting Roger and Carol Shuler were acting in good faith. . . . [Note: Harmison is citing the so-called "good-faith exception," which defense lawyers routinely use in lawsuits alleging excessive force and Fourth Amendment violations against cops. Harmison cites civil law, which has nothing to do with this criminal case.] Captain Lynn keyed the door and started to push it open, announcing the identity of officers again. Carol Shuler resisted the door, but it was pushed open. Lieutenant [Christian] Conrad announced the identity of the deputies again. Regardless, Carol Shuler continued to push Lynn multiple times and tried to pull away from him to resist detention. Lynn eventually handcuffed Carol Shuler. Consequently, the court finds the defendant guilty of Count I beyond a reasonable doubt. Sentencing is scheduled for June 11, 2018 at 10:30 a.m. [Note: Sentencing, and the hearing of post-judgment motions has been continued to 10:30 a.m. on June 19.]

So, Harmison pronounces Carol guilty, but of what? He doesn't say. He makes no mention of the governing statute -- RSMo 565.083 (Assault of a law enforcement officer . . .  in the third degree.) He doesn't even describe the offense with which Carol was charged. So, we will do it for him:

A person commits the offense if:

Such person knowingly causes or attempts to cause physical contact with a law enforcement officer . . . without the consent of the law enforcement officer.

Harmison also does not bother to address Missouri case law, which has held that the key question is: Who initiated contact? (See State v. Armstrong, 968 SW 2d 154, Mo. Court of Appeals, 1998.) Jeremy Lynn stated twice -- in his written incident report and under oath on the courtroom stand -- that he caused and initiated contact with Carol, by grabbing her as he burst through the front door of our rented duplex apartment.

From reading the final paragraph of Harmison's judgment, you would think the central element of the offense was: Did the subject push the officer? But neither the statute nor the case law says a word about pushing someone. It's all about who "knowingly caused -- or initiated -- physical contact."

Well, Jeremy Lynn admits that he knowingly grabbed Carol, and in his written report, never said a word about her pushing him. In fact, he said she tried to pull away from him. Last time I checked, it is impossible to push someone and try to pull away from them at the same time.

So, we are left with this question: Is it a crime to push a police officer -- which Carol testified she did not do -- especially in this situation?

We will examine that in an upcoming post.


(To be continued)

How can my wife, Carol, be guilty of assaulting a deputy who unlawfully was on our property and failed to follow county procedure for conducting an eviction?

My wife, Carol, has been found guilty of "assault on a law enforcement officer" during our unlawful September 2015 eviction in Springfield, Missouri. But on at least two grounds, deputies from the Greene County Sheriff's Office (GCSO) could not lawfully be on our rented property, much less throw us out of our home. The deputies' own words -- under oath, in court -- show their actions were unlawful. and they were not able to even follow the county's own procedures.

The first issue can be found on page 1 of the judgment in Carol's case. (The judgment is embedded at the end of this post.) In the second paragraph is the following language:

On August 27, 2015, an interlocutory judgment for possession was entered against the Shulers, with a future trial date established on the issue of damages.

(Note: This is false on multiple grounds: The interlocutory judgment was issued in court on August 27, but it was not entered with the court -- making it somewhat authoritative -- until August 31. This clearly is shown on the docket, and means the eviction (set for Sept. 9) was scheduled inside the 10-day window when no execution can take place. Second, the future proceeding was set mainly for our breach-of-contract counterclaim. That is not clear on the docket, but it was made clear in court. The interlocutory judgment issued no amount of money damages against us, so it's not clear why that issue would need to be addressed at a later date.)

Bottom line: The rent-and-possession matter produced an interlocutory (non-final) judgment, which cannot be the basis for execution, such as an eviction. Missouri law, per State ex rel Turner v. Sloan, 595 S.W.2d 778 (MO, 1980), holds: "An enforcement of judgment by execution supposes a judgment not merely interlocutory but become final.”

In other words, thug-cops could not lawfully be on our property, much less breaking into our home for an eviction, based on a non-final judgment. Because the judgment was interlocutory, that means the cops did not -- and could not -- have a court-authorized (signed and approved by a judge) writ of execution. In fact, the "writ of execution" the prosecution produced at trial had no judge's signature and provided no authorization for the eviction, which ended with cops breaking Carol's arm. The "writ" was signed only by attorney Craig Lowther, which suggests he and landlord Trent Cowherd conspired on an unlawful self-eviction -- with assistance from the GCSO and likely from my brother-lawyer David Shuler.

X-ray of Carol's arm, broken by a
Missouri cop who had no grounds to
be on our rented property.

The second issue is not so much a matter of state law, but rather of county procedure. And it appears Greene County does nothing to educate its sheriff's deputies about how an eviction is supposed to be conducted. How is it supposed to work? That's spelled out on the Civil Division Page of the GCSO Web site. From the site's page about eviction procedure:

The tenant should be served with, or the property posted with, a summons and petition notifying them that a lawsuit has been filed and will have the opportunity to be heard in court before any eviction. Upon the Landlord receiving a judgment for possession and filing for a Writ to Execute on the judgment for possession, the GCSO will schedule a date and time with the plaintiff/Landlord within five business days to stand by while the Landlord evicts the Tenant and regains possession of the property. The Landlord has the responsibility of scheduling for a locksmith and staff required for moving of property if needed.

Missouri State Statutes reference Landlord/Tenant Law RSMo. Chapters 441, 534 and 535.

In other words, under Greene County policy, it is the landlord's duty to evict -- with a deputy on hand usually for stand-by purposes. Carol should have been dealing with the landlord Trent Cowherd, or his representative, and not heavily armed cops who threw her and me in handcuffs (which is an arrest), with no grounds for doing so. We were minding our own business in our own home -- knowing we had filed a Notice of Appeal, which stayed the execution by operation of law.

In fact, the docket shows the Missouri Court of Appeals had received our Notice of Appeal, meaning it had jurisdiction over the case at that point -- and not the trial court, which had issued the interlocutory judgment.

The Greene County Sheriff's thugs did the following:

(1) They unlawfully acted on a non-final judgment, upon which any form of execution (including an eviction) cannot be based;

(2) They acted contrary to the county's own procedures, which call for a landlord to conduct an eviction, while a deputy (usually one, and he often does not even leave the car) is on hand to make sure a potentially volatile situation stays peaceful;

(3) They acted without a judge's signature, from a trial court that did not even have jurisdiction over the case at that point. The docket includes a letter from the Missouri Court of Appeals, stating it had received our Notice of Appeal, and that took matters out of the trial court's hands.

The GCSO, in essence, would have to improve to be a clown car.