Mississippi Churning, Part XV

In our previous post in the "Mississippi Churning" serious, we examined U.S. District Judge Henry Wingate's numerous strange decisions, rulings that virtually ensured that attorney Paul Minor and former judges Wes Teel and John Whitfield would be convicted. We return to the subject of Judge Wingate:

Expert witnesses (continued)
Wingate did not allow expert witnesses to testify for the defense, and that alone, might have ensured a conviction. It's tough to win a criminal case, when you are not allowed to defend yourself, when the single most critical point in the government's case against you goes unrebutted. And that's what happened in the Minor case, thanks to Wingate.

Was Wingate's decision to bar expert testimony grounded in law? It's hard to see how? The Federal Rules of Evidence indicate that courts should be welcoming of opinion evidence. Regarding Rule 704, the notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules states: "The basic approach to opinions, lay and expert, in these rules is to admit them when helpful to the trier of fact."

This certainly does not mean that any gooberhead should be allowed to give an opinion in court. But the two primary expert witnesses the defense planned to call had an almost combined 80 years of experience in their specialty areas.

How desperate was Wingate to ensure that these two witnesses did not testify? He said both would run afoul of Rule 704(b), which has to do with opinions about a criminal defendant's mental state. On one of the witnesses, Al Hopkins, Wingate did not give a reason for saying there were 704(b) problems. On the other, Jim George, Wingate said he was rejecting the testimony because it would involve opinions about the "mental impressions" of the Mississippi Supreme Court.

Yes, you heard that right. Just how warped was Wingate's reasoning? We know that Rule 704(b) applies to opinions about the mental state of criminal defendants. In George's case, he was to testify about defendant judge John Whitfield, showing that Whitfield's rulings were correct under the law. George was not to testify about Whitfield's mental state, but at least Whitfield was a criminal defendant. Had the judge cited "mental impressions" regarding Whitfield, he would have been in the right ballpark. But the Mississippi Supreme Court, a criminal defendant? That ballpark is somewhere on Jupiter.

So regarding the rejection of expert testimony for the defense, we are left with this question: Is Henry Wingate incompetent or is he corrupt?

Jury instructions regarding bribery
We noted in an earlier post that the process used to develop jury instructions is convoluted, baffling, and downright ineffective. That certainly was the case in the Paul Minor prosecution. And nowhere were jury instructions more critical than in the area of bribery.

The defendants were charged with federal-funds bribery under 18 U.S. Code 666. In our post, "Bribery: A Primer," we outlined the elements of the offense. According to U.S. v. Mariano, 983 F.2d 1150 (1993) and numerous other federal cases, the heart of the offense is a quid pro quo. That means there was a "something for something" transaction at the heart of the crime.

But here is a critical portion of Wingate's jury instructions on bribery:

"You may find specific criminal intent even though you may find that the rulings were legal and correct, that the official conduct would have been done anyway, that the official conduct sought to be influenced was lawful and required by law, and that the official conduct was desirable or beneficial to the public welfare."

In plain English, Wingate instructed the jury that the defendants could be found guilty of bribery even if there was no quid pro quo. This clearly is contrary to federal law.

So where did Wingate come up with this? In Mississippi state law. And who pushed this idea on him? The government prosecutors, of course. And who were they working for? The Bush Department of Justice.

I can hear some of you now. "Schnauzer, you mean to tell me that the defendants were charged with federal bribery, in federal court, but they were convicted based on a jury instruction from Mississippi state law? Surely you can't be serious!"

Yes, I am serious. And don't call me Shirley.

Need proof? That's coming up.

Mississippi Churning, Part XIII

In the most recent post in our "Mississippi Churning" series, we noted the state has made a serious effort at campaign-finance reform in the wake of the Paul Minor prosecution.

And how has this effort turned out? Well, it's a story that is rich in irony.

Remember that it was a Republican-led justice department that initiated an investigation and charged that Minor, an attorney, had bribed three Mississippi judges in exchange for favorable rulings. Minor and the two attorneys who were convicted along with him just happened to be Democratic supporters (in a state with nonpartisan judicial elections).

As we noted in earlier posts, the loan guarantees that Minor helped arrange for the judges were allowed by Mississippi law at the time in question. They still are allowed, within certain limits.

But with the government alleging that such lawful arrangements were "bribes," Mississippians evidently decided to change their laws. Current law caps donations to judicial candidates at $5,000 by a single donor.

State officials quickly saw the limit was of little use. Political high rollers-including major corporations and wealthy trial lawyers--could sidestep the limit by making donations to special tax-exempt political action committees, known as "527s." Those fund-raising entities then sent money directly to state candidates.

In 2004, Secretary of State Eric Clark and Attorney General Jim Hood tried to close this loophole in Mississippi. But guess who vetoed the campaign-finance reform bill? None other than Republican governor Haley Barbour. He objected because the bill limited corporate donations to political action committees. (Jackson Clarion-Ledger, August 28, 2005.)

To quote that great Alabamian Gomer Pyle: "Shazam!" A Republican supports corporate interests!

Does that remind anyone of Alabama Republican governor Bob Riley, who touts ethics at one moment, and vetoes an ethics bill the next?

Let's review some of the ground we've covered. The loan guarantees that Minor helped arrange were allowed by Mississippi law. So his financial contributions, in and of themselves, were not bribes at all. Under the law, they only become bribes if they have a corrupt purpose--to improperly influence the rulings of judges.

And our research--and the 12 posts leading up to this one--have shown there was no corrupt purpose because the judges' rulings in the underlying lawsuits were correctly decided. In other words, Minor's clients received favorable rulings not because of any "bribes" but because the facts and the law indicated that they should receive favorable rulings.

So with this as background, and knowing of Barber's veto on campaign-finance reform, let's ponder this question: Are Republicans really interested in limiting contributions to judicial candidates?

Answer: They are when Democrats make them.

Mississippi Churning, Part XXI

Let's return to our focus on the Paul Minor case in Mississippi, looking at evidence that illustrates the weakness of the government's case.

From checking various court documents, we learn the following:

* The government sent more than 30 agents to go through files at Minor & Associates, Paul Minor's law firm on the Mississippi Gulf Coast. (Remember Paul Minor was a major contributor to John Edwards' campaign, and we are slowly learning details about what appears to be a concerted Bush Justice Department campaign to investigate contributors to both Edwards and Hillary Clinton. Was Paul Minor one of the first major Democratic donors to be targeted in this orchestrated Justice Department campaign?)

* During the period covered by the indictment, roughly 1998 to 2003, Paul Minor's firm filed 728 cases. Out of all those cases, how many did the government's 30-some agents find that they could build their case around? Two.

* You heard that right. Two cases out of 728 raised enough questions for the government to build an indictment. And we already have written extensively about those two cases--Archie Marks and Peoples Bank.

* Marks was a personal-injury case, where a roustabout suffered a disabling back injury while working on an oil rig. The company in charge of the oil rig clearly was negligent in failing to provide safe working conditions, even though it holds a particularly high burden under maritime law to protect workers who are vulnerable because they are working offshore. The evidence is overwhelming that Judge John Whitfield ruled correctly based on the facts and the law in the case, and therefore was not influenced by any alleged "bribe" from attorney Paul Minor.

* Peoples Bank was a bad-faith insurance case, where a Biloxi bank sought coverage from USF&G. In an almost identical case at the time, another Mississippi judge had found that USF&G was obligated to provide coverage. That judge, in a case that did not involve Paul Minor, was not indicted; Judge Wes Teel, in a case that did involve Paul Minor, was indicted. The Mississippi Supreme Court eventually ruled that USF&G did not owe coverage, setting new legal precedent. But at the time of his ruling, Teel clearly was within established Mississippi law. Just as in Whitfield's case, Teel ruled correctly based on the facts and the law at the time, and therefore was not influenced by any alleged "bribe" from attorney Paul Minor.

* So we've looked at the two underlying lawsuits at the heart of the government's corruption case against Paul Minor, Wes Teel, and John Whitfield. And we've shown just how weak the government's case was in both instances. And keep this in mind: This was the best the government could come up with.

* Finally, let's look at the financial activity upon which the government built its case. It showed that Minor had helped guarantee loans to Teel and Whitfield. According to the government, Minor used these loan guarantees to gain an "unfair advantage" in cases he had before the two judges. But here is the key: Under Mississippi law at the time, it was perfectly legal for an attorney to give money, guarantee a loan, or provide other financial gifts to judges. (It still is legal, although caps have been put on the amounts that can be given.) The government shined a spotlight on Paul Minor for guaranteeing loans to two judges? But how widespread was the practice of lawyers providing financial help to judges or judicial candidates? In 1998, 580 Mississippi lawyers gave money to lawyers who were running for office.

* So we know that Paul Minor was one of 580 Mississippi lawyers in 1998 to give money to lawyers running for office. Which raises this question: Paul Minor was indicted because his clients received "favorable" rulings in two cases before judges Minor had helped financially. Does that mean that the 579 other Mississippi lawyers never won a case before a judge they had supported financially? Does that seem a little hard to believe to you? It sure does to me? So where are the indictments on these other lawyers? Is it possible that these lawyers were not as wealthy as Paul Minor, and had not been as upfront about supporting Democratic candidates, so therefore they were not targets of the government?

* According to the government's perverse logic, any lawyer who had given financial support to a judge (which is legal) would have to lose every case before that judge. If the lawyer did not lose every case, both the lawyer and the judge would be guilty of federal crimes.

* And finally, let's return to this critical point. The government's indictment said Minor used loan guarantees to gain an "unfair advantage" in certain cases and to receive "favorable rulings." But the terms "unfair advantage" and "favorable rulings" are nowhere to be found in the statutory language involving bribery and honest-services mail fraud, the two key charges in the Minor case. Under the actual law, here' s what matters in a federal bribery case: That the act was done "corruptly," meaning it was done with knowledge that it was "unlawful." Teel and Whitfield did not make unlawful rulings in the cases involving Paul Minor. In fact, they ruled as they should have based on the facts and the law. And under the actual law, here's what matters in an honest-services mail fraud case: That the public actually was "deprived" of a public official's "honest services." There was nothing dishonest about Teel and Whitfield's rulings. In fact, it would have been dishonest for them to rule against Minor's clients in these two cases. So under actual statutory language, the government's case falls apart. I suspect that's why the government used non-statutory, layman's terms in the indictment, and Judge Henry Wingate let them get away with it.

* One final point. Just how perverse is this? Had Teel and Whitfield ruled against Minor's clients in these two cases, ignoring the clear facts and the law, they would have technically been committing honest-services mail fraud. But that would have been fine with the government, and Teel and Whitfield would not be looking at heading to federal prison in December. In other words: The judges could have stayed out of federal prison had they been willing to commit a federal crime. Does that sound nuts? Hey, it's the world we live in under the Bush Justice Department.

Mississippi Churning, Part XIX

In the previous post in our "Mississippi Churning" series, we noted U.S. District Judge Henry Wingate's baffling determination to rely on Mississippi state law regarding bribery rather than federal law.

We wondered if perhaps federal law in the Fifth Judicial Circuit was somehow unclear on the elements of bribery. But we found one Fifth-Circuit case that seemed abundantly clear. Now we've found a Fifth-Circuit case that seems to be even more clear than U.S. v. Tomblin, the case we cited earlier.

The Tomblin case involved a charge under 18 U.S. Code 201, which generally is used in cases involving bribery of federal officials. Now we have U.S. v. Duvall, 846 F. 2d 966 (1988), which involves 18 U.S. Code 666, the same statute cited in the Minor case and the law that generally involves non-federal officials. For good measure, Duvall originated in Mississippi, just like the Minor case.

We've noted that Wingate seemed to go out of his way to find a jury instruction on bribery that did not require a quid pro quo. And he found it in Mississippi state law. He certainly was not going to find it in Fifth-Circuit federal law.

What did the Fifth Circuit have to say in Duvall?

"By definition a bribe is money or favor bestowed on or promised to a person in a position of trust to pervert his judgment or influence his conduct; it is something that serves to induce or influence. Bribery occurs when a gift to a government official is coupled with a particular intent and connotes some more or less specific quid pro quo for which the gift or contribution is offered or accepted. . . . Thus the distinguishing characteristic of a bribe . . . is not that it damages the public because it causes the giver to demand a higher price from the government but because it subverts a government official's loyalty and judgment."

Hard to be more clear than that? Bribery in the Fifth Circuit requires a quid pro quo. So why did Judge Wingate's jury instructions not read that way?

And that brings us back to our earlier question about Judge Wingate and the Paul Minor trial: Was he incompetent or was he corrupt?

Mississippi Churning, Part XXII

Our coverage of the Paul Minor case in Mississippi has focused on the facts, the law, the judge (U.S. District Judge Henry Wingate), and the defendants (attorney Paul Minor and judges Wes Teel, John Whitfield, and Oliver Diaz).

But what about the prosecutor? That would be Dunn Lampton, U.S. attorney for the Southern District of Mississippi. He was appointed to that position in September 2001 by President George W. Bush.

In examining Lampton's central role in the Minor case, one cannot help but recall some of the clear conflicts and bizarre public statements involving key figures in the Don Siegelman case in Alabama. In terms of conflicts, we think of the judge in the Siegelman case, Mark Fuller. And in terms of bizarre public statements, we think of Louis Franklin, acting U.S. attorney for the Central District of Alabama.

Want to hear a bizarre public statement from Lampton? Try this one after the first Minor trial, which ended with acquittal for Diaz on all charges and acquittal for the other three defendants on some charges and a hung jury on others. (The jury's failure to reach unanimous verdicts on some charges led to a second trial for Minor, Teel, and Whitfield, and they were convicted on all charges.)

Lampton was asked about evidence showing that Diaz had recused himself from cases where Minor was an attorney. In other words, Diaz had not participated in the cases, but he faced corruption-related charges on them anyway. "I knew there would be a problem on Diaz because he didn't vote on anything," Lampton said.

You heard that correctly. The prosecutor knew the case against Diaz was weak--actually the case against Diaz was nonexistent--and he brought it anyway. And we have shown that the cases against Minor, Teel, and Whitfield weren't much stronger, and Lampton chose to try them--twice.

A jury found Minor, Teel, and Whitfield guilty, you might say, so the case must not have been too weak. But we've shown that the jury almost had to produce a guilty verdict because Judge Henry Wingate butchered the case--unlawfully excluding expert witnesses for the defense and and giving jury instructions on bribery and honest-services mail fraud that were blatantly at odds with actual federal law.

But enough about Wingate. Our focus now is on Lampton and his motivations for bringing a case that was spectacularly weak.

It's not hard to see where Lampton had conflicts--and probably raging biases--connected to the Minor case. Consider:

* Lampton is close friends with Keith Starrett, who once ran a losing campaign against Diaz for a seat on the Mississippi Supreme Court. But Starrett wound up with a nice consolation prize: an appointment to a federal judgeship in the Southern District of Mississippi. And who should preside over the swearing-in ceremony for Starrett? Why none other than Henry Wingate. And according to the Brookhaven Daily Ledger, Wingate had effusive praise for Starrett, calling him a "true star" in the judicial constellation and saying there is "no finer man in Mississippi." Lampton attended the ceremony and praised Starrett, whom he's known since they played Little League baseball together. How sweet.

* This is not so sweet. The Jackson Clarion-Ledger reported that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce injected about $1 million into Mississippi judicial races in 2000, some of which went to ads attacking Diaz (who was supported by Minor) and promoting his opponent, Starrett (who was supported by Lampton). And we're supposed to believe that Lampton was an objective, disinterested observer when he brought charges against Minor and Diaz?

* Here's something else that's not so sweet. At the beginning of the investigation into Minor's campaign-finance activities, special FBI agent Matthew Campbell, a forensic accountancy expert, was in charge of the investigation. When he questioned why Mississippi trial lawyer Richard "Dickie" Scruggs (brother-in-law of Senator Trent Lott, R-MS) was not being investigated, Campbell was removed from the investigation and transferred to Guantanomo Bay. (I'm sure there must be a strong need for forensic-accounting experts there.) The new FBI agent on the Minor case was Kevin Rust, who had made personal contributions to Starrett's failed campaign against Diaz. So both the lead investigator and the prosecutor have major reasons to be biased against both Minor and Diaz. But they are leading the charge.

You might think that this alone would call into question the objectivity of the Minor prosecution. But you would be wrong. We are just getting warmed up in our examination of Dunn Lampton's conflicts in the Minor case. More to come.

Mississippi Churning, Part XX

An abundance of news this week on the Don Siegelman-front has caused an interruption in our "Mississippi Churning" series. But there is much more to write on the Paul Minor case, and thanks to U.S. Rep. Steve Cohen (D-TN), our work here now has the attention of Congress. So let's return to activity in the Magnolia State, where the U.S. Justice Department and a federal judge have been up to some serious shenanigans:


Judge Wingate Revisited
We've noted two critical decisions that U.S. District Judge Henry Wingate made that virtually ensured the defendants would be found guilty in the Paul Minor case. One was his decision not to allow expert testimony for the defense. The second was his jury instruction finding that the defendants could be convicted of bribery even if no quid pro quo existed. This instruction was based in Mississippi state law, even though federal law in the Fifth Circuit clearly requires a quid pro quo for a bribery conviction.

We've presented substantial evidence to show that these two rulings were incorrect under the law. But the wrongheadedness in the Minor trial did not stop there. Some other examples:

The indictment:
The government's indictment, alleging various forms of corruption against attorney Paul Minor and judges Wes Teel and John Whitfield, used language that does not exist under any federal statute--or state statute for that matter.

The indictment alleged that Minor bribed the judges in order to receive an "unfair advantage." It alleged that the judges gave him "favorable" rulings. No such language is found in the federal statutes. Under the actual law, the key word is that something of value was "corruptly" given, with knowledge that it was "unlawful." Since Mississippi campaign-finance laws allow the loan guarantees Minor provided to the judges, the key issue became: Did the judges make unlawful rulings? Whether Minor received "favorable" rulings, or whether he sought an "unfair advantage, was irrelevant. And as we showed earlier in our series, in the two underlying lawsuits at the heart of the government's case--Archie Marks and Accu-Fab--the law and the facts indicated that Minor's clients should prevail. In other words, Judges Wes Teel and John Whitfield ruled correctly.

In essence, "unfair advantage" and "favorable rulings" are layman's terms with no legal meaning in the Minor case. But prosecutors surely knew those phrases would resonate with a jury. And that language would ensure that there would be no messy testimony from expert witnesses showing that the judges' rulings were not unlawful.

Defense attorneys filed several motions challenging the language in the indictment. Wingate allowed it to stand. The judge's decision essentially means that Minor is in prison, and Teel and Whitfield soon are heading to prison, for convictions based on language that doesn't exist in the law.

Standards of evidence
There was a dramatic change in the evidence that was allowed from the first to the second trial. A source close to the case estimates that about 75 percent of the defense evidence allowed in the first trial was not allowed in the second trial. We will go into this in more detail later, but some examples include:

* Minor could not present "good works" evidence, including his military service in Vietnam, his Bronze Star, his charitable work, and his work with low-income individuals through the Legal Services Foundation in south Mississippi.

* Minor could not produce evidence that he could have filed more than 500 cases before Teel and Whitfield--cases which resulted in gross judgments of more than $75 million and attorneys' fees to Minor's firm of more than $13 million--but filed them in other jurisdictions instead. Does that sound like the actions of a corrupt attorney? No. Is that why Wingate didn't allow the testimony? Yes.

The jury and paperwork
Sources report that Wingate allowed jurors to have copies of the government indictment throughout the trial. And yet, once he had read the jury instructions, he did not allow jurors to take copies with them to the jury room. Our sources say both of these procedures are most unusual.

Quid pro quo
We've noted that Wingate did not require a finding of a quid pro quo on the bribery charge in the second trial. Sources tell us that he did require a quid pro quo in the first trial. The first trial resulted in acquittals on several counts, with the jury deadlocking on other counts, leading to the retrial.

As we showed in our previous post, Fifth Circuit law clearly requires a quid pro quo for conviction on a bribery charge under 18 U.S. Code 666, the statute upon which the Minor prosecution was based.

The key judicial precedent that Wingate should have followed was U.S. v. Duvall 846, F.2d 916 (1988). But he conveniently chose to ignore Duvall and cobbled together a jury instruction based mostly in Mississippi state law. The defendants, of course, were not charged with violating state law. But that's essentially what they were convicted on.

Maybe Judge Wingate was so worried about the vacancy on the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals that he neglected to concern himself with the small issue of justice for Paul Minor, Wes Teel, and John Whitfield. As it turned out, Minor, Teel and Whitfield got cheated by our federal courts, and Wingate didn't get the job he evidently so cherished. Nicely orchestrated by the judge--a lose-lose-lose-lose situation.

Mississippi Churning, Part XII

The Paul Minor case in Mississippi has helped shine a spotlight on the issue of campaign contributions to judges. And more litigants are questioning the impartiality of judges, asking them to recuse themselves.

From January 2003 to August 2004, when the Minor case was very much in the news, 110 motions were filed asking justices on the Mississippi Supreme Court to recuse themselves. A variety of reasons were cited, including campaign donations. Justices approved seven of the 110 requests.

The Minor case focused on contributions and loan guarantees from a lawyer to judges. But the issue goes beyond interactions between those in the legal community. Here are a couple of examples where litigants called into question the impartiality of judges:

Edwin Welsh of Madison, MS, saw the state high court rule against him in a dispute with his former employers, the owners of a wireless company. In seeking rehearing, Welsh stated that the opposing party had made more than $16,000 in campaign contributions to two members of the Supreme Court.

In another case, Ellisville, MS, plumber Archie Wayne Courtney won a court judgment of $1.8 million from a bank, but a Supreme Court decision reduced the amount to $45,000. Jim Smith Jr., chief justice of the Supreme Court, wrote the opinion. But Courtney's attorney filed a motion for rehearing after learning that Smith's campaign committee borrowed $55,000 from a bank that is part of the same chain Courtney sued.

Brant Brantly, executive director of the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance, said such conflicts involving judicial campaigns are likely to increase in number because of the high costs of seeking such posts. "It's a natural by-product of campaigns," Brantley said. "They have become so costly and more organized." (Jackson Clarion-Ledger, August 22, 2004.)

The Schnauzer take: Mississippians probably are correct to question the fairness of their courts. But the Minor case is not a good reason to do so. My research indicates that the lawsuits at the heart of the government's case against attorney Minor and three judges were correctly decided. While an objective observer might think it unseemly for an attorney to be guaranteeing loans for judges before whom he has cases, Mississippi law allows such loans, contributions, etc. You could count me among those who think such activity should be outlawed. But it wasn't at the time, and loans/contributions to judges still are legal within certain limits. So the financial activity between Minor and the judges was legal, and my research indicates that the judges' rulings on Minor's cases were properly grounded in law--and I don't think it's even a particularly close call that the underlying lawsuits were correctly decided.

So what should Mississippians and residents of other states be concerned about? First, they should push for changes that will do away with contributions to judges, not only from trial lawyers but also from business interests. I find it revealing that the Minor case focused on contributions by a trial lawyer and lawsuits where working-class folks or small businesses filed claims against large businesses.

What about a case where a regular person has a legitimate claim against a business--perhaps for personal injury, wrongful death, fraud, etc.--and has that case dismissed (summary judgment) by a Republican-leaning judge who has received contributions (and maybe loans) from business interests? What if the Republican-leaning judge's dismissal was not well grounded in law, or supported by the facts? Will the Bush Justice Department look into such cases in Mississippi, Alabama--or any other state?

And what about efforts to reform campaign-finance law? There has been a serious proposal to do just that in Mississippi. And you will never guess who was opposed to it--and wound up killing it.

More on that coming up.

Mississippi Churning, Part VIII

The second lawsuit at the heart of the government's case against attorney Paul Minor and two Mississippi judges was Diamond Offshore Management Company v. Archie Marks.

This is the kind of case that makes me think I should consider going to law school. The facts and the law are very interesting, even if you don't consider the broader implications.

And by broader implications, I mean the possibility that the Minor prosecution was a "political hit," similar to the Don Siegelman prosecution in Alabama and part of a larger Bush administration scheme to attack trial lawyers who were sources of funds for Democratic candidates.

The Archie Marks case adds to the evidence that the Minor case was wrongly decided. But on its own, the Marks case is fascinating stuff. So let's give it a close look.

By the way, I was able to find little information on The Peoples Bank case because it was settled. There were no appellate rulings. The Marks case was appealed to the Supreme Court of Mississippi and can be readily found if you have access to a service such as Lexis-Nexis or Westlaw. Here is a summary of the case.

Archie Marks was employed by Diamond Offshore as a roustabout on its vessel, the Ocean Nugget. In April 1998, Marks injured his back while carrying a bucket of water up some stairs. Marks subsequently filed suit against Diamond and others, claiming breach of contract, negligence, and maintaining an unseaworthy vessel in violation of general maritime law.

Paul Minor represented Marks, and in June 2000, the case went to a bench trial before Circuit Judge John Whitfield.

According to the government indictment, Minor had arranged two loans for Whitfield totaling about $140,000. In July 2000, Whitfield entered a $3.75 million judgment in favor Marks, Minor's client. The Supreme Court of Mississippi upheld Whitfield's finding on liability, but reduced the damages to $1.64 million.

After Minor and Whitfield were convicted on corruption charges, the Supreme Court of Mississippi issued a decision on April 26, 2007, withdrawing its earlier opinion, vacating the trial-court judgment, and remanding the case for a new trial.

A layperson, at first glance, might consider the verdict in favor of Marks to have been tainted. After all, Minor apparently did arrange loans for Judge Whitfield, who then ruled in favor of Minor's client. The casual observer might look at it as a cut-and-dried example of bribery.

But when you study the law, and look closely at the facts of the Marks case, at least one layperson (your humble Legal Schnauzer) has concluded that Judge Whitfield's ruling was largely correct. And it certainly appears that Marks could not support a finding of bribery and honest-services mail fraud against Minor and Whitfield.

Why would I, of all people, come to this conclusion? After all, this blog started mainly because I was the victim of corrupt lawyers and judges in Alabama. But my interest goes beyond my case to our justice system in general.

My experience in Alabama courts has caused me to work up what I hope is an appropriate and "healthy" contempt for those who would abuse our justice system. And while my initial instinct might have been to consider Minor and Whitfield a couple of scoundrels, I came to a different conclusion after taking a closer look.

Here's why I think they acted within the law:

* The Ocean Nugget is a "jack-up rig" that performs oil-drilling operations in the Gulf of Mexico, off the shore of Louisiana. Marks was assigned to clean the upper pipe rack deck in preparation for moving the vessel. In order to do this, Marks had to fill a five-gallon mop bucket with water from faucets on the main deck, located one deck below the area he was to clean. Due to the size of the upper deck, this required Marks to make repeated trips up and down the stairs to get fresh buckets of water. After approximately seven trips up the stairs with a bucket of water, Marks felt a sudden pain in his back and legs. He completed his shift, but was unable to get out of bed for his next shift and was taken ashore for medical treatment. Marks returned to his home in Gulfport, MS, to recuperate under a conservative regimen of steroid injections and physical therapy. After Marks failed to improve, doctors recommended back surgery, which was performed in July 1998. About six months after the surgery, the surgeon concluded that Marks had reached maximum medical improvement and had experienced 25 percent total body loss pursuant to American Medical Association guidelines. The doctor said Marks could no longer perform his duties as a roustabout.

* A vocational expert at trial testified that Marks' reading, spelling, and math abilities were at or below a first-grade level. Marks' previous work history had entailed only heavy manual unskilled labor. The expert testified that, based on Marks work history and cognitive deficits, the injury had caused him to be permanently and totally disabled. Diamond presented an expert stating that Marks was capable of working an eight-hour day and identified five available local jobs he could perform. The trial court discounted the testimony of Diamond's expert because she had never met Marks and had never performed any tests on him.

* Why was Archie Marks forced to repeatedly carry buckets of water up and down stairs? There was no water available on the upper deck because the vessel's faucets on that level were defective. Diamond's own installation manager testified that Marks should not have been required, or allowed, to carry a five-gallon bucket of water up and down stairs. Also, Marks' supervisor, who was responsible for the safe-work practices of his crew, was unable to read and was unable to convey the text of safety manuals to his crew.

* The Supreme Court of Mississippi concluded: "As the record clearly reveals, even under the standard of ordinary prudence under the circumstances, there is substantial evidence that Diamond was negligent and that its negligence was the proximate cause of Marks' injury."

* The Supreme Court also noted the special provisions of the Jones Act, which provides a cause of action for seamen injured in the course of their employment by their employer's negligence. "The seaman, while on the vessel, is subject to the rigorous discipline of the sea and has little opportunity to appeal to the protection from abuse of power which the law makes readily available to the landsman. His complaints to superior officers of unsafe working conditions not infrequently provoke harsh treatment. He cannot leave the vessel while at sea. . . . In the performance of duty he is often under the necessity of making quick decisions with little opportunity or capacity to appraise the relative safety or alternative courses of action." In other words, maritime employers have a special duty to protect their vulnerable employees. And the Supreme Court agreed with Whitfield that Diamond had failed to live up to this duty.

* As to the issue of damages, the Supreme Court stated: "We concede that the trial court had ample material in the record to justify a high award of damages." The Supreme Court, though, did reduce the damage award by $2 million, to $1.64 million.

In summary, the Mississippi Supreme Court agreed with Whitfield that there was overwhelming evidence of negligence on the part of Diamond. It agreed that Whitfield had ample evidence to justify a high award of damages. And as we noted earlier, the loans Minor arranged for Whitfield were allowed under Mississippi law.

If Whitfield's rulings were properly grounded in fact and law, and the Mississippi Supreme Court found that they were, the Marks case cannot support a finding of bribery or honest-services mail fraud against Whitfield and Minor.

And yet, Whitfield currently is in prison because a jury found that he handled this case corruptly. And Minor is in prison because a jury found that he caused Whitfield to handle the case corruptly.

The facts and the law of the Marks case simply do not support a prosecution, much less a conviction, on corruption charges. And neither do the facts and the law of The Peoples Bank case.

That's why I look for Congressional investigators to focus heavy attention on Mississippi, as well as Alabama, in their scrutiny of the Bush Justice Department.

Mississippi Churning, Part XVII

Jury instructions regarding bribery (continued)

How did the defendants in the Paul Minor case get convicted in federal court based on state law?

Our first step is to recall that the two primary charges in the Minor case were federal-funds bribery and honest-services mail fraud. Racketeering and conspiracy also were charged, but those are essentially spinoffs of the first two charges. The case revolved around bribery and mail fraud.

The "confusion" over federal and state law, I believe, arose from the honest-services mail fraud charges. (Remember that this charge often is central to corruption cases. Twenty of the 30-some charges in Alabama against Don Siegelman were for honest-services mail fraud; seven of the 14 charges in the Minor case were for mail fraud.)

Our second step is to understand that Mississippi is part of the Fifth U.S. Judicial Circuit, along with Louisiana and Texas. (Alabama is in the 11th Circuit, with Georgia and Florida.) Evidently the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has included some judges who are dedicated members of the Federalist Society because they came up with a dandy little opinion known as U.S. v. Brumley, 116 F. 3d 728 (1997).

I don't see a problem with the final result in the Brumley case. But the opinion itself is a truly lousy piece of judicial handiwork. (More later on what makes this opinion so wrongheaded.) But for now the key point is this: The Brumley court found that, in an honest-services mail fraud case under 18 U.S. Code 1346, the services in question "must be owed under state law and that the government must prove in a federal prosecution that they were in fact not delivered." The court went on to say, "The statute contemplates that there must first be a breach of a state-owed duty."

The Fifth Circuit parted with almost all other judicial circuits on this point. The Fifth-Circuit judges, in their deep-fried Southern thinking, evidently were concerned about the federal "gubmint" interfering with Dixie's corrupt public officials. In their Federalist Society minds, I think, Brumley struck a little blow in the "state's rights" war. (Forget, Hell!)

Rational judges in other circuits have pointed out that the Brumley ruling is pointless because it has long been held that the duty of honest services owed by government officials derives from fiduciary duties at common law. There was no reason for the Fifth-Circuit judges to get their Federalist panties all wadded up. But they did, and so we have the Brumley case in the Fifth Circuit, which includes Mississippi.

What did that mean in the Minor trial? A review of court documents shows that government lawyers in the case were high on Brumley. When you read the transcript, you can almost hear the chants, "State law! State law!"

And those chants found a receptive ear with Judge Wingate.

But here is a critical point: Brumley never said that a mail-fraud case must be based on a violation of state law. It said it must be based on a duty owed under state law. What did the court mean by that? It doesn't say. But it seems simple enough. The duties of a judge are clearly stated in Article 6, Section 155 of the Constitution of Mississippi.

So even Brumley, as poorly reasoned as it was, did not say anything about a violation of state law. But with the prosecution chanting "state law, state law," Wingate evidently decided, "Hey, that sounds good."

And why did the prosecutors seem so interested in state law? Well, they weren't thinking about honest-services mail fraud (the subject of the Brumley case). They were thinking about bribery. They knew, I feel certain, that's the charge that would resonate with the jury--particularly since Paul Minor was a wealthy Democrat, of all things. And they knew that Mississippi's state bribery law is more loosely worded than the federal statute (and case law) on bribery.

The state law can be found in Section 97-11-11 of Mississippi Code of 1972. It involves some mind-numbing legalese, but the key point is this: The state law does not require a quid pro quo in order to convict on bribery. As we've noted in a previous post, federal law most definitely does require a quid pro quo--a "something for something" transaction.

Why would prosecutors want to avoid the quid pro quo standard of federal law. Remember that federal law requires a "corrupt act." And an act is done corruptly "if it is done intentionally with an unlawful purpose."

What would that standard mean for the prosecution? It would mean determining the lawfulness, the correctness, of the judge's rulings in the underlying lawsuits. It would mean allowing expert witnesses who could easily show that the rulings were indeed lawful. And as we've already shown, Wingate wanted nothing to do with expert witnesses.

And so an idea was hatched. Take the "state duty" language of Brumley, morph it into "state law" language, and apply it not to honest-services mail fraud (where it started) but to bribery (where it would be most effective for the prosecution).

A neat switcheroo. And it worked. Three men were wrongly convicted because of it.

Think I'm nuts? Well, I've read major chunks of the trial transcript. And Wingate, after allowing extensive argument about the jury instructions, plainly says that he will write the instructions on his own. And what does he come up with? An instruction that he states is based on Mississippi's state bribery law. Even cites several examples of state case law from Mississippi.

The defendants' attorneys all objected to the bribery instruction, preserving the issue for appeal. But Wingate and the prosecution were of the same mind, regardless of what federal law says. This is one blogger who finds it hard to believe that was an accident.

Mississippi Churning, Part VI

Before we examine the two lawsuits that were at the heart of the government's case in the Paul Minor trial, let's look at the issue of jury instructions.

I've had to represent myself in a trial, and take it from me, it's a scary experience. But one of the scariest parts for me was the process used for developing jury instructions.

Here's how you might think it would work: The judge is supposed to know the law, and he is well paid, so you figure he would tell the jury what the law is and maybe throw in a few citations or two--to show the jury how smart he is and maybe impress them a bit. Seriously, you would think he would include citations for all statements of law, just so the jury would know it's deliberations are well grounded.

But that's not how it works, at least in my experience. Each side writes up what it thinks the jury instructions ought to be and hands them to the judge. The two sides talk to the judge in earnest tones, the judge shuffles the papers around a bit, maybe goes to his chambers or the bathroom (watch out for wide stances!), and then returns to read the law to the jury. I'm not even sure if the jury gets a written copy of the jury instructions. Don't think they did in my case; I know I didn't get a copy.

I was well acquainted with the applicable law in my case. But by the time we had traded papers, and the judge had shuffled them around, and hummed and hawed, and taken a bathroom break or two, I had no idea if his instructions to the jury were correct.

Based on my own experience, I was intrigued to read the jury instructions for the Minor trial when they showed up on the Web. I don't know if they are still on the Web or not. But I do know that judges have enormous power when it comes to the instructions that jurors hear. Keeping in mind the power of Judge Henry Wingate, here are some points in the Minor jury instructions that jumped out at me:

Honest-services mail fraud and state bribery laws

Wingate says: "This deprivation of 'honest services' owed to the State of Mississippi refers to the bribery laws of the State of Mississippi. . . . In order to deprive the State of Mississippi of their honest services, defendants John H. Whitfield and Walter W. "Wes" Teel must have owed the State of Mississippi a duty that is defined by the bribery laws of the State of Mississippi and have violated that duty."

Legal Schnauzer says: I don't get it. I've seen numerous cases of case law that state honest-services mail fraud need not be connected to state law. One example is U.S. v. Frega, 933 F. Supp. 1536 (1996): "The mail fraud statute . . . did not need to reference state law in order to define fraudulent conduct." Or how about this: "An honest services mail fraud or mail fraud conviction does not require proof of a state-law violation." U.S. v. Walker, 490 F. 3d 1282 (2007). So your humble correspondent is confused. Why is the judge tying the federal mail-fraud charge to state bribery law? Hmmm.


A judge's honest views

Wingate says: "If the particular judge acted in a particular circumstance, based upon his honest views not corrupted by a bribe, his actions do not constitute a deprivation of honest services under the mail and wire fraud statutes."

Legal Schnauzer says: That matches the law I've read. But how can the judge prove this if he is not allowed to call an expert witness to testify that his rulings were fair and correct under the law?


Criminal intent

Wingate says: "You may find specific criminal intent even though you may find that the rulings were legal and correct, that the official conduct would have been done anyway, that the official conduct sought to be influenced was lawful and required by law, and that the official conduct was desirable or beneficial to the public welfare."

Legal Schnauzer says: Sounds like the prosecution wrote this one. So you are saying, "The loans and gifts etc. can be legal (which they were), and the judges' rulings can by lawful and correct, and the jury still can find criminal intent?" Excuse me while I scratch my head. Actually, excuse me while I say you are flat-out wrong. Consider this case law: "Even if a public official engages in 'reprehensible misconduct related to an official position,' his conviction for honest services fraud cannot stand where the conduct does not actually deprive the public of its right to [his] honest services, and it is not shown to intend the result." U.S. v. Walker, 490 F. 3d 1282 (2007). Clearly, the public cannot be deprived of a judge's honest services if the judge's rulings in a case were fair and correct--no matter how many loans (legal ones) an attorney might have provided to the judge. So your Honor, what gives? And finally consider this: "Undisclosed, biased decision-making for personal gain, whether or not tangible loss to the public is shown, constitutes a deprivation of honest services." U.S. v. Antico 275 F. 3d 245 (2001). Where is the biased decision-making in the Minor case? We will look at this more closely in a moment, but you didn't give the judge defendants a chance to show that their decision-making was not biased. Why?

Concealment

Wingate says: "Prior to January 19, 1999, the laws of the State of Mississippi governing judicial elections and/or campaigns did not require the disclosure on a campaign finance disclosure form of loans to a campaign nor the fact that any such loan was guaranteed by some third party or the identity of the guarantor, if any. . . . Money obtained by a public official as a borrower on a loan from a bank, and transactions to obtain or renew such a bank loan, do not ordinarily constitute income to the public official for any such reporting purpose. . . . Further, no such financial disclosure laws in Mississippi require the disclosure by a public official of the name of a source of actual income; instead the law requires only that the types of sources of gross income be disclosed on the Statements of Economic Interest. . . . Proof that a defendant failed to comply with the directives of a Statement of Economic Interest, standing alone, is not proof that a federal law has been violated."

Legal Schnauzer says: Wow, sounds like the defense wrote this one, and you evidently agreed that this is the law. So tell me again: How did these people get convicted? Were they convicted for "concealing" transactions that they didn't have to reveal anyway? Did the jurors sleep through your instructions?

Paul Minor's alleged concealment

Wingate says: "As to defendant Paul Minor. He was never a public official, nor candidate for office; therefore, he was not required to file any such disclosure at any time."

Legal Schnauzer says: "Well snip my pickle and call me Shlomo (to quote the cantankerous Dr. Kelso on Scrubs). News reports say Minor and Co. were convicted mainly because of their acts of concealment. But you seem to be saying that the judges weren't required to reveal certain information, and Minor, heck, he could "conceal" stuff all he wanted. He's not a public official. So tell me again, how did these folks get convicted?"

Legal Schnauzer has the last word (after all, it is my blog): Your Honor, you appear to have made some serious mistakes in jury instructions. If some of your rulings and jury instructions are supported by law, I sure as heck can't find the law. (If anyone else can find it, please let me know.) And in instances where your jury instructions were correct, it appears that the highly educated jury chose to ignore them.

Ah, justice in Mississippi. Sounds a lot like justice in Alabama.

Our Political-Prisoner Population Grows

Today should be a sobering day for all Americans, as our population of known political prisoners doubles in size.

Former Alabama Governor Don Siegelman and Mississippi attorney Paul Minor have been in federal prison for months now. They are joined today by former Mississippi state judges Wes Teel and John Whitfield, both convicted with Minor on corruption-related charges.

The real crimes of all four men? Being active and successful Democrats in Deep South states, where Republicans in the Age of Rove will brook no competition.

Let me repeat that to ensure that it sinks in: At least four Americans, all Democrats, are being held political prisoner, right now. Most Americans have not realized the enormity of this story. When is the last (or the first) time that you have heard a presidential candidate from either party mention it?

A strong argument could be made that it is the most important domestic issue in our country at the moment. Few Americans can grasp the concept that our Department of Justice (DOJ) is knowingly imprisoning people who have committed no crimes. But that is exactly what has taken place with Siegelman, Minor, Teel, and Whitfield.

Scott Horton, of Harper's.org., has written with stark clarity about the Siegelman case, and we here at Legal Schnauzer are among a number of bloggers who have followed the story closely. As for the Minor case, we have written 30-plus posts about the case, showing that the three defendants did not even come close to committing federal crimes.

Horton also has written a number of major posts about the Minor case, the most recent coming yesterday and focusing on Wes Teel. The headline: Collateral Damage: Is Mississippi Judge Wes Teel the Victim of a Political Prosecution?

The answer to that question is a resounding yes. And Horton goes on to outline the absurdity of the government's "case" against Teel. Horton earlier had reported that Paul Minor, a successful Gulf Coast attorney, was a generous donor to Democratic campaigns, including those of Teel and Whitfield. Minor also supported Democratic presidential hopeful John Edwards, and Horton has reported on an apparent campaign by the Bush DOJ to target Edwards' trial-lawyer supporters.

"Of course, they were out after Paul Minor," Teel tells Horton, days before reporting to federal prison in Atlanta. "I was just collateral damage."

Indeed, evidence strongly suggests that both Teel and Whitfield got caught in the ugly crossfire aimed at a successful Democratic attorney who had successfully sued the asbestos and tobacco industries, not to mention oil interests. Those are traits Minor shares with another political prisoner--Don Siegelman.

Horton provides valuable insight on the underlying lawsuit that wound up putting Wes Teel in prison. The lawsuit involved The Peoples Bank, represented by Paul Minor, against the insurer USF&G. The bank contended that it was owed coverage on a policy designed to address liability arising from automobiles that the bank financed. When the insurance company failed to provide coverage under the policy, the bank sued.

The case was straightforward, Horton reports. The issue was the interpretation of specific insurance contract language. Then he makes a critical point:

"Of course the insurance company had written the contract language, which is why, as a general premise, ambiguities would not be settled in its favor."

It should not have been a surprise to the insurance company then that Teel ruled in the bank's favor on liability. Teel also had ruled in the bank's favor on a discovery matter.

But did any of Teel's actions indicate he was corrupt, ruling contrary to the facts and law in the case? Evidently even the insurance company did not think so. As Horton notes, the insurance company did not take a number of steps it could have taken if it thought Teel was clearly wrong and/or corrupt in his rulings. Instead, it chose to settle the case.

So Wes Teel did not even make a final ruling in the lawsuit, and there is no evidence that he ruled contrary to law. And yet, because of this case, Wes Teel is reporting to federal prison today.

How could that be? After the insurance company chose to settle, the Mississippi Supreme Court handed down a split decision in a similar case, siding with the insurance company and against the bank. As tends to happen in our modern courts, the ruling had politics written all over it: Republican justices sided with the insurance company, Democrats supported the bank.

But get this: The government used this ruling, which came well after the lawsuit that had settled before Teel, as proof that Teel had acted corruptly. Never mind that Teel's decisions did not run counter to any law that was settled at the time of his rulings.

"It looks to me like the prosecution of Judge Teel was motivated by a very emotional case of buyer's remorse on the part of the insurance company and its lawyers," Horton writes. "As it turned out, they didn't call things correctly. The Supreme Court went their way. The criminal prosecution offered a way to get restitution and overturn the settlement.

"This is, to put it mildly, not an appropriate use of the criminal justice system. But it's just the sort of use to which the Bush Justice Department is itching to put it."

I've had the pleasure of getting to know Wes Teel via e-mail over the past several months. He is a good-natured fellow, with a keen sense of humor. So it is appropriate that Horton managed to find some humor in the Teel saga, by noting the strange premise upon which the government built its case.

"The Justice Department's contention is that the insurance company wouldn't have entered into the settlement but for the pressure of Judge Teel," Horton writes. "That means the Justice Department has decided to treat the insurance companies and their high-priced lawyers with the sort of special paternalistic deference reserved in the nineteenth century for widows, imbeciles, and orphans. . . . Now the insurance company and its fancy lawyers were definitely not widows or orphans, and whether they were imbeciles would be a judgment call I am not prepared to make. But for the Bush Justice Department they are, apparently, to be viewed as persons who cannot fend for themselves in the rough wilderness of Mississippi's judiciary . . . "

Were the insurance-company lawyers truly helpless? Hardly. Just consider the weapons at their disposal. One was to accept Teel's rulings and move forward to trial, confident in the strength of their case. If the trial didn't go well, they could appeal to a higher court, confident in the strength of their case. And if they truly thought Teel was wrong, they had two weapons they could have used right then and there.

You can read about these weapons here, provided by the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure, which appear to be pretty much identical to the Alabama rules. Under Rule 5, the insurance company could have sought an interlocutory appeal by permission. If Teel failed to grant permission--and the evidence suggests he would have been perfectly fine with the insurance company taking the question to a higher court--the company could have sought a writ of mandamus. This is an extraordinary writ, asking a higher court to direct a lower-court judge to take a certain action that is in line with its interpretation of the law.

The insurance company had all kinds of weapons at its disposal--if it had been confident in its case. But that's the problem. Evidence suggests that the insurance company knew it was on shaky legal footing. Based on my reading of the criminal-trial transcript, I understand that the contentious discovery issue involved a document in which insurance-company officials acknowledged that they were on shaky legal footing under the law at the time.

As I recall, the insurance company contended that the document was privileged, but Teel ruled that it was discoverable. My guess is this: The real reason the insurance company settled is that one of their own documents had come to light showing they didn't have a very good case--and they knew it.

And irony of irony, a very similar document came to light in the ExxonMobil case, where the Alabama Supreme Court overturned a $3.6 billion verdict in favor of the state against the oil giant.

What does this tell us about Republican justice in the Age of Rove: When you uncover one of their dirty little corporate secrets, watch out. They will do their darnedest to make somebody pay.

Scott Horton has more posts coming about the people who have wrongfully been forced to pay in the Paul Minor case. Horton evidently will focus like a laser on U.S. District Judge Henry Wingate, who presided over the Minor trial.

We here at Legal Schnauzer will do the same. We have shown conclusively, through our "Mississippi Churning" series, that Wingate made numerous unlawful rulings that all but ensured the defendants would be convicted. Wingate's key errors, which almost certainly were not accidental, involved the following:

* Expert witnesses for the defense, who would have shown that Teel and Whitfield ruled correctly based on the facts and law before them.

* Jury instructions on bribery, which were not at all in line with actual federal bribery law.

* Jury instructions on honest-services mail fraud, which were not at all in line with actual federal bribery law.

We soon will be presenting a summary of our "Mississippi Churning" series. Three innocent Americans currently are in federal prison because of the Paul Minor case. It is critical that Americans understand the corrupt actions of the federal judge who put them there.

Mississippi Churning, Part I

Let's start with a "just-the-facts-ma'am" version of what happened in the Paul Minor case in Mississippi.

Paul Minor is a very successful south-Mississippi lawyer who became a multimillionaire based on his skills as a trial attorney. He won a number of high-profile cases involving tobacco, asbestos, wrongful death, and personal injury. His father, Bill Minor, is a longtime Mississippi journalist known for his courageous reporting during the civil-rights era. Paul Minor is known to support, both philosophically and financially, the causes of the Democratic Party.

A federal investigation of Minor and three judges began in 2002 on the Mississippi Gulf Coast. The three judges who wound up being indicted, along with Minor, are former State Supreme Court Justice Oliver Diaz, former Chancery Judge Wes Teel, and former Circuit Judge John Whitfield. Minor was accused of securing loans for the judges in exchange for favorable rulings on cases before them.

In the first trial in 2005, a jury acquitted Diaz on all charges. He later was acquitted on tax-evasion charges in a separate indictment. The same jury in the first trial acquitted Minor, Teel, and Whitfield on some corruption charges and failed to agree unanimously on others.

Federal prosecutors decided to retry Minor, Teel, and Whitfield, and they were found guilty on all charges in March 2007. Charges included bribery, racketeering, conspiracy, and honest-services mail fraud.

Leading the prosecution were Dunn Lampton, U.S. attorney for the Southern District of Mississippi, and Noel Hillman, then chief of the Public Integrity Section of the U.S. Department of Justice. Lampton is a Republican appointee and Hillman has since been nominated to a federal judgeship by the Bush White House.

The judge, Henry Wingate, is a Republican appointee.

Sentencing in the case was announced on September 7. Minor was sentenced to 11 years in federal prison; Whitfield and Teel were sentenced to 110 months and 70 months, respectively.

(Source: Jackson Clarion-Ledger, Sept. 8, 2007)

Spotlight Shines on Minor Case

Two Mississippi reporters recently have focused attention on the Paul Minor case and the issue of selective prosecution.

Blogger Casey Ann Hughes, Ph.D., has a splendid piece at the Cottonmouth blog, focusing on former Mississippi judge Wes Teel, his family, and the human costs of partisan prosecutions. Hughes' piece is cross-posted at The Natchez Blog.

Hughes has a doctorate in psychology, so she offers special insight into the emotional toll taken by a justice department out of control. Much of the coverage of the Minor case has focused on Paul Minor himself (an attorney) and Mississippi Supreme Court Justice Oliver Diaz (who was acquitted on all charges). Former state judges Wes Teel and John Whitfield (who were convicted along with Minor in the second trial) have been somewhat in the background.

Hughes connects us with the human side of this story. She introduces us to Teel, his wife, and grandchildren, and includes photos with the story. She notes that Teel's wife was a longtime public-school teacher before having to retire on disability because of multiple sclerosis, and she depends heavily on her husband for support. Her husband, however, is due to report to federal prison in late December.

Some readers might say, "Hey, Mr. Teel was convicted of a crime. His family will just have to tough it out. Mr. Teel should have thought of his family before committing bribery, honest-services mail fraud, conspiracy, etc."

Those readers would have a good point--if Mr. Teel had actually committed those crimes. But through 20-plus posts in our "Mississippi Churning" series here at Legal Schnauzer, we have shown that Teel, Minor, and Whitfield did not commit the crimes for which they were charged. A jury convicted them only because Judge Henry Wingate, a Republican appointee, made numerous unlawful decisions in the case. His rulings related to expert witnesses for the defense and jury instructions on bribery and honest-services mail fraud were particularly off target.

Hughes opens her piece by noting that political prisoners are associated with Stalin's Soviet Union, Hussein's Iraq, Franco's Spain, and Hitler's Germany.

She closes on a note that is both hopeful and distressing:

"These men will eventually be cleared, but it will take years. In the meantime, who will take care of Judge Teel's wife?

"This is a scary story because the United States Justice Department is imprisoning innocent citizens for purely political reasons, and quieting political dissent through fear. I've just told you about Mississippi, but it's happening all across the country, in Alabama, Georgia, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin--the list keep growing.

"Is this America, or one of those dictatorships? What country are we living in?"

Joining Hughes in shining light on the Minor case is Adam Lynch of the Jackson Free Press. In a piece titled "Dem at Your Own Risk," Lynch smartly takes the reader through the case, starting with the tort-reform craze that hit Mississippi in 2000 and going through introduction of the Minor case at the recent U.S. House Judiciary Committee hearing on selective prosecution.

Lynch includes interesting comments from a number of key players--including prosecutor Dunn Lampton (who indicates he had strong disagreements with the Justice Department on the handling of the case) and Missouri political scientist Donald Shields, whose research has shown the Bush Justice Department has investigated seven times as many Democrats as Republicans.

Mississippi Churning, Part XVI

Jury instructions regarding bribery (continued)
In the previous post in our Mississippi Churning series, we noted that the defendants in the Paul Minor case apparently were convicted in federal court on jury instructions that were based on state law.

You don't need a degree from Harvard Law School to know that shouldn't happen. My research indicates it wasn't an accident. That raises serious questions about U.S. District Judge Henry Wingate's handling of the Minor trial. And it adds to the growing body of evidence suggesting that the Minor case was a "political hit," similar to the Don Siegelman case in Alabama that is the subject of a Congressional investigation.

So far, the Congressional investigation is focusing on the Siegelman case, the Georgia Thompson case (Wisconsin), and the Cyril Wecht case (Pennsylvania). My knowledge of those three cases is not perfect. But my research on the Minor case makes me think it might be the most flagrant political hit of them all.

Here's why. If attorney Paul Minor and former judges Wes Teel and John Whitfield were convicted in federal court on jury instructions grounded in state law, how wrongheaded is that?

Consider this scenario: You are at a basketball game, and a player gets the ball right under the basket and hits a layup. The official signals that the basket is good for three points. The opposing coach goes berserk and hollers at the ref: "What the heck is going on?" The ref pulls a rule book out of his pocket and shows the coach: "See, a field goal is worth three points." The coach is beside himself. "That's a football rule book, you ding dong. A field goal is worth three points in football. This is a sport we know as basketball. A field goal in our sport--at least one made from way inside the three-point line--is worth two points." "Hey, I'm in charge here," the ref says. "Sit down and shut up."

The legal equivalent of that scenario appears to have happened in the Paul Minor case. All the evidence I've seen indicates that the defendants had excellent attorneys. I suspect they knew they were being railroaded. But if you argue too vociferously with a basketball official, you get thrown out of the game. You argue too vociferously with a judge, you get thrown in jail.

Remember the old Saturday Night Live routine with Dan Aykroyd: "Jane, you ignorant slut." Try that line on a judge, and he or she is not likely to be amused.

How could federal and state law get mixed up in a high-profile case like the Paul Minor trial? you might ask. Henry Wingate is a federal judge; he couldn't be that dumb.

It's not a matter of being dumb. You can read the trial transcript and quickly see that Judge Wingate has a keen intellect. And it's possible that in many of his cases, he has acted in a lawful and honorable way. But we live in an era where the Bush Justice Department, and people who think like the people who run the Bush Justice Department, are in charge. These people have an agenda, and they will not let quaint concepts like the law and justice and right and wrong get in the way.

In my own case, in Alabama state courts, Republican judges made rulings that were every bit as absurd as the one made by the basketball official above. In fact, in my very first post on this blog, I used a sports analogy to illustrate just how blatantly corrupt these judges were.

They clearly had an agenda. And I see no reason to think that Judge Henry Wingate, if the proper amount of pressure or incentive were applied, couldn't have an agenda too--and act on it.
What is the agenda of these true believers of the GOP? It is to take out and ruin key people who have an agenda that differs from their own. In Alabama, one such person, a person with political clout, was Don Siegelman. In Mississippi, one such person, a person with financial clout, was Paul Minor. Both now are in federal prison. And people like Richard Scrushy (in Alabama) and Wes Teel and John Whitfield (in Mississippi) got caught in the crossfire--collateral damage, if you will.
So, enough theory and philosophy from your humble Schnauzer. Let's get back to the nuts and bolts of the Paul Minor case, particularly the issue of alleged federal crimes and misused state law.

The story behind this little mishap takes some twists and turns. But hang in there with me. I think you will find it interesting. It's a classic example of how a judge can cause a "jury of your peers" to find you guilty of a crime you didn't commit at all.

A National View of Judicial Corruption

Just how corrupt was U.S. District Judge Henry Wingate in his handling of the Paul Minor trial, which has resulted in three men (an attorney and two former state judges) going to federal prison for crimes they did not commit?

That question, which we have examined in detail here at Legal Schnauzer, received national attention recently with a post from Scott Horton of Harper's.org.

Horton does not use the "C" word in his account. He uses somewhat more charitable language--"irregular," "unsettling," "doesn't look right"--to describe Wingate's shenanigans in the Minor case.

Horton's assessment of Wingate's performance can be summed up in these two statements:

* "Most judges would have shut down this prosecution at the start."

* "Every significant ruling by Judge Wingate in the case broke in favor of the prosecution. Some were truly breathtaking."

That's a kind way of saying Wingate, a Reagan appointee, acted corruptly in his handling of a trial that resulted in unlawful prison terms for three Mississippi Democrats.

We've been showing for some time on this blog that Wingate acted corruptly, and we will continue to show that when we soon begin a summary of our 25-part "Mississippi Churning" series.

What is shocking, or "breathtaking" to use Horton's term, is just how blatant Wingate was about it. He made little, if any, effort to cover up what he was doing.

I suspect that's because he knows that his actions will spark little, if any, outrage in the legal community. Lawyers, even the smartest and most honest among them, have a natural inclination to protect fellow members of the clan, at least a little. When Horton interviewed lawyers in Mississippi about the Minor case, many of them--even those who disagreed vehemently with the judges handling of the case--seemed to pull their punches. They were reluctant to call Wingate what he is: a crook.

Well, I'm not a lawyer, and I have no reason to pull punches. So I will say what lawyers will not: Henry Wingate is a dirtbag, and his actions probably rise to the level of criminal activity. Someone should look into impeachment proceedings against him, and he probably belongs behind bars.

Want to get an idea for just how corrupt Wingate was in his handling of the Minor case? Check out this post. Or here is another one, that shows Wingate actually used Mississippi state bribery law in order to get a conviction in federal court. I'm not making this stuff up, folks.

U.S. Rep. Steve Cohen (D-TN) introduced the Minor case at the U.S. House Judiciary Committee hearing on selective prosecution. Hopefully, he can lead the way on exposing Wingate, who is every bit as corrupt and evil as U.S. District Judge Mark Fuller, the man who is largely responsible for unlawfully putting former Alabama Governor Don Siegelman in federal prison.

Horton adds some important information to the Minor saga:

* He points out that federal prosecutors easily can time the return of an indictment to coincide with the availability of a certain, desired judge. This is a quaint form of judge shopping, which prosecutors almost certainly practiced to ensure that Wingate would handle the Minor case.

* He points out a key fact that we have addressed here at Legal Schnauzer: Wingate's jury instrution on bribery did not require a quid pro quo, even though Fifth Circuit precedent clearly requires such a "something-for-something" arrangement. This jury instruction, Horton says, was "unconscionable." I've got a better word for it: corrupt.

* He points out another key fact that we have noted: Wingate wrongfully did not allow the defense to present expert witnesses, showing that judges Wes Teel and John Whitfield made rulings that were correct under the law at the time. "Wingate was rather dramatically remapping Mississippi law as he went along," Horton writes. Bingo!

* He notes that Wingate allowed the jury to keep copies of the government indictment from day one, with no corresponding documents from the defense. And yet when it came to the complex jury instructions, Wingate did not allow jurors to have a copy of those. And the judge actually conducted voir dire examination of defense witnesses outside hearing of the jury, reviewing in advance what would be asked and how it would be answered. Wingate took a "blue pencil" to the testimony, "essentially doing the prosecution's work for them," Horton writes.

Henry Wingate's handling of the Minor case is a pox on American justice. Let's hope Rep. Cohen can lead the effort in the new year to expose scoundrels like Wingate, who have taught us the true perverted meaning of "justice" in the Age of Rove.

A couple of points I would add to Horton's account:

* This bears repeating: Not only did Wingate not get the law right in the Minor case, he did not even get the right kind of law right. He unlawfully used Mississippi state bribery law in crafting jury instructions for a federal case. That's a bit like getting convicted in South Dakota based on South Carolina law.

* Horton says he does not like the defendants' chances of winning on appeal in the Minor case, citing the GOP-controlled and notoriously partisan nature of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. If Horton is right about that, we might as well shut down our courts, blow up the law schools, tear up all bar cards, and start over from scratch. (Actually, I think that's a pretty good idea anyway.) This case, by law, has to be overturned on too many grounds to mention here. Democrats and others who are concerned about justice should watch this appeal with the utmost concern. Let me state again: By law, this case must be overturned on multiple grounds. If it is not, I would suggest that Congressional action must be taken.

* Here is an even more important point: Wingate was leading a trial that accused Mississippi state judges Wes Teel and John Whitfield of honest-services mail fraud. At the heart of that offense is using the U.S. mails in furtherance of an unlawful and dishonest scheme. We have shown that Teel and Whitfield did not even come close to committing that offense. But guess who almost certainly did? Wingate himself. Many of Wingate's unlawful rulings came in open court, in front of God and everybody. But if the U.S. mails were used at any point in his scheme to rob citizens of their intangible right to honest services--and Wingate had reason to foresee that the mails would be used--Wingate committed a federal crime. And the same would apply to any judges on the Fifth Circuit who vote to uphold the unlawful trial verdict in the Minor case. The mails certainly will be used in the appeals process.

* What about impeachment of a federal judge? That is a rarity in our country, and my research indicates it would be unlikely in Wingate's case. But the issue already is on the table in Wingate's neck of the woods. And naturally, the judge in the cross hairs is a Democratic appointee, by Bill Clinton. But compare the alleged wrongdoing of this federal judge to what we know Wingate has done. Whose behavior was worse. Given that Wingate is responsible for three human beings being wrongfully imprisoned, I don't think it's even a close call.

Mississippi Churning, Part X

Let's take a look at another lawsuit the government cited in its case against Mississippi Supreme Court justice Oliver Diaz.

The Paul Minor case involved an attorney and three judges from the Mississippi Gulf Coast, so it's not surprising that some of the underlying lawsuits involve oil rigs, ships, barges, and such.

Accu-Fab v. Richard Ladner, 778 So. 2d 766 (2001) was one such case. Keep in mind that the Accu-Fab case was central to the government's corruption case against Diaz.

One absurdity strikes even the casual observer right off the bat. Diaz did not participate in hearing the case. He recused himself, evidently because Paul Minor represented the heirs of Richard Ladner and Minor had helped secure loans for Diaz. Evidently thinking this could call his impartiality into question, Diaz did not participate. And apparently no evidence was presented that Diaz sought to influence the other justices.

So what was the government thinking by using Accu-Fab in an attempt to show that Diaz acted corruptly? One can only wonder. But even if Diaz had participated, it would be hard to see where the case was wrongly decided, and that's why it's worth our while to check out Accu-Fab. (Plus, I just find these sea-related cases fascinating; guess that comes from watching Lloyd Bridges in Sea Hunt as a kid.)

Ladner was working as a subcontractor's employee on the roof of a casino barge when he fell through a hole in the roof and later died from his injuries. A jury awarded his heirs $2 million in damages against the general contractor and another of its subcontractors. The Mississippi Court of Appeals first reversed and then affirmed the lower-court ruling. The contractors appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court, which also upheld the ruling.

Several contractors and subcontractors were involved, which makes things complicated. But here's the gist: A subcontractor was hired to construct the stairwells and stringers on the barge and had requested that the general contractor not install roof decking until the stairs had been installed. Due to time constraints, the general contractor denied the request and went ahead with the roof decking. The subcontractor received permission to cut a hole in the roof in order to facilitate installation of the stairway.

The hole was cut on a Saturday, and the job was supposed to be completed by the end of the weekend. But the prefabricated stairway did not fit properly, so the subcontractor could not complete installation and took the stairway back to its shop for refabrication. Neither the subcontrator nor the contractor placed any warning signs or barricades around the hole. They did nothing to cover the hole in the roof.

On the following Monday morning, Ladner (an iron worker) fell through the hole in the roof and later died of his injuries. Ladner's heirs sued, seeking compensation for his death.

There was little question of liability, and the case mostly involved the contractor and various subcontractors trying to blame one another. The jury wound up attributing 70 percent fault to the contractor, 25 percent to the subcontractor, and 5 percent to Ladner.

An interesting side note: When Ladner was taken to the hospital, a nurse mistakenly thought he was an employee of the contractor and ordered a drug test. It came back positive, and a marijuana cigarette was found in Ladner's pocket at the time of the fall. The trial court excluded the drug evidence because there was no foundation showing that Ladner was actually impaired at the time of the fall. The Supreme Court affirmed on this and all other counts.

Evidence of negligence in Accu-Fab was overwhelming, so even if Diaz had participated in the case, it's hard to imagine how the government hoped to prove corruption based on this case.

The weakness of the case against Diaz borders on the absurd. And we have shown that the cases against attorney Paul Minor and judges Wes Teel and John Whitfield also do not hold up well under scrutiny.

But those are not the only factors that raise questions about the government's prosecution in Mississippi. Was this a "political hit," similar to what appears to have happened with the Don Siegelman case in Alabama? Were the Minor defendants targeted by a Republican-led justice department not because they were corrupt but because they had Democratic leanings? Will Congress include this case in its investigation into selective prosecution by the Bush Justice Department?

We will turn our attention soon to some other interesting questions raised by the Paul Minor case.

Mississippi Churning, Part VII

Let's return to our analysis of the Paul Minor case in Mississippi.

We have noted that the Minor case has important connections to the Don Siegelman prosecution in Alabama, the broader Bush Department of Justice (DOJ) scandal, and my own Legal Schnauzer case.

Thanks to Scott Horton, of Harper's, we now know that there might have been particularly sinister motives behind the Minor prosecution. Horton reported on Saturday that his sources are telling him that the Bush administration devised a scheme in late 2001 or early 2002 to target wealthy trial lawyers who are sources of campaign funding for Democratic candidates. Horton's sources say at least five raids have been conducted on law offices around the country, seeking financial data and other information that could be used in criminal prosecutions. The idea? To dry up sources of Democratic funding.

Minor certainly fits the profile of a wealthy trial lawyer who was generous with his funding of Democratic candidates. And if the scheme Horton describes is proven, it might turn out that Minor was one of its first targets.

In posts last week, we described the applicable law in the Minor case and noted strong evidence to suggest the case was wrongly decided and might have been a "political hit" similar to the Siegelman prosecution in Alabama. We particularly noted strange rulings and jury instructions by Judge Henry Wingate (a Republican appointee) that do not appear to square with case law.

Now we look at the two lawsuits that were at the heart of the government's case against Minor and Judges Wes Teel and John Whitfield. The government's case claimed that Minor provided a series of loans to the judges in exchange for favorable rulings on cases he had before them. The primary charges against the defendants were federal funds bribery (18 U.S. Code 666) and honest-services mail fraud (18 U.S. Code 1346), and they were found guilty on all counts.

We noted earlier that the key to a bribery and honest-services mail fraud conviction is a finding that acts were taken with knowledge that they were unlawful, depriving citizens of the judges' honest services. The central question is this: Did the judges actually make unlawful rulings, rulings that were not supported by the facts and the law?

The first lawsuit in the government's case was The Peoples Bank v. USF & G. Minor, representing The Peoples Bank of Biloxi, MS, filed the lawsuit on August 25, 1998. I don't have a lot information about the specific issues involved in the case. But something tells me it involved banking and insurance. (You've got to get up early to sneak one past the Legal Schnauzer.)

For our purposes, we don't need to know a lot about the issues in the case. We do know that on October 16, 2000, Judge Wes Teel ruled in favor of Minor's client, The Peoples Bank, on a discovery issue. USF & G had claimed that certain information was privileged and should not be produced in discovery.

In December 2001, Teel ruled in favor of The Peoples Bank on the issue of liability. About three days after the ruling, the parties held a settlement conference, and USF & G agreed to pay $1.5 million to settle the case. The government alleged that Minor received approximately $500,000 in attorney's fees.

As I've noted previously, I was not present at the trial. But even the government's indictment does not provide any information showing that Teel's rulings were contrary to law. It does not state the nature of the privilege claim that USF & G made, but even a pseudo-lawyer such as myself knows that judges have great leeway in ruling on discovery matters. Information that might not be admissible at trial still is discoverable. Privileged information is not discoverable, but I see no information indicating that Teel's ruling was incorrect.

And there is no indication that Teel's ruling on liability was contrary to law. As I've noted earlier, it would not be unlawful for Teel to rule in Minor's favor if the law and the facts indicated he should rule in Minor's favor. And the loans Minor provided to Teel were allowed under Mississippi law. (Although you could count me among those who think such loans, gifts, etc. should not be allowed.)

Several apparent facts make this seem like a weak case for the government to base its corruption charges. If attorneys for USF & G felt Judge Teel was prejudiced against them and was ruling contrary to law, they had several steps they could have taken:

* They could have filed an interlocutory appeal under Rule 5 of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure.

* They could have filed a writ of mandamus under Rule 21 of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure.

* They could have filed a motion seeking Judge Teel's recusal and appointment of a new judge.

If none of that worked, they could have contacted journalists in the business press and alerted them to wrongdoing in Mississippi courts. I suspect business journalists pay attention when representatives of USF & G call.

I see no indication that the attorneys for USF & G took any of these steps, which makes me think they did not see Judge Teel's rulings as being ungrounded in law.

Perhaps the most important point regarding The Peoples Bank case is this: Teel made no final ruling in the case. USF & G chose to settle, but there was nothing to keep the company from moving forward and taking the case to trial.

The government's decision to charge Teel and Minor with corruption offenses on a case where Teel did not even make a final ruling seems highly questionable.

Mississippi Churning, Part IX

Perhaps nothing raises questions about the Paul Minor prosecution as much as the corruption case against Mississippi Supreme Court Justice Oliver Diaz.

Diaz joined judges Wes Teel and John Whitfield, along with attorney Minor, as defendants in the first trial, which took place in 2005. Diaz was acquitted on all counts, and was acquitted in a subsequent trial on tax-evasion charges. The jury in the first corruption trial acquitted the other three defendants on some charges and failed to reach unanimous verdicts on others, leading to a retrial earlier this year. The three defendants were found guilty on all charges in the retrial.

As we've noted in recent posts, the government's cases against Minor, Teel, and Whitfield do not hold up well under close scrutiny. But the case against Diaz borders on the absurd.

For one, Diaz did not participate in some of the Supreme Court rulings that were at the heart of the government's case. He recused himself from a number of cases involving Minor's clients, and there was no evidence that he attempted to persuade other members of the court to vote Minor's way.

And even in a case where Diaz did participate, the lawsuit at the heart of the government's case against him offers almost no evidence of corruption. In other words, evidence strongly suggests that the court's rulings were correct, regardless of loans Minor had arranged for Diaz (which were allowed under Mississippi law).

Let's take a closer look at one case. In Rex Armistead v. Bill Minor, a law-enforcement officer sued a newspaper columnist for defamation. Columnist Bill Minor, Paul Minor's father, writes a column called "Eyes on Mississippi" that is published in newspapers across the state. Here is a good summary of the case.

In April 1998, Bill Minor wrote a column that was sparked by a story in The Memphis Commercial Appeal about Rex Armistead's service as a paid investigator for the "Arkansas Project," an effort by American Spectator magazine to develop exposes about President Bill Clinton.

Minor's column recounted Armistead's activities dating to the 1960s. Minor described Armistead's "odoriferous background in Mississippi, ranging all the way from head-bashing of black civil-rights workers to concocting a bizarre homosexual scandal in an attempt to defeat a gubernatorial candidate."

As a public figure, Armistead had to show that Bill Minor acted with actual malice, meaning the columnist knew the published statements were false or acted with reckless disregard for the truth. Actual malice has long proved to be an extremely difficult standard for public figures to reach in defamation cases, and the Supreme Court (including Diaz) ruled 8-0 that the trial court correctly dismissed Armistead's case.

The Supreme Court found that Bill Minor's column was substantially true and was supported by information from numerous other publications. "While it may be evident that Minor does not hold Armistead in high regard, such feelings do not amount to actual malice," Justice James W. Smith Jr. wrote.

Smith went on to write: "As the United States Supreme Court has noted, 'minor inaccuracies do not amount to falsity so long as the substance, the gist, the sting, of the libelous charge can be justified.' Put another way, the statement is not considered false unless it 'would have a different effect on the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth would have produced.' Masson v. New Yorker Magazine Inc. 501 U.S. 517."

To make the government's case against Diaz even weaker, Paul Minor did not even serve as an active attorney in his father's case.

Let's take a look at another lawsuit the government cited in prosecuting Diaz. And this one, like the Bill Minor case, adds to the evidence that the case against Diaz was extraordinarily weak.

The careful reader might ask him or herself: If the government's case was this weak against Diaz, was it really substantially stronger against the other three defendants? Does the weakness of the case against Diaz call into question the entire prosecution? Was this a "political hit," similar to what appears to have happened in the Don Siegelman prosecution in Alabama?

Why Did Trent Lott Really Resign?

A lot of folks are speculating about the reasons for Senator Trent Lott's resignation. MSNBC's Keith Olbermann had his usual interesting take on the subject.

Most commentators have focused on changes in lobbying laws or Lott's loss of power under the flailing GOP. Some have even suggested the good senator simply needs to make more cash than his lowly Congressional gig brings home. And some have said, "Hey, lots of Republicans are retiring. It's just a trend."

Well, I don't think most of the retiring folks just got re-elected last year. I don't think most of them hold a safe seat of power till 2012, as Lott does.

So the Legal Schnauzer was just sitting here, ears alert, wondering: What if Trent Lott's resignation has something to do with the Paul Minor case in Mississippi? The Minor case has been the subject of a 25-part series here at our humble blog. (Gee, 25 parts? We must care about this case.)

I decided to turn to the much trusted Scott Horton at Harper's.org. And what to my wandering eyes did appear? This most intriguing post, noting that Horton's sources say FBI agents currently are raiding the law office of Mississippi attorney Richard "Dickie" Scruggs, who is Lott's brother-in-law.

Scruggs, you may recall, joins Paul Minor as probably the two most successful trial lawyers in Mississippi. Both have made financial contributions to state judges, which are perfectly legal under Mississippi law. But Scruggs, who is Lott's relative and a major donor to Republicans, was never prosecuted. Minor, a major donor to Democrats and a thorn in the side of numerous corporations (tobacco, asbestos, oil), was prosecuted and convicted, along with "pro plaintiff" (read Democrat) judges Wes Teel and John Whitfield.

What's going on with the raid at Scruggs' office? Is he going to get nailed for committing crimes, just as Minor did?

I can only guess, but I don't think that's what is happening. Did Scruggs give financial help to state judges? Evidently, yes. Did he receive favorable rulings from said judges? Probably yes. But as we have noted in our "Mississippi Churning" series, that is not a crime. It is only a crime if Scruggs receives a ruling in his favor that is "corrupt" and "unlawful."

The lawsuits at the heart of the Minor case were decided correctly by the judges. The fact they were in Minor's "favor" is irrelevant under the law.

So my guess? I don't think Dickie Scruggs is a criminal any more than Paul Minor is a criminal. But could evidence at Scruggs' firm show that Trent Lott took steps to protect Scruggs while siccing federal investigators on Minor?

You never know with the Bush Justice Department. But that is the question that should be asked.

And we do have a new attorney general in Michael Mukasey. Perhaps he actually is interested in justice, unlike his predecessor, Alberto Gonzalez--who helped turn the Justice Department into a disgusting sewer.

Is Mukasey the guy to drain the swamp? We can hope. And if that's the case, I know the offices of several state judges in Alabama he needs to raid. I think I feel an e-mail coming.