Did Judge William Acker Jr. Engage In A Criminal Conspiracy By Corruptly Dismissing My Lawsuit?

Judge William M. Acker Jr. (right),
with Stanford professor Jack Rakove

A federal judge has unlawfully dismissed the lawsuit over my wrongful termination at the University of Alabama at Birmingham (UAB), and evidence suggests that he and others might have committed criminal acts in the process.

U.S. District Judge William M. Acker Jr., an 84-year-old Reagan appointee, granted summary judgment for the University of Alabama and various individual defendants--and he did it without giving either side an opportunity to conduct discovery. Procedural and case law make it clear that summary judgment cannot be considered, much less granted, when the parties have not been able to conduct discovery.

Acker ignored black-letter law and essentially allowed the UAB defendants to cheat me out of my job without having to provide any documents or answer any questions related to my termination. The case currently is on appeal before the U.S. Eleventh Circuit in Atlanta, and if the law still means anything in the Deep South, Acker's rulings will have to be overturned. But as we have seen in the Don Siegelman case, the Eleventh Circuit often is more interested in protecting trial-court judges than in making sure the law is upheld, so the outcome in my appeal hardly is a certainty.

This much, however, is certain: It's hard to imagine a more grotesque example of judicial incompetence or corruption. (Acker's old, but I see no signs that he's senile; that makes me think this is a case of corruption, not incompetence.) It becomes even more disgusting when you consider that a public, taxpayer-supported university--and several of its officials/managers--are trying to pervert the court system by knowingly taking advantage of tainted rulings.

Most disturbing, perhaps, is this: Acker made statements from the bench--and I have them in an official court transcript--indicating he had talked with one or more people connected to UAB about my case. If that indeed happened, and it influenced Acker's rulings, it would point to federal crimes, including obstruction of justice under 18 U.S. Code 1503.

I recently reported about corrupt rulings I had witnessed in federal court and pointed specifically to two judges from the Northern District of Alabama--Acker and Abdul Kallon. On the surface, the two judges could not be more different. Acker is old, white, and a Republican. Kallon is young, black, and supposedly a Democrat (an Obama appointee). But they have consistently shown a lack of respect for the law, the office they hold, and the parties who come before them. In my previous post, I wrote that I would be providing details about the corrupt actions of Acker and Kallon. This is the first in a series of followup posts that will unmask two rogues on the federal bench.

The law governing my UAB case could not be more simple. It's fairly common for defendants in a lawsuit to file a Rule (12)(b)(6) motion, also known as a "motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim." We discussed these motions in a previous post and noted that, even under recently heightened pleading standards, they should almost never be granted. In fact, when a defendant attaches "matters outside the pleadings" to a motion to dismiss and the court does not exclude them, the motion must be converted to a motion for summary judgment and handled according to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP). This process is outlined in Rule 12(d) FRCP.

The record shows that UAB entered matters outside the pleadings, in the form of affidavits, and the court did not exclude them. The record also shows that Judge Acker converted the motions to dismiss to a motions for summary judgment. (See document below.) So far, so good.

But Acker veered into a swamp of unlawful activity when he ruled on summary judgment without giving me (or the other side, for that matter) an opportunity to conduct discovery. This is like declaring the New York Yankees the winners over the Boston Red Sox, without giving the Red Sox a chance to bat. It simply cannot be done, either under Rule 56 or Eleventh Circuit precedent.

Acker did not order a discovery conference among the parties, as required by Rule 26(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), and he never set a scheduling order as required by Rule 16(b) FRCP.

That Acker pulled this stunt indicates he is a judicial rogue of the worst sort. That the UAB defendants are quietly trying to take advantage of such thuggery, when their in-house lawyers have to know it is unlawful, tells us all we need to known about the university's ethically challenged "leadership."

How simple is the law in question? Rule 56(d) FRCP allows a nonmoving party (me, in this instance) to show by affidavit that he has not been able to obtain information that is essential to opposing the motion for summary judgment. The Eleventh Circuit has streamlined this process by operating for almost 24 years under a ruling styled Snook v. Trust Company of Georgia, 859 F. 2d 865 (11th Cir., 1988).

In Snook, the Eleventh Circuit found that a party opposing summary judgment need not file an affidavit to invoke the protection of Rule 56(d). Instead, the nonmoving party simply must bring to the district court's attention that discovery is outstanding. Once that is done, consideration of summary judgment is premature. From Snook:

This court has often noted that summary judgment should not be granted until the party opposing the motion has had an adequate opportunity for discovery. . . . The party opposing a motion for summary judgment has a right to challenge the affidavits and other factual materials submitted in support of the motion by conducting sufficient discovery so as to enable him to determine whether he can furnish opposing affidavits. . . . Generally summary judgment is inappropriate when the party opposing the motion has been unable to obtain responses to his discovery requests.

I was not allowed to even make discovery requests, much less obtain responses--and I filed two motions alerting the court to this. (See one of those motions below.) But Acker ruled on summary judgment anyway.

This is dumbfoundingly unlawful, and it indicates that Acker thinks I am too stupid to realize what he did. It also hints that he thinks other parties who come before him are stupid--and, with a lifetime appointment, he really doesn't care that he has butchered the law.

Evidence suggests that Acker might be more than just a bad judge; he might be a crook. Consider a statement Acker made in a hearing on December 10, 2010, after I asked him how much time I had to file a response to a UAB motion:

I think I'm going to give you until after Christmas so I can wish you a happy Christmas by giving you the time for Christmas. I know that UAB and the people over there are very anxious about this, and I want to accommodate them, too, but I think I'm going to eliminate the anxiety for me between now and Christmas by giving him at least that much time.

How would Acker know that "UAB and the people over there" were "very anxious" about my case? I can think of only one answer--someone connected to UAB told him. At a bare minimum, this means Acker had improper ex parte communications about my case, violating judicial ethics and requiring his recusal. Given that Acker went on to unlawfully grant summary judgment without discovery, it more likely means that Acker and one or more persons acted criminally in my case.

Below is a memorandum opinion, and on page 2, Acker clearly states that he is converting defendants' motions to dismiss to motions for summary judgment and will treat them as such. After that, is a motion where I timely notify the court, as required by Snook, that discovery is outstanding. At this point, summary judgment could not lawfully be considered, much less granted. Acker granted it anyway.

Such blatant contempt for the law indicates that Acker does not try very hard to conceal the fact he is crooked. And from our reporting on the Don Siegelman and Paul Minor criminal cases, we know that Acker is not alone.

This is more evidence about the shameful state of our federal courts--and most Americans have no idea how their tax dollars are being abused by "rogues in robes."



(To be continued)


UAB-Acker MSJ Ruling


UAB--Shuler Motion for Discovery

Hideously corrupt U.S. judge William Acker Jr. has "kicked the bucket," a step forward for justice in Alabama, a state that remains a judicial sewer

William M. Acker II

Just when you are rid of perhaps the worst federal judge in Alabama history, along comes another who seems hell-bent on proving she is just as bad.

In a rare piece of good news on "justice" in the Deep South, William M. Acker Jr., 90, died on June 21 after spending 34 years as a "judge" in the Northern District of Alabama -- the last 20 on senior status, before his full retirement in 2016. The wrinkled Reagan appointee had been on the federal bench in Birmingham since 1982.

Acker is the judge who cheated me raw in my First Amendment/discrimination lawsuit against UAB. Many of the ugly events that have happened to my wife, Carol, and me in the past six or seven years -- my kidnapping and incarceration; loss of our home of 25 years in Birmingham to wrongful foreclosure; our unlawful eviction in Missouri; Carol's shattered arm, requiring almost eight hours of trauma surgery (thanks to Greene County deputies) -- would not have happened if Acker had handled the UAB case lawfully.

Perhaps the best part about Acker's death is that it might allow for revival of my lawsuit against UAB. Wouldn't that be a hoot if the SOBs (and daughters of bitches, DOBs?) who thought they got away with cheating me the first time were to see my complaint slapped on their desks -- or wind up in their mailboxes, for those who no longer work at the university? It could happen.

The original case was not a hard one to decide, given that UAB human-resources official Anita Bonasera admitted in a tape-recorded phone call that I was targeted because of my reporting on this blog about the Don Siegelman case. But Acker, being a Bastard-Coated Bastard With Bastard Filling (BCBWBF), repeatedly ruled contrary to black-letter law -- and he even had the audacity to state in open court that he was going to cheat me, and then he did it. Naturally, his corrupt cronies on the U.S. Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Atlanta backed him up in a "Do Not Publish" opinion -- which is a little trick federal judges use to cheat certain litigants without screwing up the actual law in federal reporters.

The late Monroe Freedman, a Hofstra University professor who was considered the father of modern legal ethics as an academic subject, said he was sick of seeing crooked opinions like the one Acker produced in my case. From Freedman:

Frankly, I have had more than enough of judicial opinions that bear no relationship whatsoever to the cases that have been filed and argued before the judges.

I am talking about judicial opinions that falsify the facts of the cases that have been argued, judicial opinions that make disingenuous use or omission of material authorities, judicial opinions that cover up these things with no-publication and no-citation rules.

Freedman said that in a 1989 speech, and the quote made me feel like I was in awfully good company in reporting on scoundrels, like Acker, on the federal bench. Freedman died in 2015, and judicial corruption only got worse during the later years of his life.

As for the Northern District of Alabama, I've learned in recent weeks that Judge Virginia Emerson Hopkins, who reportedly retired to senior status in June, might be just as crooked as Acker. We will deal with her in upcoming posts. But for now, let's tell the world that William M. Acker Jr. was a hideous criminal, and the world is a better place now that he's dead.

An American tradition is that we speak kindly (and falsely) of the dead, no matter how big a BCBWBF he was in real life. That applies to Acker, as you can see from this article about his death at al.com:

Colleagues of retired United States District Judge William M. Acker, Jr., are remembering him this week as a brilliant and compassionate jurist who ruled on a variety of cases during a three-decade career on the federal bench.

"Brilliant and compassionate," my ass. You will notice the article includes only quotes from fellow judges and lawyers -- none from parties who had cases before Acker. I wish they had asked me for a quote. Here is what it would have been.

I consider Bill Acker to be a worse criminal than Jarrod W. Ramos, who killed five people in the recent newspaper shooting at Annapolis, Maryland. At least Ramos had the decency to use his own money to purchase his weapon. Even the worst mass killers generally do that. But not Bill Acker and his fellow judicial crooks. They use taxpayer money, in taxpayer-funded facilities. to cheat taxpayers who have cases before them -- all the while treating constitutional rights like they were used toilet paper and showing utter disrespect for the rule of law. In other words, Acker steals your money to buy a gun and shoot you with it. Hell, Jarrod Ramos almost certainly has more integrity than that. 

How badly did Acker screw me on the UAB case? I've written several lengthy posts on that subject (see here, here, and here), but it boils down to this. He granted the university summary judgment, without discovery, in clear violation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Eleventh Circuit precedent, as outlined in Snook v. Trust Company of Georgia, 859 F. 2d 865 (11th Cir., 1988). From Snook:

"This court has often noted that summary judgment should not be granted until the party opposing the motion has had an adequate opportunity for discovery. . . . The party opposing a motion for summary judgment has a right to challenge the affidavits and other factual materials submitted in support of the motion by conducting sufficient discovery so as to enable him to determine whether he can furnish opposing affidavits. . . . Generally summary judgment is inappropriate when the party opposing the motion has been unable to obtain responses to his discovery requests."

Law doesn't get much more direct and simple than that. I filed at least three motions to inform the court that discovery had not been conducted, and Acker admitted in open court that he was aware of that, and I was entitled to conduct discovery to counter UAB's motion for summary judgment.

We've reported on at least one of Acker's judicial colleagues in the Northern District of Alabama who knows the law on discovery and summary judgment and has applied it correctly multiple times. We've reported that  Acker himself has correctly applied the law in multiple cases. He just didn't do it in my case, and that's probably because he knew political thugs had pressured UAB to unlawfully terminate me, and Acker chose to protect those thugs. Specifically, Acker likely was protecting GOP cretin Rob "Uday" Riley and his associates, who were the driving forces behind my cheat job at UAB. We recently have uncovered evidence that suggests the Alabama State Bar might have been involved, too.

Speaking of Rob Riley, I'm not the only litigant Acker cheated in the name of protecting the son of former Alabama GOP Gov. Bob Riley.  He did much the same thing in a whistle blower case on which we reported, where Rob Riley's company (and individuals tied to UAB) reportedly were engaging in health-care fraud. The plaintiff's Mississippi lawyers were left so amazed at Acker's unlawful rulings that they hardly knew what to say. They did say it might be possible to re-bring the case later, "but we'll have to wait for him to die."

Well, thank God, that time has arrived, although a send-off remains on schedule for Acker. According to an obituary at al.com, a "celebration" of Acker's life will be at 11 a.m. on July 28 at Highlands United Methodist Church. How do you "celebrate" the life of a publicly funded criminal? From the obit:

Judge Acker was known for his humorous limericks and writings but most particularly for his legal writings. Two weeks before his death, although nearly blind, he completed a law review article which will be published in the Cumberland Law Review in the near future.

Acker was a funny guy? Tell that to the parties he cheated in court. Acker almost went blind near the end of his life? Let's hope he enjoyed his time in near darkness, and maybe he learned something from it -- like karma really can be a bitch.

As for the possibility of reviving my UAB lawsuit, I'm still researching that topic -- but I think it is a possibility. In terms of new evidence, all evidence in the case is new because Acker did not allow any discovery the first time around. This much is certain: If my UAB case winds up back on the docket, William Marsh Acker II won't be hearing it.

Before we leave, let's pay tribute to Dr. Perry Cox, the memorable character from Scrubs who created a classic phrase we borrowed above. Here's the video:

Chief Judge Joel Dubina Provides Cover For His Crooked Crony On The Bench In Alabama

Joel Dubina

The chief judge of the U.S. Eleventh Circuit is ignoring overwhelming evidence that one of his trial-court brethren is acting corruptly in my employment lawsuit against the University of Alabama at Birmingham (UAB).

This will not come as a surprise to regular Legal Schnauzer readers. In both the Don Siegelman and Paul Minor criminal prosecutions, we've shown that appellate judges often are more interested in protecting rogues on the trial bench than in making sure that justice is served. Now I'm seeing the same sort of behavior in my civil case.

U.S. District Judge William M. Acker Jr. has made statements from the bench that can only be interpreted in one way--that he intended from the outset to rule unlawfully in favor of UAB and against me. In essence, Acker stated in open court that he was going to cheat me, and he  proceeded to do exactly that, by granting summary judgment to UAB even though no discovery had been conducted in the case. All sorts of procedural and case law says that simply cannot be done--at least if a judge is making any effort to follow the law.

But Acker, an 84-year-old Reagan appointee, isn't concerned with appearances. He doesn't care who knows that he's crooked--and apparently Joel F. Dubina does not care either.

Dubina is the chief U.S. circuit judge in Atlanta, and he reviewed my complaint against Acker under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 (28 U.S.C. 351-364). Most Americans probably are not aware we have a procedure for filing a complaint against a federal judge. (Here is a link to a Ninth Circuit overview of the procedure for filing such a complaint.) That's just as well because a process that involves judges reviewing complaints against other judges is almost always going to be a sham anyway.

Dubina's handling of my complaint against Acker is a case in point. It's instructive to note that Dubina, like Acker, is a Reagan appointee from Alabama. God only knows how long the two right wingers have been buddies. What were the chances of my complaint against Acker being taken seriously? I would say the word "zero" pretty well sums it up.

Here is a "big picture" view of Joel Dubina: He was appointed a U.S. magistrate judge by Ronald Reagan in 1986 and elevated to the U.S. Eleventh Circuit in 1990 by President George H.W. Bush, rising to chief judge (based on his seniority) in 2009. Dubina took the appellate seat that was vacated when Robert Vance Sr. was killed by a mail bomb in 1989. Vance, a Democrat and Jimmy Carter appointee, was widely known as a supporter of civil rights and was a mentor to future Alabama governor Don Siegelman. When you consider that Siegelman's 2006 convictions have unlawfully been upheld by the Eleventh Circuit--and the political prosecution was brought by the George W. Bush Department of Justice--this question comes to the forefront: Was Joel Dubina's appointment to the Eleventh Circuit, replacing Robert Vance, an early sign that the Bush family was going to sully our federal justice system by appointing political hacks to key positions?

Let's consider Dubina's response to my complaint that Acker had warned me multiple times in a hearing to look up the rule for a writ of mandamus. As I explained in a previous post, Acker's words can be interpreted only one way--at least by anyone who is serious about notions of due process and equal protection under the law:

To fully grasp what Acker is doing here, you have to understand the purpose of a writ of mandamus. The filing of a petition for such a writ is governed by Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (FRAP). It is a form of appeal while the case still is in the trial court. That's why it is called an "extraordinary writ"; the process is designed to address close questions of law or fact, not to serve as a pinch hitter for a trial judge who is too crooked to rule correctly on simple procedural issues. 

The transcript, read in full, shows there was no legitimate reason for Acker to warn me twice that I would need to learn about the mandamus process. But Acker knew two things about mandamus petitions: (1) They are time consuming; and (2) They are expensive, with an appellate docketing fee of $450 every time you file one. 

In so many words, Acker was telling me: "I'm going to screw you on every little detail of this case, and you are going to have to spend months of your time and thousands of your dollars just to make the simplest step forward in your case. I will drain you of your resources simply because I can--and no one can stop me."

Did Dubina take Acker's threats seriously? Of course not. Here is how he brushed them off. (You can read Dubina's full ruling at the end of this post.)

Mr. Shuler provides no credible facts or evidence to substantiate his claim that Judge Acker committed misconduct with respect to this issue. Judge Acker's statements--that Mr. Shuler would need to "study up" on the procedure for filing a writ of mandamus--do not support Mr. Shuler's allegation that Judge Acker was going to "cheat" Mr. Shuler, did not know the law, intending to intentionally misapply the law, or was going to force Mr. Shuler to waste resources by filing multiple appeals. It appears that the statements were made in an effort to inform Mr. Shuler of a process for redress in the event that Judge Acker made any erroneous rulings. Furthermore, the fact that Judge Acker made the alleged statements only to Mr. Shuler, and not to counsel for the defendants, does not support Mr. Shuler's claim that Judge Acker was biased against him, given that Mr. Shuler was representing himself pro se. In this context, the statements appear to be Judge Acker's explanation of the different options available to a pro se litigant, as opposed to an indication of bias against Mr. Shuler.

First, it should be noted that these weren't "alleged statements" from Acker. An official court transcript shows they were exactly as my wife and I reported them in affidavits to support my complaint. Second, Acker's own words show that Dubina's explanation is a pile of horse feces. On page 6 of the hearing transcript, Judge Acker commented on my apparent knowledge of the law:

Mr. Shuler, you, in representing yourself, demonstrated to me that you are more cognizant of and aware of the Rules of Civil Procedure and some of the statutory causes of action you present, or attempt to present, than some of the lawyers that come in here . . .

Acker knew I didn't need to "study up" on the mandamus rule. He simply was making it clear that he was intentionally going to rule against me. He's a cheat and a bully, and he thought I wouldn't have the cojones to file a complaint against him. He was wrong about that one.

Let's also examine Dubina's response to my complaint about Acker stating in open court that he knew that "UAB and the people over there are anxious about this." What did that mean? Here is how I explained it:

How could Acker know that UAB is anxious about the case? It could only be because someone connected to the university told him--and this is the kind of prejudicial communication that is strictly prohibited by judicial ethics rules.

Did Dubina see the obvious? Not a chance. Here is how he brushed this one off:

Mr. Shuler provides no credible facts or evidence to substantiate this claim, as the alleged statement does not support that Judge Acker had inappropriate conversations with someone external to the case. Given that UAB was the defendant in a lawsuit, Judge Acker could assume or perceive that UAB was anxious about the case, without having been informed of that information by someone.

This is laughable, and it shows that Dubina either is a blatant apologist for corrupt judges or he lives in an impenetrable bubble--or both. I'm the one who has been subjected to a career assassination. I'm the one who has been stripped of my livelihood in the midst of an epic recession. If anyone should have been anxious about this case, it was me. But did Acker "assume or perceive" that? Of course not.

In fact, Acker did not "assume or perceive" anything. The transcript shows that he said "I know" that UAB and the people over there are anxious. He was making a statement of fact, based on what someone had told him.

At the risk of sounding overly dramatic, Joel Dubina's handling of my complaint against Judge Acker shows that we need major reform of our justice system. A system of lawyers monitoring lawyers, and judges monitoring judges, is failing horribly--and this is just one more piece of evidence that helps prove it.

Acker Misconduct Ruling

U.S. Judge William Acker Jr. And His Corrupt Rulings Represent Ronald Reagan's Lasting "Justice" Legacy

Judge William M. Acker Jr. (right)

To what extent can a federal judge twist facts and the law--not to mention logic--in order to produce an unlawful result that he desires? In the case of U.S. District Judge William M. Acker Jr., a Reagan appointee from the Northern District of Alabama, he produces twists that even Chubby Checker could not imagine.

Acker might be 85 years old, but he can contort himself in impressive fashion when he really wants to cheat a litigant who comes before him. I know because I've been one of those litigants.

We recently used the words of a fellow federal judge to prove that Acker committed a monstrous cheat job in a lawsuit over my unlawful termination at the University of Alabama at Birmingham (UAB). Acker granted summary judgment for the University of Alabama Board of Trustees and various individual defendants, even though no discovery had been conducted in the case. We used an opinion from U.S. District Judge Lynwood Smith Jr., to show that cannot lawfully be done.

But that only scratches the surface of Acker's chicanery in my case. His 10-page memorandum opinion, in which he explains his "reasoning" for dismissing my case, reeks of deceit and disingenuous thinking. When Acker isn't engaging in gross distortions of fact and law, he is lobbing insults at me--apparently because I refused to hire an attorney and had the audacity to represent myself. I've read Acker's opinion probably 10 times, and I still discover new jaw-dropping material. Each time, I come away thinking, "This is the work of a diseased mind." (The full opinion can be read at the end of this post.)

How diseased is Acker's mind? Well, the contempt he holds for everyday citizens comes across most clearly in the numerous pot shots he takes at me. We will address those in a future post, but for now, let's examine what passes for "legal scholarship" in a Bill Acker opinion.

My complaint in the UAB case presented a number of problems for Acker. Perhaps the biggest one involved a legal concept called qualified immunity. Individual state employees generally are protected from lawsuit--they are immune--as long as their actions do not violate a "clearly established constitutional right." (See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 2002.)

The Eleventh Circuit has held that the determining factor is whether the complaint alleges a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. (See Chesser v. Sparks, 248 F. 3d 1117, 11th Cir., 2001) My complaint alleges that the university terminated me in violation of the First Amendment right to free speech on matters of public concern--specifically the prosecution of former Alabama Governor Don Siegelman.

It's hard to imagine more clearly established constitutional rights than those spelled out in the First Amendment. Since my complaint alleged such a violation, that meant the individual UAB defendants could not lawfully be dismissed from the case. In legal terms, they did not enjoy qualified immunity.

How did Acker get around that, seeing that he clearly wanted to let the UAB defendants off the hook? As our headline states, he pulled "facts" right out of his butt. That's a crass way of putting it, but the description fits here. This is from page 6 of Acker's opinion:

Shuler's allegations, taken as true, do not provide a basis for any of the individual defendants to know that what he or she did, or failed to do, in connection with the termination of Shuler (after determining he had engaged in blogging at work after he had been warned not to do so) constituted a constitutional violation or violations and should have been recognized as such by a similarly situated person holding a supervisory position at an institution of higher learning. This court has looked for, but not found, any constitutional protection for an imagined right to blog on the job.

This might be the biggest load of horse feces ever written by a federal judge. First, the allegations in my complaint are the determining factor, and under "Count One, Violation of First Amendment," I clearly allege that I was terminated for blogging about a matter of public concern. Nowhere do I claim to have a right to "blog on the job," and nowhere does UAB even allege that I was "blogging on the job."

After Acker issued his order, I filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, outlining Acker's numerous mistakes of fact and law. Such a motion is governed by Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and mine can be viewed at the end of this post. In item No. 10 ("Shuler Asserted a Valid First Amendment Claim"), I addressed Acker's contortions on the subject of qualified immunity:

This court dips into bizarre territory when it states that Shuler's "blogging on the job" was not a constitutionally protected act. Why is this bizarre? Because Shuler never claims that "blogging on the job" is a constitutionally protected act. In fact, Shuler claims that he was fired largely because he wrote a blog, on his own time and with his own resources, about matters of public concern--and that is a constitutionally protected act. In no pleadings filed in this case does Shuler claim a right to "blog on the job." He specifically states that he was not blogging on the job and that UAB's own grievance committee found this to be true. Even UAB and its defendants do not claim, in any court document, that Shuler was "blogging on the job." One can only imagine where Judge Acker pulled this notion from.

Actually, I don't have to imagine too hard to figure out where Acker got this notion. He got it from the various political and legal forces who pressured UAB to fire me in the first place. These same forces wanted to ensure that I also got cheated in court.

We already have presented evidence that Acker was influenced by unlawful, ex parte communications in my case--and we've shown that such conduct likely constitutes obstruction of justice and possibly other federal crimes. Acker's references to a supposed "right to blog on the job"--words which are not contained in any document filed by either party in the case--are a clear sign that the judicial process was hopelessly tainted in my case.

This is ugly stuff, but we can find one comedic twist to the whole sordid tale. Acker's own words reveal exactly what he is doing--the judge, in fact, largely unmasks himself.

We are left with this discomforting thought: Bill Acker is a horrible judge, but he might be an even worse criminal. As the Iran-Contra Affair and the Savings and Loan Crisis remind us, Acker has plenty of company from the Reagan era.


(To be continued)

UAB-Acker Summary Judgment by Roger Shuler

Acker Motion to Amend

A Fellow Federal Judge Proves William Acker Jr. Butchered My Employment Lawsuit Against UAB

Judge William M. Acker Jr. (right)

New evidence shows that U.S. District Judge William M. Acker Jr. acted way outside the law in his handling of my employment lawsuit against the University of Alabama at Birmingham (UAB). The evidence this time comes from one of Acker's colleagues on the federal bench in the Northern District of Alabama.

This revelation raises disturbing questions about Acker's competence, integrity, and fitness as a federal judge. But perhaps more importantly, it shows the wild disparity in the way similar cases are handled, based simply on the supposedly random selection of a judge. We learn that "justice" in America can come down to a crap shoot that might be fitting for the "Wild, Wild West"--if you get one judge, you have a decent shot at receiving lawful treatment; if you draw another judge, you have no chance.

Acker's actions in my case against UAB--granting summary judgment to the university and individual defendants even though no discovery had been conducted--were so outrageous that we don't need additional evidence to prove that the 85-year-old Reagan appointee is a corrupt hack. In fact, we've shown that Acker almost had to have engaged in a criminal conspiracy that likely involved certain members of the Birmingham legal community and several UAB officials. (Acker's bogus ruling on summary judgment can be viewed at the end of this post.)

While anyone with a few weeks of law school (or the ability to read my posts on the subject) should clearly see that Acker acted corruptly in my case, it's nice to receive confirmation from one of the judge's judicial brethren.

The latest evidence comes in the form of a memorandum opinion by U.S. District Judge Lynwood Smith Jr., in a case styled April D. Chandler v. Volunteers of America, North Alabama Inc. (Civil Action No. 10-S-2961-NW).

How similar are the two cases? Smith, like Acker, serves on the federal bench in the Northern District of Alabama. April Chandler, like yours truly, brought various discrimination claims against her former employer.

Some might question my objectivity on this, but I dare say my case against UAB was much stronger than the one April Chandler has against Volunteers. For one, my case included alleged Constitutional violations. And my First Amendment claim was supported by tape-recorded evidence showing that a UAB human-resources official admitted I was targeted because of my reporting on this blog about the political prosecution of former Alabama Governor Don Siegelman.

That is not to discount the serious nature of Ms. Chandler's claims. The evidentiary record in her case points to the likelihood that she experienced racial discrimination. But here is perhaps the key difference in these two cases: Ms. Chandler, in fact, had an evidentiary record in her case; there essentially was none in mine, other than a few affidavits that individual UAB defendants filed--and I was not allowed to challenge.

Let's consider a brief scorecard of how these two similar cases were handled on critical issues:

I. Discovery 

Chandler case--Extensive discovery was conducted. Judge Smith's memorandum opinion includes 251 footnotes, many of them references to affidavits and depositions submitted by the party opposing summary judgment, which was Plaintiff Chandler. 

Shuler case--No discovery was conducted. The party opposing summary judgment, me, was not allowed to gather any evidence, even though I notified the court in multiple documents that no discovery had been conducted. In fact, the case docket shows no discovery meeting even was scheduled. Judge Acker's memorandum opinion includes no footnotes because there was no evidentiary record. 

II. Outcome on Summary Judgment 

Chandler case--Judge Smith had harsh criticism for Chandler's attorney, who apparently has brought a number of discrimination claims against Volunteer. Smith said the lawyer's briefs and evidentiary material were sketchy and disorganized. Smith granted summary judgment and dismissed Chandler's claims for hostile work environment and retaliation, but he allowed certain aspects of her disparate-treatment claim to go forward. That means Chandler has a chance to receive some measure of justice, likely in the form of a settlement before the case reaches a jury verdict. 

Shuler case--Before rendering his finding on summary judgment, Acker actually praised my work as a pro se litigant, stating that my briefs and other documents were better than those he receives from many lawyers. But Acker ignored my multiple motions requesting that discovery be scheduled and conducted, dismissing all of my claims without giving me an opportunity to gather any evidence. The end result? He allowed UAB to get away with misconduct that even one of the university's own HR officials admitted took place.

How off target was Acker? Well, let's consider the following words from Judge Smith in the April Chandler case. It comes under the heading "Motion for Summary Judgment: Legal Standards":

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary judgment "should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

So we learn from Smith that discovery is an essential part of the summary judgment process. But he doesn't stop there:

In other words, summary judgment is proper "after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)

Here we learn that summary judgment is proper only "after adequate time for discovery." And Judge Smith cites Celotex, a well-known U.S. Supreme Court case from 1986.

Judge Lynwood Smith

Last time I checked, U.S. Supreme Court rulings are supposed to apply in the Northern District of Alabama. But you would never know that from Judge Acker's handling of my case against UAB. Not only did I not have "adequate time for discovery," I had no time for discovery.

I applaud April Chandler for getting over the summary-judgment hurdle and moving toward a shot at justice; I intend to keep up with her case. But here are questions that any American with a functioning conscience should ask upon learning how these two cases were handled:

"What kind of justice system do we have if the outcome of court cases can vary wildly depending on luck of the draw regarding a judge? What do the 14th Amendment guarantees of 'due process' and 'equal protection' mean if we do not have judge who are able and willing to enforce them? How much damage do corrupt charlatans, such as William M. Acker Jr., inflict upon the very foundation of our democracy?

Here is perhaps the most important question of all;

"How long are we going to quietly allow such gross injustice in the federal courts that all taxpayers fund?"

(Note to readers: Following is Judge William M. Acker's memorandum opinion, granting summary judgment in my lawsuit against UAB. I've been operating for months under the notion that I had scanned this document and run it multiple times on Legal Schnauzer. After all, I've referenced Acker's erroneous ruling on summary judgment in more than a dozen posts. But I recently discovered that I've never run his actual opinion, and that was an oversight on my part. I've run numerous documents leading up to the summary-judgment ruling and a number of documents that came after, including appellate documents. But this is the first time Acker's actual opinion has appeared, and that's because I have it only in hard-copy form, and I just now realized that I have never scanned it for publication on the blog. My apologies for the omission of this critical document in my personal legal journey. But now, better late than never, here is your opportunity to peruse perhaps one of the most outlandish documents in the history of American jurisprudence. I will examine its many absurdities in upcoming posts, but I invite readers to take their own close-up looks at the kind of "reasoning" and "logic" that your tax dollars support.)

UAB-Acker Summary Judgment

U.S. Judge William M. Acker's own words and actions show he intentionally cheated me in employment case

William M. Acker Jr.
(From al.com)

Have you ever wondered what it would be like to catch a federal judge, red-handed, cheating a litigant before him? Stick with us, and we will show you exactly how it happened in one case.

The judge in question is William M. Acker Jr., an 87-year-old Reagan appointee in the Northern District of Alabama. Acker presided over my discrimination/First Amendment complaint against the University of Alabama Board of Trustees after I had been fired at UAB for reporting accurately (on my own time, with my own resources) on the corrupt actions of disgraced federal judge Mark Fuller in the Don Siegelman case.

Acker violated simple procedural law and black-letter, Eleventh-Circuit case law to grant the university summary judgment without allowing any discovery in the case--without even setting a discovery schedule, as required by law.

Given Acker's age, some might explain this ruling as a sign of senility or some form of advancing dementia. But court records show that Acker knows the law requires discovery before summary judgment can be considered, much less granted. Records show that Acker, over and over, has ordered discovery, even in employment cases very much like mine.

So this wasn't an accident, or the result of an impaired judge. This was the result of a judge who is morally and ethically bankrupt, and his own words and actions prove it.

Let's first consider a case styled EEOC v. McPherson Companies, 914 F. Supp. 1234 (2012). It's an intriguing case involving alleged same-sex harassment on the job. In his memorandum opinion on summary judgment, Acker sets the scene as follows:

This Title VII case revolves around repeated churlish, childish, gross, sordid, vulgar, foul, disgusting, profane utterances in the workplace. The question in the case, however, is not how vile and obnoxious this workplace language was. It was vile and obnoxious enough to score nine on a scale of ten. This will become apparent as the story unfolds. The question for the court is rather whether this verbal mayhem morphed from a competition to see who could beat whom in the foul-mouth game into a cause of action under Title VII by an offended employee for same-sex sexual harassment.

How did Acker know the language was "vile and obnoxious enough to score nine on a scale of ten"? The parties conducted discovery, and facts obtained during the process show the language was, indeed, nasty. In fact, in footnote 6 of his opinion, Acker quotes directly from several depositions taken during discovery.

That establishes the obvious--discovery is necessary before a determination on summary judgment, even in an employment case, with William Acker as judge.

Now, let's consider Hunt v. 21st Mortgage Corporation (2013), a debt-collection case where Acker was asked to compel the defendant to turn over certain information in discovery. Acker granted plaintiff Charese Hunt's Motion to Compel, stating:

It is a widely known (and widely quoted) maxim that “the deposition-discovery rules [under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment.” Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). “[E]ither party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession.” Id. Thus, plaintiff’s motion must be granted so long as he meets the low bar set out for him in Rule 26: his request must be for “nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2).

In the context of my case against UAB, I was entitled to "broad and liberal" discovery. Instead, I was denied discovery altogether.

Acker goes on in Hunt to explain why the plaintiff not only must be allowed discovery in general, but why he is due to receive particular items in discovery:

The analysis of this low bar is uncomplicated. Among plaintiff’s claims is that defendant called him using an illegal automatic dialer, and among defendant’s defenses is that, on the contrary, it used manual dialing in all of its communications with plaintiff. Obviously, plaintiff is not required to take defendant’s word for it; it is precisely these types of factual disputes for which discovery exists.

Acker then chastises the defendant for claiming the "evidence is undisputed":

Second, defendant’s claim that “the evidence is undisputed” is one it must save for summary judgment or some other later stage of this litigation. Indeed, the very purpose of the instant motion is to make the evidence disputed. Plaintiff is not required to accept defendant’s claims that all calls were made manually; in short, he is free to argue before a jury, whether rightly or wrongly, that defendant’s assertion is a lie or an error, and that in fact defendant did make “numerous calls by illegal automatic dialers and/or predictive dialers . . . at all hours of the day and night. . . .” Should he choose to do so, he is permitted under the federal discovery rules to obtain information from defendant with which to support his argument.

This all raises some obvious questions: Why didn't discovery exist to address factual disputes in my case against UAB? Why was I not allowed, via discovery, to show that UAB's assertions were lies or errors? Why was I not allowed, via discovery, to obtain information to support my arguments?

The likely answer? Hunt was not facing powerful political defendants. I was, in the form of the Riley Machine, especially then "first son" Rob Riley, and Acker felt duty bound to protect his "conservative" brethren--no matter what the law says.

Finally, let's examine a case styled Huntley v. The Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama (2010). Like my case, this involves employment issues, discrimination, and UAB. The plaintiff, Dr. Horace Huntley, was a long-time history faculty member (now retired) who alleged he was denied tenure for discriminatory reasons.

University attorneys undoubtedly invoked some of the same arguments--qualified and sovereign immunity, etc.--that they used in an effort to avoid discovery in my case. Those arguments didn't work in Huntley because, as shown by Acker's own words in the Hunt case, the plaintiff was entitled to conduct discovery that would counter UAB's arguments.

Dr. Huntley was not successful in denying summary judgment to the university. But he was allowed to conduct discovery. From Acker's memorandum opinion in the case:

Additionally, Dr. Huntley admitted in his deposition that he is not a full-time faculty member: Q: Okay. So you are a part-time faculty member, correct? A: Well, I am – yes, I guess I am, you could say I am a part-time faculty member. (Doc. 35-1, at 26:3-7.)

How could Acker quote from Dr. Huntley's deposition? Because discovery had been conducted, and the deposition was entered into the record. That's the way a case against UAB must be conducted, under the law. But my case was not handled that way at all.

The concept of "equal protection of the laws" obviously means nothing to William Acker. I had to be singled out for a cheat job in court--on top of a cheat job in the workplace--because Acker's right-wing buddies from Riley Inc. were behind my termination at UAB.

No one connected to the Rileys was behind the alleged discrimination against Horace Huntley, so his lawyers were able to conduct discovery, as required by law. Acker wasn't concerned about what discovery might turn up in the Huntley case. But he sure as heck was concerned about what he knew discovery would turn up in my case. So he made sure that no discovery took place.

Is this infuriating for my wife, Carol, and me? Of course it is. With a termination on my employment record--not to mention a bogus incarceration, also driven by Rob Riley--it's been almost impossible for me to find a job. The ability to work, to support ourselves, essentially has been stolen from us--so that makes Acker's blatantly unlawful actions deeply personal.

But the thoughtful reader will realize this goes way beyond Carol and me. The right to "equal protection of the laws" supposedly is guaranteed under the due-process clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. It might be the single most profound provision in the constitution.

But a corrupt judge like William Acker has no respect for the law--or the oath he took to uphold it. This post, based on public records, makes that abundantly clear. If Americans stay silent about judges like Acker--if we allow rogues like him to chip away at our constitutional rights--we eventually will find ourselves living in a country that does not resemble a democracy.

Trump-appointed judge David Stras administered gross cheat job on police-shooting lawsuit, but William Acker's "railroading" in my UAB case was even worse

William M. Acker Jr.

David Stras, the Trump-appointed federal judge who unlawfully forced a finding of immunity for a Kansas City police officer who fatally shot an unarmed black man -- Ryan Stokes -- in the back, is an unmasked crook with a robe. But Stras' opinion in N.S. v. Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners (8th Cir., 2019) reveals that he actually is not as bad as a federal judge with whom I have come face to face in the Northern District of Alabama.

We are talking about William M. Acker Jr. (now deceased), the Reagan appointee who administered a monumental cheat job in my First Amendment/wrongful termination lawsuit against UAB (University of Alabama System Board of Trustees), where I had worked for 20 years. Evidence clearly shows I was targeted because of my reporting on the Don Siegelman case at this blog, but Acker took steps to ensure the case was decided with no facts in the record. (I'm not kidding).

David Stras

The U.S. Supreme Court, apparently anticipating that rogue judges like Acker would trample summary-judgment procedure, came up with a term for such an action; they called it a "railroad job."

Stras clearly conducted a "railroad job" in the Stokes case, so how could Acker be worse than that? Let's revisit  a key section of the N.S. opinion that Stras authored:

Some evidence supports [Officer William] Thompson's account. The police discovered a handgun on the driver's seat of the car, which could mean that Stokes was armed when he entered the parking lot but then tossed the gun into the car. And witnesses who saw Stokes running said that he appeared to be "holding up his pants as he ran," which is arguably consistent with Thompson's perception that Stokes was holding a gun. Finally, Thompson's partner claims to have heard Thompson order Stokes to "get on the ground."

Other evidence supports the family's account. No one besides Thompson observed Stokes with a gun, nor was any gun found on or near his body. The car's owner, who was Stokes's friend, claimed that the gun recovered from the car belonged to him and that it had been there all night. Moreover, some officers did not recall hearing Thompson shout anything during the encounter, and at least one officer thought Stokes was trying to surrender when Thompson shot him.

Notice the repeated references to evidence; that shows that trial-court judge Brian Wimes allowed for discovery before considering summary judgment based on police-immunity claims -- as he was required by law to do. Wimes denied summary judgment for Officer Thompson, but the Stras panel vacated that finding and essentially forced a ruling that found Thompson was immune from lawsuit.

We can give Stras a little credit for not trying to hide in  his opinion that facts had been entered into the record via discovery. What about Acker in my case against UAB? He allowed zero discovery -- meaning the case essentially was decided without facts -- violating U.S. Supreme Court and 11th Circuit precedent. Here is how we described Acker's handiwork in a June 2018 post:

How badly did Acker screw me on the UAB case? I've written several lengthy posts on that subject (see here, here, and here), but it boils down to this. He granted the university summary judgment, without discovery, in clear violation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Eleventh Circuit precedent, as outlined in Snook v. Trust Company of Georgia, 859 F. 2d 865 (11th Cir., 1988). From Snook:

"This court has often noted that summary judgment should not be granted until the party opposing the motion has had an adequate opportunity for discovery. . . . The party opposing a motion for summary judgment has a right to challenge the affidavits and other factual materials submitted in support of the motion by conducting sufficient discovery so as to enable him to determine whether he can furnish opposing affidavits. . . . Generally summary judgment is inappropriate when the party opposing the motion has been unable to obtain responses to his discovery requests."

Law doesn't get much more direct and simple than that. I filed at least three motions to inform the court that discovery had not been conducted, and Acker admitted in open court that he was aware of that, and I was entitled to conduct discovery to counter UAB's motion for summary judgment.

We've reported on at least one of Acker's judicial colleagues in the Northern District of Alabama who knows the law on discovery and summary judgment and has applied it correctly multiple times. We've reported that Acker himself has correctly applied the law in multiple cases. He just didn't do it in my case, and that's probably because he knew political thugs had pressured UAB to unlawfully terminate me, and Acker chose to protect those thugs. Specifically, Acker likely was protecting GOP cretin Rob "Uday" Riley and his associates, who were the driving forces behind my cheat job at UAB. We recently have uncovered evidence that suggests the Alabama State Bar might have been involved, too.

For good measure, we recently reported on Sarah Palin's ongoing defamation lawsuit against The New York Times, where the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in so many words, confirmed that Acker cheated me raw on the UAB matter.

Acker did not just violate 11th Circuit precedent; he also pissed all over the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS). From a case styled Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 US 317 (Supreme Court, 1986):

We think that the position taken by the majority of the Court of Appeals is inconsistent with the standard for summary judgment set forth in Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.[4] Under Rule 56(c), summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to any material fact," since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law" because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof. "[T]h[e] standard [for granting summary judgment] mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) . . . ." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., ante, at 250.

As you can see, there must not only be discovery, but "adequate time" for discovery. In my UAB case, Acker ensured there was no time for discovery. SCOTUS, in Celotex, seemingly was able to look into the future and see that rogue judges like Acker would try to skirt the law:

Respondent commenced this action in September 1980, and petitioner's motion was filed in September 1981. The parties had conducted discovery, and no serious claim can be made that respondent was in any sense "railroaded" by a premature motion for summary judgment. Any potential problem with such premature motions can be adequately dealt with under Rule 56(f),[6] which allows a summary judgment motion to be denied, or the hearing on the motion to be continued, if the nonmoving party has not had an opportunity to make full discovery.

Do I have no choice but to sit back and accept Acker's screw job, which the University of Alabama Office of Counsel facilitated with its silence? Do Mrs. Schnauzer and I have to accept multiple screw jobs we have experienced jointly in other federal cases? Not necessarily, as I wrote in a September 2019 post about the wrongful foreclosure on our home of 25 years in Birmingham:

If this were a case of incompetence in the 11th Circuit, that would be alarming enough. But this involves intentional cheating, which probably rises to the level of fraud on the court. And that, by law, should give us grounds to reopen "The House Case," along with all of the other federal matters -- including our employment cases against UAB and Infinity Insurance -- where we were intentionally cheated due to fraud on the court.

My initial research indicates a ruling grounded in fraud on the court can be attacked as void at any time, with no deadline for seeking justice. The con artists at UAB probably think my employment matter is way in the past, over and done with. They might be wrong about that. 

 

Ryan Stokes and his daughter

 

Federal Judge William M. Acker Jr. Says Up Front That He's Going to Cheat Me--And Then He Does It

Judge William M. Acker Jr. (right)
with Stanford professor Jack Rakove

You have to admire U.S. District Judge William M. Acker Jr.--in a macabre kind of way. From personal experience, I know that judicial corruption is not unusual in the American justice system; in some parts of the country, I would say it's the norm.

But Acker, an 84-year-old Reagan appointee in the Northern District of Alabama, applies an unusual twist to the crooked game: He tells you up front, in open court, that he's going to screw you--and then he does it.

How do I know? He did it to me, in the lawsuit I filed over my unlawful termination at the University of Alabama at Birmingham (UAB). And I have an official court transcript to prove it.

Not content to state publicly that he was going to unlawfully rule against me at every turn, Acker also admitted that he'd had communications with someone connected to the opposing party. That's in the transcript, too.

Don't you just love that kind of brazenness? When you are 84 years old, with a lifetime appointment and pretty much no oversight over what you do, I guess that's how you behave.

A transcript of the hearing in which Acker makes his intentions clear is available at the end of this post. The judge's words are likely to shock any reader with a functioning conscience. But let's compare Acker to some of his brethren on the federal bench--say Mark Fuller, from the Middle District of Alabama, and Henry Wingate, from the Southern District of Mississippi.

If you have followed the story of Bush-era political prosecutions, you will recognize the names of Fuller and Wingate. They presided over the Don Siegelman and Paul Minor cases, respectively. Our research indicates that Fuller and Wingate acted with consistent righteousness in public, while knowingly sending innocent men to federal prison. By comparison, I think I prefer Acker. He makes no pretense about being fair, objective, or obedient to the law. He tells you to your face, "I'm going to screw you over and over, so deal with it and learn to enjoy it." In the "through the looking glass" world of American courts, that kind of brutal honesty is oddly refreshing.

Not that I'm going to bend over and take it. I filed a complaint against Acker with the Judicial Conference of the United States, pursuant to 28 U.S.C., 351-364. That's how I wound up with a copy of the hearing transcript, which I intend to share with the world. Also, the transcript is part of the record in my appeal before the U.S. Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Atlanta.

How did Acker make good on his vow to cheat me? As I reported in a recent post, he granted summary judgment without giving the opposing party (me) an opportunity to conduct discovery. That simply cannot be done--under clear and simple procedural, statutory, and case law. If the law still means anything in the U.S.--and that's a big if--the Eleventh Circuit will have no choice but to overturn on appeal. But Acker's words will remain a glaring example of how badly our judicial train has gone off the tracks.

The hearing in question took place in Acker's court on December 10, 2010. It's clear from the transcript that Acker is going to convert motions to dismiss to motions for summary judgment--and there had been no discovery in the case. And yet, he granted summary judgment on January 28, 2011, without even a discovery meeting having been held between the parties.

Courtroom crookedness doesn't get much more outrageous than that. But it came as no surprise, given Acker's statements in open court on December 10. One issue on that date was a motion to dismiss from the City of Birmingham, which I had named as a party in my complaint. The record shows that the city attached an affidavit to its motion, and the transcript makes clear that Acker did not exclude it. When a defendant attaches "matters outside the pleadings" to a motion to dismiss and the court does not exclude them, the motion must be converted to a motion for summary judgment and handled according to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP)--and that means discovery must be conducted. This process is outlined in Rule 12(d) FRCP, which ends with this sentence: "All parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion." Law doesn't get much more clear cut than that.

I pointed out the requirements of Rule 12(d) to Acker, but he wasn't going to hear it. The give-and-take on this issue can be read in pages 10-15 of the transcript below. But Acker's dark intentions become clear on page 14:

MR. SHULER: Well, I just want to be on record that --

THE COURT: You have your record.

MR. SHULER: -- it has to be converted, and I think we all here know that.

THE COURT: I suppose with all the work you have done on this and other cases that you know what a petition for a writ of mandamus is. Have you run into one of those yet?

MR SHULER: That shouldn't be needed.

THE COURT: That would be the way to get an immediate review of my disagreement with you. You better look that up. . . .

MR. SHULER: Isn't that a waste of judicial resources when everybody here --

THE COURT: You know, I give pro se parties slack because they are due it. You are about halfway between a pro se party and a represented party. You are still pro se, so I have got to cut you some slack, but I don't have to give you free legal advice, some of which I have already given you. So I think I'm stopping there on that for the question of the City of Birmingham. They are going to be out, one way or the other. . . .

So there you have a federal judge admitting that he's not going to follow the law. But Acker does not stop there. Near the end of the hearing, on page 27 in the transcript, he returns to the issue of a writ of mandamus:

THE COURT: . . . But if you file something before I do it, I will read it, and it will be in the file, and the record will be made. But as of now, we are just making the record for today. And don't forget to look up the mandamus rule. Look that up.

To fully grasp what Acker is doing here, you have to understand the purpose of a writ of mandamus. The filing of a petition for such a writ is governed by Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (FRAP). It is a form of appeal while the case still is in the trial court. That's why it is called an "extraordinary writ"; the process is designed to address close questions of law or fact, not to serve as a pinch hitter for a trial judge who is too crooked to rule correctly on simple procedural issues.

The transcript, read in full, shows there was no legitimate reason for Acker to warn me twice that I would need to learn about the mandamus process. But Acker knew two things about mandamus petitions: (1) They are time consuming; and (2) They are expensive, with an appellate docketing fee of $450 every time you file one.

In so many words, Acker was telling me: "I'm going to screw you on every little detail of this case, and you are going to have to spend months of your time and thousands of your dollars just to make the simplest step forward in your case. I will drain you of your resources simply because I can--and no one can stop me."

Why would a federal judge act in such a flagrantly corrupt and vicious fashion toward a party he does not know? Acker provides the answer on page 28 of the transcript, after I ask him how much time I have to file a reply to an opposing party's motion:

THE COURT: I think I'm going to give you until after Christmas so I can wish you a happy Christmas by giving you the time for Christmas. I know that UAB and the people over there are anxious about this, and I want to accommodate them, too, but I think I'm going to eliminate the anxiety for me between now and Christmas by giving (you) at least that much time.

How could Acker know that UAB is anxious about the case? It could only be because someone connected to the university told him--and this is the kind of prejudicial communication that is strictly prohibited by judicial ethics rules.

How about this? Acker references "the anxiety for me" regarding this issue. Was someone pushing so hard about UAB's anxiety that it was causing anxiety for the judge? I see no way to reach any other conclusion.

And that points to any number of federal crimes, including obstruction of justice.

I already can hear apologists in the legal community claiming there are other explanations for Acker's comments. But the truth is this: Acker told me up front that he was going to cheat me--and it was due to unlawful pressure from someone associated with the opposing party. It's right there in black and white.

I've seen a lot of courtroom shenanigans, but even I was shocked that a judge would be so lazy, arrogant, and stupid to make these statements in open court.

UAB Acker Transcript

Even as Mark Fuller steps down, William Acker Jr. proves federal bench in Alabama is a corrupt sewer

William M. Acker Jr.
(From al.com)

The resignation of U.S. Judge Mark Fuller took effect on Saturday (August 1), in the wake of a wife-beating scandal that erupted last summer. Fuller's exit might cause some citizens to think that the federal bench in Alabama suddenly has become pristine, filled with enlightenment and integrity.

Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, it's debatable whether Fuller is the worst federal judge in Alabama. There is a lot of competition for that "honor," but it might have to go to William M. Acker Jr., an 87-year-old Reagan appointee who has the charming habit of telling parties to their faces, in open court, that he is going to cheat them--and then he does it.

During my employment case against the University of Alabama Board of Trustees and a number of individuals at UAB--where I was fired after almost 20 years on the job for reporting accurately on this blog about Judge Fuller's unlawful actions in the Don Siegelman case (see here and here)--Acker cheated me in a variety of ways.

But No. 1 on the list was his denial of discovery--and failure to set a discovery schedule--even after he had converted the university's motions to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. Black-letter law shows that Acker corruptly denied discovery, but his actions in other cases prove that he knows his obligations under the law, but intentionally failed to abide by them in the UAB case.

Why is that? For one, discovery probably would have unearthed a treasure trove of e-mails, text messages, and other communications that would have proven I was the victim of discrimination--and I was fired in violation of my First Amendment rights. Two, my termination clearly was driven by someone connected to the administration of then Governor Bob Riley--probably former "first son" Rob Riley--and we've seen evidence that Acker has a history of protecting Rob Riley against allegations of fraud and other malfeasance. (See here and here.)

It's not as if Acker was dealing with complicated law in my UAB case. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) requires that discovery be conducted before summary judgment is considered. Controlling case law in the Eleventh Circuit--via a case styled Snook v. Trust Company of Georgia, 859 F. 2d 865 (11th Cir., 1988)--makes the same holding. Snook nicely sums up the law as follows:

This court has often noted that summary judgment should not be granted until the party opposing the motion has had an adequate opportunity for discovery. . . . The party opposing a motion for summary judgment has a right to challenge the affidavits and other factual materials submitted in support of the motion by conducting sufficient discovery so as to enable him to determine whether he can furnish opposing affidavits. . . . Generally summary judgment is inappropriate when the party opposing the motion has been unable to obtain responses to his discovery requests.

How blatant were Acker's actions in granting the university summary judgment without allowing discovery? Rule 26(f) FRCP requires the parties to conduct a discovery-scheduling conference, submitting a written report to the court. Under Rule 16(b) FRCP, the trial judge must issue a scheduling order, setting dates when discovery is to begin and end.

Acker admitted in open court that the case was at summary-judgment stage, and there had been no discovery schedule and no discovery. (Anyone can call up PACER or check the file on public computers at the Hugo Black Courthouse in Birmingham and see that no discovery took place.) This is straight from a court transcript, which can be viewed at the end of this post, as Acker addresses university lawyer Lisa Huggins, on pages 15 and 16:

THE COURT: In your case, I'm going to convert it to a motion for summary judgment and put a submission order out, which would require him to controvert anything that you say in your motion for summary judgment that is dispositive in the way of present condition. He is right that there has been no scheduling order, there has been no discovery.

In the same transcript, Acker admits that I had a right to conduct discovery--in fact, the law says the court is required to grant discovery:

I think he has a point, that the alternative motion to dismiss should be converted to a motion for summary judgment, which might occasion some right by him to invoke Rule 56(f)--I don't know whether he is familiar with that or not; I think maybe he is--which would allow him to poke around into your people to some degree before we get to that.

These two exchanges show that Huggins is as corrupt as Acker. She's acting like it's a debatable point that the law requires discovery, when it isn't. Even Acker, at that point in the proceedings, more or less tells her that she's full of feces. But this gives you a sense of how desperate Huggins and university officials were to make sure I was not allowed "to poke around into (their) people."

Acker made statements in open court that indicate he had communications with individuals connected to UAB. Someone must have convinced him, at some point, it was best to violate the law and deny me discovery--probably because depositions and requests for production of documents would have shown that Rob Riley, or someone connected to him, was responsible for my termination.

How serious is this? The evidence points to obstruction of justice, conspiracy, and perhaps enough criminality to justify an investigation under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute. In other words, this gives off a strong whiff of organized crime.

Acker ultimately granted summary judgment to the university, without discovery, and tried to justify it with an order that is shameless and absurd to the point that it would be comical--if it weren't so corrupt. I replied with a Motion to Alter, Amend or Vacate Judgment, citing the exact law that Acker had butchered. (Both documents can be viewed at the end of this post, along with the hearing transcript.) Acker, of course, ignored my efforts to get him to follow the law.

But here is something fascinating: We've examined documents related to other cases Acker has handled, even employment cases similar to mine, and he has consistently ordered and allowed discovery. This provides clear evidence that he knowingly violated the law in my case, and we will spell it out in an upcoming post.


(To be continued)

UAB Acker Transcript by Roger Shuler

UAB-Acker Summary Judgment by Roger Shuler

Acker Motion to Amend by Roger Shuler